THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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RECENT ACTION AND THE DEPOSITED BOOK

IN the March issue (pp. 668-670) we pointed out that for Modernists the difficulties felt with regard to the Deposited Book did not arise out of concessions made to Anglo-Catholics. We recognized that such concessions had been made, but as believers in the comprehensiveness of the Church of England, Modernists accepted them in the hope that they would satisfy the great bulk of the Anglo-Catholic party. The difficulties of Modernists were two-fold.

First, they were concerned with the ability of the episcopate to administer the Deposited Book. The Bishops with their present powers are helpless to enforce liturgical order. Even the Bishop of Birmingham cannot do it. Yet the Bishops are not seeking greater powers in this direction. It is vain to hope that moral suasion, public opinion, a new sense of loyalty and order in the clergy will secure liturgical obedience. And the reason is this: a powerful section of the clergy is convinced on principle that liturgical obedience is due, not to the local episcopate, but to Catholic practice.

Secondly, the episcopate seemed to be seeking a serious increase of power in the matter of the *jus liturgicum*. If the Deposited Book were legalized the Bishops would have the power to make and rescind rules for the conduct of public worship in accordance with the principles and rubrics of the Deposited Book. Such power over public worship the Bishops have not had since the Reformation, and the giving of such

power fills Modernist constitutionalists with alarm. Hence we wrote :—

> 'To give the Episcopate power to frame our liturgical rules is a very serious matter in view of their record. We do not doubt their good faith, but we fear that when once they have the power to make liturgical rules they will yield to pressure, and we shall be plunged into worse confusion than has hitherto been the case. Every diocese will become a law unto itself, and possibly every parish' (p. 669).

Some six months later (September 19th) Dr. Carnegie Simpson, Moderator of the Federal Council of the Evangelical Churches of England, took as the subject of his address from the chair, 'The Free Churches and the New Prayer-Book.' This, we venture to think, is the most statesmanlike treatment of the problems of the Deposited Book which has yet been put forth, and we should advise all members of Parliament to read it. His conclusion with regard to the alternative Communion Service is thus expressed :

> 'The general result I arrive at is that, if we are concerned only with the terms of the book itself, and if these terms are to be faithfully observed, then it cannot in fairness be said that here is such a specific denial of reformed doctrine and evangelical religion as would demand uncompromising opposition.'

Dr. Carnegie Simpson passes on to the problem of the administration of the Deposited Book. On this point he ought to be cited in full :

> 'The real danger in this whole matter for reformed doctrine and for evangelical religion lies less in the new Prayer Book itself—in the terms of its alternative services and in its rubrics—than in how it will be used and to what it will lead. This book undeniably makes very great concessions in directions which a large section and probably the majority of the nation view with apprehension. Is it to be a limit—I do not use the word "final," for, of course, nothing human is final—and will it be accepted and maintained as such? Here is a question which to many people who are most reluctant to be forced into an attitude of hostility to the passing of the book—and I think not a few of us here count ourselves among such—is of real seriousness, and the Anglican authorities will make a mistake if they do not realise that upon solid and adequate assurances being given on this point depends the support to the passing of the book of a not inconsiderable section of opinion—and it may be much larger than I know—in Parliament.
>
> It is significant that this question, which at first was dismissed somewhat cavalierly, is now being treated seriously. In the Church Assembly both Primates dealt with it at length, and the Archbishop of Canterbury made upon it a definite declaration. "You may," he said, "take it from me that the bishops will require obedience to the new rules and will do their utmost to secure it." The Duke of Devonshire and others have, in a letter to the *Times*, quoted the declaration as if it should satisfy everyone and settle the matter. But with the greatest respect for the Archbishop, a public anxiety of this definite

character can hardly be satisfied merely by such a general statement. We have perfect right—indeed, remembering how Anglican bishops' efforts to "require obedience" have often been met, we have reason as well as right—to enquire what this "utmost" will mean. I find little in the way of answer to this in the Archbishop's speech, which first holds out a prospect of some future measure on the reform of ecclesiastical courts—a complicated and contentious subject, any proposals on which have an uncertain future, and, in any case, are not ready to meet the emergency which may arise in a few months—and, secondly, speaks generally of discipline as "remedial rather than penal." Similarly the Archbishop of York spoke of "encouraging a general loyalty to the principles of law and authority"—which is excellent, but obviously stops short just at the difficulty. No one is calling on the bishops for "threats"—least of all threats of civil penalties. But have they any agreed mind and purpose in this business? I have no desire to be unfair—and I shall be glad to be corrected if I am—but I cannot say otherwise than that the impression left on my mind by these two speeches is that, however sincere in the matter the speakers may be (and that, of course, one does not for a moment question), the bishops are simply hoping and praying that disobedience will not be extensive or infectious, and that, as a matter of fact, they have no immediate settled policy about maintaining the new order. If this be the case, I must take leave to say that the Archbishop's declaration is somewhat empty. There is no indication —though here, again, I shall be glad to be corrected if in error—even that the bishops are going to act together as a body, which is obviously the primary and an essential thing; for, if irregularities and illegalities are to be refused in Norwich and resisted in Birmingham, while smiled upon in Truro and winked at in London, the result will be simply discipline *pour rire*.

For such reasons, I am compelled to say—and I say it with regret—that this question has not been sufficiently and satisfactorily answered. . . . The Church is morally bound to be both able and ready to undertake that these safeguards will be maintained as *an integral part of an honourable agreement*. The bishops should not present the book unless they can see that its terms are kept—especially those terms without which they know the nation would not pass it; if they can and will see to this, there need be no difficulty in their giving the nation assurances about it.'

The Moderator summed up as follows:

'The conclusions I have reached are three and may be summed up thus:—

(1) Primarily we are, as Christians and Churchmen, concerned about the welfare of any branch of the Church; and we should, therefore, take no action which would injure the peace and progress of the Church of England—as the summary rejection of the new Prayer Book manifestly would—except on the strongest grounds of faithfulness to truth and duty.

(2) As regards the book itself, while there are things in it of which we, as evangelicals, gravely disapprove, it is not possible with fairness to say that its use would subvert the character of the Church of England, *provided that it is faithfully adhered to as the limit of what is not only permissible but permitted within the Church.*

But (3) this proviso is essential; and, inasmuch as the nation certainly would not sanction this book without the limiting safeguards

explicitly stated therein, it is at once a matter of fair dealing on the part of Church and a matter of duty for members of Parliament to see that substantial and sufficient guarantee is given to the nation that the limits thus safeguarded will be effectively maintained, if and when the book is passed into law.'

In October representative members of the Churchmen's Union and the Anglican Evangelical Group Movement, being seriously alarmed at the insecurity of the position, met and authorized the Presidents and Chairmen of the two bodies to write to the Archbishops and to send a copy of the letter to each of the Diocesan Bishops. As a result of this meeting the following letter was sent:

CHURCH HOUSE,
WESTMINSTER.
October, 1927.

YOUR GRACE,

At a Conference held on Monday, 10th October, between representative members of the Churchmen's Union and the Anglican Evangelical Group Movement, on the subject of the Deposited Book, it was unanimously decided that a letter should be written to the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and that copies should be sent to all the Diocesan Bishops.

The Deposited Book has received a large measure of support from both of our Societies, and we believe that all our members would loyally accept it if it should be passed into law. There is, however, much anxiety among us, as among other members of the Church, as to whether the provisions of the Book—assuming that it is accepted by Parliament—will be strictly administered by the bishops. We venture to remind Your Grace that the support given to the Book by those whom we represent was given because we placed implicit trust in the Bishops, and in their intention to see that the regulations of the Book will be observed.

We believe that any resistance to the passage of the Measure through Parliament would be lessened, and the anxiety of very many Churchmen relieved, if some united assurance could be given by the Bishops that they will use their authority to secure obedience to the regulations laid down in the Book.

One matter in particular we feel to be of great importance—namely, the scope and range of the *jus liturgicum*. We should welcome with great gratitude a definite assurance that the *jus liturgicum* does not include the right of any individual Bishop to sanction practices which are definitely excluded by the Deposited Book.

We beg to assure Your Grace that our sole motive in thus addressing you is our desire to see the regulations made by the Bench of Bishops and approved by the Church Assembly maintained in their integrity.

We remain, etc.,

(Signed) W. R. INGE.
DOUGLAS WHITE.
H. MONTAGUE DALE.
VERNON F. STORR.

The last sentence but one in this letter some would have preferred, in the interests of precision, to have run as follows:

> We should welcome with great gratitude a definite assurance that the *jus liturgicum* to be exercised by the bishops does not include the right of any individual bishop, or even of the united episcopate, to sanction practices which are *not definitely included in the Deposited Book.*

We hope that in Parliament the affirmative answer from the Bench will be given in that form.

To this letter the Primate replied as follows:

LAMBETH PALACE, S.E.
October 29th, 1927.

DEAR CANON STORR,

I am most willing to receive the deputation which you desire to bring to me from those who have some anxiety respecting the observance of what is prescribed in the Revised Prayer Book, should it receive legal sanction. I think it may be well, however, that I should at once write to you upon the matter in question. I did not speak lightly when, on July 6th, I publicly used the words—

> You may take it from me as absolutely certain that the Bishops will require obedience to the new rules and will do their utmost to secure it.

I was sure at the time that I was speaking correctly, but I have now, in conjunction with the Archbishop of York, had an opportunity of meeting, or communicating with, all the Diocesan Bishops of both Provinces, forty-three in number, and I am able to tell you that I have obtained the concurrence of every one of them (except the Bishop of Norwich) in reiterating the announcement I have referred to. It is obvious that the methods by which this clear and definite intention will be fulfilled cannot be specified in detail beforehand; but those whom you represent, and indeed all others who are interested in the matter, may rest assured that what is laid down in the new Book will, if the Measure receives the Royal Assent, be faithfully administered and that the Bishops will act together in the matter.

I am, etc.,
RANDALL CANTUAR.

The Primate's reply produced an important letter from Professor Carnegie Simpson in which he regards the Primate's pledges as 'substantially sufficient.'

LETTER OF DR. CARNEGIE SIMPSON.

WESTMINSTER COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.
November 4th, 1927.

MY DEAR LORD ARCHBISHOP,

It was kind of you—for you must be overburdened with correspondence—to trouble to write to me about your letter to Canon Storr on 'assurances'; and, while I have no wish to say much more on the subject, I cannot but reply.

It was, of course, entirely for yourself to judge as to the most convenient way for you to make your statement; and this requires no kind of explanation to me. I only remark that, to whomsoever your communication be addressed, the question is not one merely of satisfying domestic anxieties among the Evangelical clergy of the Church of England, but is essentially one between the Church and the nation. For this reason I do not feel that I am called on to give a personal opinion about your letter. It is not for me and it is not for the Free Churches, but it is for the nation, to be satisfied on the matter. Since, however, in your most friendly letter to myself, you practically invite me to say whether I regard what has been said as all which can reasonably be asked for, and since I had as much to do as anyone in raising this question of assurances—the importance of which, I am glad to see, the Bishops now recognise—I shall reply frankly to your note and give my opinion for what little it may be worth. I speak only for myself, and commit neither the Free Churches nor anyone in them.

If your letter to Canon Storr had been only a reiteration of your previous statement, I could not for a moment have regarded it as adequate. But I note with satisfaction that it contains at least two new and important things. One is that 'the Bishops will act together.' You are aware that I—and, I think, every one who has taken up this matter—regard this as essential, for reasons I need not describe. It is of real value to have it definitely stated.

The other thing is even more important. You say that 'all' may 'rest assured' that the new Book 'will be faithfully administered.' This is a definite pledge of action, and, as such, is distinctly more than the earlier declaration that the Bishops would 'require' obedience and 'do their utmost to secure it,' which was little more than a sincere, but possibly futile, intention. This pledge, moreover, is given *sans phrase*; and it is not made dependent on the passing of some future—and almost certainly contentious—Act about ecclesiastical Courts. I am confident that one in your position would not have publicly given so distinct and unqualified a pledge that the Book 'will be' administered unless you and the Bishops generally saw the way to make it good; otherwise it would be—to use a word I have already used in this connection—'empty.' Personally, I might desire a little more explicitness, especially as regards the induction of persons of doubtful loyalty to the new Book; but I recognise the difficulties of a complex situation, and that a more defined statement might defeat its own end. In these circumstances, I rely on your Grace's word thus publicly given in the name of all the Bishops (except one); and—speaking for myself alone—I regard your letter to Canon Storr as, if not explicit in every point, substantially sufficient. (My saying this has not been helped by one or two utterances of Bishops since your letter; but I prefer to deal only with your Grace, as the spokesman of the Church.)

To absolve me from any charge of presumption in this letter, I must repeat I write it solely in answer to yours to me. I must also add that, in view of my present position as Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council, I cannot engage in private correspondence in this matter, and must therefore be allowed to make this letter public. It expects no answer from you.

Permit me to close—if I may do so with propriety—by assuring you that very many in the Free Churches, while they may be critical

in this business, are not hostile, and they earnestly pray for the 'peace' of your 'Jerusalem,' and not least that you yourself may be upheld amid many and very heavy responsibilities. And believe me to be, with much regard and respect, most truly,

P. CARNEGIE SIMPSON.

This letter has been followed by two critical evaluations of the Primate's pledges which are not the less valuable because somewhat disconcerting. The first, from Dr. Pollock, was published in the *Sunday Times* of Nov. 6th :

SIR,

Your arresting and important article last spring about the inconclusive character of the correspondence between the Archbishop of Canterbury and Sir W. Joynson-Hicks has not been forgotten; and this makes the *Sunday Times* the right place for me, by your goodness, to explain (if explanation be required) my position in regard to the more recent letter of the Archbishop addressed to Canon Storr, in which he follows up what he previously wrote. Plainly, it would have been inconsistent with my attitude of complete detachment from any responsibility for the new Prayer Book if I had momentarily stepped back into the discussions of the Bishops in regard to this one topic of 'enforcement.' I could not, without inconsistency and vacillation (of which I here know nothing), have isolated this single point whether for agreement or disagreement. I entirely withdrew from the counsels of the Bishops last January. I am driven to oppose the Book as a whole, for its excellent and its alarming parts cannot be separated when it comes before Parliament.

I do not, of course, suggest that at this stage the Archbishop might have written more convincingly; he has said all that he could so far as it goes. Nothing but directions, etc., *inside the Book* could carry full constitutional and certain authority. This consideration draws attention to His Grace's words :—

> 'It is obvious that the methods by which this clear and definite intention will be fulfilled cannot be specified in detail beforehand.'

The 'methods' and the 'detail' matter much; yet, being no part of the Book, they will obviously be open to various handling. For example : was an eminent cleric right or wrong who suggested to me almost in so many words that, though we should now have a united policy in the Church, the clergy who *already* go outside the provisions of the new Book in regard to the Blessed Sacrament (some of whom have expressed their intention to continue to do so) might be treated differently from other clergy?

As to the permanency and weight of these decisions of Bishops, which are no part of the Book as enacted by Parliament, allow me to make three remarks :—

(1) As I have explained, for sound or weak reasons, I have not identified myself with this letter. What I have done any other Bishop now or in the future can, on grounds sufficient in his own eyes, also do.

(2) Bishop Knox has written :—

> The Bishops' meeting is an entirely unofficial body. No Bishop need attend it unless he choose to do so. No Bishop is bound by its resolutions. Recent Church history is strewn with the wrecks of ineffective decisions of the Bishops' meetings.

(3) I can bear him out. I, too, have witnessed apparent agreement reached by Bishops subsequently breaking up. What guarantee is there that, human nature and clerical nature and episcopal nature being what they are, this will not happen again? A newly-appointed Bishop can, and, I know it, does, say, 'Oh, but this or that was decided before I was a Bishop; it does not express my view; how does it bind me?'

Believe me, sir, that any policy or rules that are to be at all secure and to hold together the existing Bishops and their successors must be found within the covers of the new Book. This affords another reason for rejecting, as they now stand, this unalterable volume and the unalterable measure authorising it. Such rejection would also afford an opportunity, very welcome to many, of substituting a 'revision, revised' along lines of compromise to which I think you referred in a recent issue.

The Palace, Norwich. B. NORWIC.

The second, from Sir William Joynson-Hicks, is contained in a memorandum addressed to the Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament. In this memorandum the Home Secretary agrees with Dr. Pollock as to the inadequate character of the Primate's pledges. He maintains that while the Deposited Book and the measure legalizing it confer extensive powers upon the episcopate for the regulation of public worship, it exacts no security for their proper use. Vague assurances have been offered, but these only bind those who give them, and do not bind their successors. Moreover, the regulations to be made by the episcopate, although only such as are required or authorized under any rubric of the Deposited Book, yet make the episcopate, subject to this limitation, the sole judges of the regulations put forth by them, and such regulations have the force of an Act of Parliament. Furthermore, it is added: 'There can be no finality, for they are to be made or rescinded at discretion.'

Sir William here touches the point about which Modernists have been most sensitive—the modification of the present constitutional episcopacy in the direction of absolutist episcopacy. Freedom and order are best preserved by a written law which those who administer have no power of themselves to make or unmake, and which in its interpretation admits of a right of appeal by the governed to some independent tribunal. We should certainly desire to see this right safeguarded, especially as the Church is in for a long period of agitation by Anglo-Catholics, to be promoted to alter the mode of appointing the

bishops. This agitation may easily end in our bishops becoming the nominees of the highly-organized and indefatigable Anglo-Catholic party. In that case the episcopal regulations for public worship would render the Reformed liturgical ideal of the Church of England a dead letter. But quite apart from this future contingency, there are the problems of the present. If the Deposited Book is legalized, can the bishops administer it? Dr. Headlam is quite convinced that they can, and has written to the *Times* to say: 'The new Prayer-book can be administered and will be obeyed.' This declaration would be more comforting if it came from the Metropolis than from peaceful, quiet Gloucester. Dr. Henson has somewhat weakened the force of Dr. Headlam's brave declaration by writing to 'a Peer perplexed': 'The Bishops must not be bustled.' The bishops cannot justly complain of being bustled. They have taken twenty-one years over Prayer-book revision. Should they require another twenty-one years to restore order in the Church, the whole of the present episcopate will be where the wicked cease from troubling before order is restored; and their successors will claim that what their predecessors failed to accomplish, it is unjust to expect them to achieve.

Fr. Francis Woodlock, S.J., who is not altogether an uninterested spectator, writes in his recently issued booklet, *The Reformation and the Blessed Eucharist*,[1]:

> 'Over 140 London Churches had the Sacrament thus reserved before the Revised Book was presented to the Convocations. In many of these Churches it had been the object of public devotions similar to Benediction Service. Such 'devotions' *must now cease;* so declare the New Book and the Bishops. But there is not much likelihood of this law being generally observed by extreme Anglo-Catholics, who will, I imagine, carry on as before' (pp. 76—77).

What is the reasonable conclusion from this survey? It is that if the Deposited Book is authorized by the proposed Measure we shall be entirely in the hands of the bishops. Whether, in view of their record, it is an act of reasonable faith or of fatuous credulity to trust them is not for practical men to consider. We shall have no alternative. No Church in Christendom has taken such an exalted view of episcopacy as the English Church. If the English episcopate fails in its coming trial, the knell of the Church of England will have struck.

[1] Sheed and Ward, Paternoster Row, E.C. 4, 1/- net.

DR. BARNES AND HIS CRITICS

IT is not a matter of surprise that the growing irritation of the extreme Anglo-Catholics with the Bishop of Birmingham's firm administrative methods and his trenchant criticism of sacramental superstitions should have culminated in a disorderly scene in St. Paul's Cathedral when the Bishop was denounced as a profane heretic. The hubricity of the editorials of the *Church Times* over-stimulates the more neurotic of its readers. Persistent and many-sided misrepresentations cannot fail to distort for many the character and conduct of one who has had to occupy an administrative post of peculiar difficulty. Canon Bullock-Webster's action seems to us far more excusable than that Dr. Selwyn in the scholarly pages of *Theology* should assail the Bishop in such terms as these:

> 'Few of our readers, we imagine, will have felt other than shame and dismay as they have read the successive utterances of Dr. Barnes.
>
> . . . So long as Dr. Barnes was without rebuke from higher authority, the Church and its episcopate seemed committed to a policy of tolerance which to many of us appeared to differ little from apostacy.
>
> . . . Scornful and cruel, the Bishop has shown himself not a shepherd but a wolf; and men cannot but feel that they will be betraying Christ if they yield to his rule.' (Vol. XV, No. 89, pp. 276*f*.)

In view of such attacks the best defence is to publish the Bishop of Birmingham's actual words and to let our readers judge.[1]

After the incident in St. Paul's the Bishop addressed an Open Letter to the Primate; to this the Primate replied; and the Bishop cleared the issues by a second Open Letter. These letters are published here:

> My Lord Archbishop,
>
> Certain reflections upon an interruption to the service in St. Paul's Cathedral, when I was preaching there last Sunday, may well take the form of an open letter to yourself, as the incident has a significance which your Grace will not minimize.
>
> A dozen years ago I found myself Master of the Temple, and as such minister of that congregation which, with its legal nucleus, is probably the most intellectual in England.
>
> Soon I discovered that while ancient pieties and the stress of war brought men and women to worship in the Temple Church, there were

[1] The Bishop's Westminster Abbey sermon and St. Martin's address are published in this number of the *Modern Churchman*.

relatively few among them for whom Christian dogma had any vitality. Traditional formulae had withered in the mental environment created by modern knowledge, and had been replaced by a wistful agnosticism.

I thereupon began to preach sermons in which I set forth clearly my own beliefs and doubts. I found immediate response and shrewd criticism. I was thereby encouraged to read widely. I learned the value of plain speech.

If honest conviction is expressed in simple language and maintained by reasoned argument, the strength of its appeal is great. I still try thus to study and to teach. I neither have, nor seek to have, skill in controversy.

So, while I argue forcibly against untrue doctrines, I never criticize individuals who hold them. Most of my teaching is positive and unreported. One cause of weakness of the Church has arisen from the apparent determination of religious teachers to ignore scientific discovery.

Though all competent biologists accept man's evolution from an ape-like stock, the theological consequences of such belief are still seldom stated. I set myself years ago to expound these consequences, and to show why they did not seem to me to upset the main Christian position.

On this topic I have preached, or spoken, scores of times. A sermon which I preached when the British Association met at Cardiff in 1920 travelled round the world, and brought me over a thousand letters.

I have always admitted that neither evolution nor Copernican astronomy were accepted at the Reformation when our Prayer Book and Articles received substantially their present form, but the whole theological scheme reared by Augustine on 'The Fall' can be rejected without injury to the main fabric of Christian belief.

The second main reason for the present alienation of educated men and women from the Church of England is the growth of erroneous sacramental doctrines. During and since the war the degeneration of sacramental belief has proceeded apace, until to-day late mediaeval theories rejected in the bluntest language at the Reformation are openly taught in Anglican churches.

Hitherto, those who hold such theories have merely asked for tolerance within our communion, but at St. Paul's last Sunday I was denounced for condemning exactly those sacramental errors which our Church repudiates.

A new era has apparently opened when a Bishop of the Church of England who upholds its traditional sacramental doctrine is for that reason to be exposed to public attack by those who ignore what is seemly in public worship.

The immediate cause of the outburst appears to be a statement which I now reaffirm: that the doctrine of Transubstantiation is untrue. As every student of comparative religion knows, it has affinities with the magico-religious beliefs of a lower cultural level than that of our present civilization.

I have not hesitated to describe the belief as a superstition, inasmuch as one of our present Articles says that it 'overthroweth the nature of a Sacrament, and hath given occasion to many superstitions.'

I have pointed out the close parallel between the arguments by which ineffective attempts are made to defend alike Transubstantia-

tion and idolatry, and I need not remind your Grace that the final rubric of our present Communion Service uses the word 'idolatry.'

We have no right to assume the existence of spiritual properties in an inanimate object unless they can be spiritually discerned; yet there is no man living who possesses the spiritual discernment by which to discriminate between consecrated and unconsecrated bread.

For the last twenty years I have constantly urged in my teaching that our Church formally denies that any change occurs in the bread and wine at consecration.

According to mediaeval theory matter possesses 'accidents' and 'substance.' The 'accidents' are physical properties which we can perceive by the senses, and no one has ever suggested that these are changed at consecration. If any change at all takes place it must be in the 'substance,' but such change in the 'substance' the Church of England declares to be 'repugnant to the plain words of Scripture.'

I grieve at the suggestion that we who value traditional Anglican doctrine thereby deprecate the sacraments.

In reply, I spoke as follows in the Birmingham address which called forth the recent protest: 'We understand sacramental grace in its fullness and power, not by foolishly speaking of bread as if it were God Himself, but when the heavens open for us and for a moment we see the whole creation as the expression of God's purpose and He Himself in wisdom, might, and love, the goal to Whom our striving leads and the end where man's restless spirit has peace.'

In this letter I have endeavoured to set before your Grace as clearly and decisively as I can the teaching against which objection has been taken. It is not false and heretical. No protest must hinder me as a Bishop, and, indeed, as a Christian, from upholding religious truth. No man shall drive me to Tennessee or to Rome.

It is vital to the welfare of English religion that the officers of the national Church should fear neither to welcome new knowledge nor to maintain all that is sound in ancient doctrine.

The standard of education is slowly rising. I invite your Grace to consider what steps can be taken to help those of us who are giving of our best to fit the Church to be in the future the spiritual guide of an educated nation.

This letter, of course, calls for no public reply.

I have the honour to be,

Your Grace's obedient servant,

E. W. Birmingham.

My dear Bishop of Birmingham,

I have read with great care your Open Letter to myself, published two days ago. You will not doubt my condemnation of the unseemly incident in St. Paul's Cathedral which you have taken as an occasion for writing to me. Not by action of that sort can the cause of truth be reasonably set forward.

But, speaking generally, I think that you mistake what it is that has evoked from cultured men, with scientific and philosophical as well as theological knowledge, vehement reprobation of some of your recent utterances. With regard to these, I have probably received, publicly and privately, more communications than anyone except yourself.

I do not attach great weight to the denunciations of what I have heard described as 'the gorilla sermons.' I believe that you over-rate the adherence of thoughtful people to Creation theories of fifty to a hundred years ago, and I scarcely think that among those who listen to you there are a great number who hold the opinions which you satirize. For myself at least, I can say that your position on the biological question in outline, and so far as I understand it, is one with which I personally have been familiar for more than fifty years. Believe me, this teaching, however admirable, is to most of us not novel, and I do not think that those who hear you on the subject with interest and advantage would recognize themselves as 'wistful agnostics.' As far as I can judge, it is not on what you have said with regard to that branch of science or theology that the attention of thoughtful men has been centred. It is too familiar. You may, I am certain, dismiss, my dear Bishop, the fear that anyone in England desires to lead or drive you either to Rome or to Tennessee.

The words which give rise to the sort of indignation I refer to are the words which you use in dealing with the Sacrament of Holy Communion. It is on what you have said respecting Sacramental Doctrine that intelligent and large-minded Churchmen, lay as well as clerical, have approached me day by day.

I have an intense dislike to the use of the daily Press for the discussion of such subjects. I purposely refrain from trying in such a letter as this to discuss the profound and life-giving doctrines involved, but of course I am more than ready to go into the matter with yourself at any time should you so desire. But your Open Letter forces me, however reluctantly, to some reply. Formally and publicly you invite me 'to consider what steps can be taken to help those of us who are giving of our best to fit the Church to be in the future the spiritual guide of an educated nation.' That is a large and difficult matter needing time and care, but I can at once say that in my judgment one of the first steps is to secure the scrupulous use of the most careful language possible in dealing with doctrinal matters of deep solemnity which affect the devotional thoughts and prayers of Christian people. That duty, obligatory upon every Christian teacher, is peculiarly incumbent upon us Bishops, who have to weigh the effect of our words upon all sections of the great body to whom we desire to be Fathers in God. We promised on our Consecration Day 'to be ready with all faithful diligence to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrine contrary to God's word,' and while, as you have truly said, 'smooth unctuous platitudes' are not enough, yet in all the range of our duties there is none which calls more clearly for the exercise of tender and fatherly carefulness in word and act.

Now in your Open Letter to myself you assure me that what you have been lately doing, and have been denounced for doing, is as 'a Bishop of the Church of England' to 'uphold its traditional sacramental doctrine' and to 'affirm'—as we all affirm— that 'the doctrine of Transubstantiation is untrue.' Do not suppose me to be unmindful of our duty to stem whatever trend there is that way. The duty is clear. But when I turn to the Birmingham sermon which aroused criticism I find that the statement you make to me fails to describe fairly what you said there. In your natural and legitimate desire to denounce the few in the Church of England who hold or teach the doctrine of Transubstantiation you were led to speak of the Sacrament

of Holy Communion in a way which—quite reasonably as I think—gives real offence to the great body of devout Churchmen and Churchwomen, and not least to those who are able to give scholarly as well as reverent consideration to the sacramental doctrines which our Church upholds.

I do not believe that you had any intention of wounding the souls of honest and faithful English Churchmen, but you ignore or belittle the position and teaching of those within our Church who stand in the tradition of such English Bishops as Andrewes, or Ken, or Wilson, or, in our own day, Edward King or Charles Gore. Nay more. Your words seem to me capable of being so interpreted as to include in reprobation or almost in contempt the position of the great mass of Churchmen who would associate themselves with the teaching of such leaders as, say, my own great masters, Bishop Lightfoot or Bishop Westcott, or who have caught the devotional spirit of the hymns of Charles Wesley.

I prefer to think that if you re-read your Birmingham sermon in the light of such criticism as your letter has drawn from me, you will feel that what I have said is not unfair.

You say in your letter that your teaching is 'positive and unreported.' Your Birmingham sermon, however, contains some such positive teaching. And, as I read your words about the grace of our Saviour's presence through the whole act of worship, they leave me wondering whether, if you were to consider what are their implications, you would not find further cause to modify the width and scope of your negative and destructive statements.

We have all been impressed in these recent months by the self-restraint and the considerateness for others shown by many of the clergy and laity who have been foremost in our Prayer Book discussions. To the larger tasks which lie beyond these discussions we Bishops must lead the way. But we shall lead only if we walk 'with all lowliness and meekness, with long-suffering . . . giving diligence to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.'

I am, yours very truly,

RANDALL CANTUAR.

MY LORD ARCHBISHOP,

I would publicly thank your Grace for you letter in answer to my own. By tacit acknowledgment of the truth of the biological doctrine of evolution, your Grace removes from Christian ministers of our Church any qualms in proclaiming it.

Of course, in my gorilla sermons, as you smilingly label them, I have sought to emphasize not so much the doctrine itself as the readjustments of traditional Christian dogma consequent upon its acceptance. Differences of opinion have arisen as to the legitimacy of such action. After your Grace's statement such differences are less likely to occur.

I take this opportunity to urge that in a greater freedom to remodel Christian theology on such a basis, we must preserve rather than disparage the many-sided excellence of the Old Testament. The sombre insight of the *Wisdom* literature, the inspired internationalism of the *Book of Jonah*, the spiritual confidence of the *Psalms* and, above all, the ethical monotheism of the great Hebrew prophets are supremely

important in our religious heritage. Because we abandon Jewish cosmogony we must not forget that to understand Christ aright we need to know the spiritual development of his race.

In regard to the sacramental issue, I note that your Grace repudiates the doctrine of Transubstantiation. I have also, with satisfaction, failed to find any similar repudiation of my own sacramental teaching.

Naturally I am sorry that your Grace should have to say that I have given real offence to some members of our Church. Such offence as I have given may, to some, be aggravated by the knowledge that all my controversial sermons have been most carefully prepared. With grave anxiety I have weighed words and phrases, sought due balance, and tried to advocate truth without giving needless pain.

I might plead that some pain is inevitable. Truth pierces like a sword: it hurts at times. I need not suggest to your Grace that our Lord may have had this fact in mind when He said, 'I come not to send peace, but a sword.'

About 1,100 relevant letters have reached me during the past fortnight. Less than forty have been critical or abusive. In these the only serious contention is that any experimental test of sacramental dogmas must be inadequate. Here I cannot agree, and would endeavour to make my reason clearer than it seems to appear.

Mediaeval method, which still too largely survives in theology, consists in deducing dogma from the interpretations which particular texts of the Bible have in the past received from a string of scholars or saints. The modern man, influenced by the scientific method of our era, at once seeks to test by experiment any statement which he is asked to accept. This attitude of mind has become common-place in physics and biology and is being rapidly extended to psychology.

Now the dogma of Transubstantiation only differs from that of an objective real presence in the consecrated elements in that the former rests on a now discarded philosophy of matter, while the latter has no philosophical basis at all.

Both dogmas belong to a domain of religious psychology in which experimental tests can be made. It is surely fair (even if not desirable) to suggest that such tests could be reverently carried out in a suitable place. Moreover, since these tests will show that no man by his spiritual capacity can distinguish consecrated from unconsecrated bread, we can assume that the consecration of material objects causes no spiritual change in them.

In short, spiritual grace is given not to the elements which are its vehicles in the Sacrament of Holy Communion, but to the worshipper who takes, eats and drinks as he comes with faith and prayer and love to Christ.

Your Grace reminds me of Bishop Lightfoot, and I would submit that my sacramental teaching does not conflict with his nor with that of his friend and my master, Dr. Hort.

I venture simply to restate it:

(*a*) The real presence of Christ can be with His followers in public worship—He is present wherever two or three are gathered in His name.

(*b*) A special solemnity attaches to the celebration of the Lord's Supper inasmuch as for most Christians the sense of Christ's

presence is then strengthened. For such it is a sacrament—the fellowship meal, the communion with each other and the Lord.

(*c*) There is no 'objective' real presence of Christ attached to the bread and wine used in Holy Communion.

Your Grace will not inquire why I thus insist on what I maintain to be alike the true and the traditional sacramental doctrine of the Church.

All our serious administrative difficulties as bishops are due to erroneous sacramental beliefs—from the beliefs that a consecrated wafer is really (as I recently heard a poor woman say) 'Christ my Saviour.' Most of the irregularities which have crept into our churches of recent years will naturally follow.

Only by continuance of clear teaching can we reach that unity of the spirit in the bond of peace which your Grace so beautifully commends. To that end I cannot personally regret discussion of such high matters, even in the public Press.

Surely there can be among those tasks to which you bid us as bishops to turn none larger than to bring the great truths of religion to the mass of men and women now indifferent to all forms of Christian belief. It is our duty to show them the beauty and power of a reasonable faith. We shall never profane the sanctities of our Church if we honestly try by any method open to us to get men to worship Christ in spirit and in truth.

I have the honour to be,
Your Grace's obedient servant,
E. W. Birmingham.

There is no doubt that the utterances of Dr. Barnes have been provocative both of thought and of conflict. There is very little clear-cut teaching, except it be the exposition of generally accepted truth, which is not of this kind. The situation in the Church to-day demands such teaching. The Church in this country, owing to intellectual obscurantism and timidity combined with acquiescence in the growth of superstition and sacerdotalism, is in a parlous condition — a condition in which it ought certainly not to be, for probably there has never been more *diffused* Christianity and a greater readiness to respond to 'the real Christian thing' among English people than there is to-day. We need lucid, incisive, provocative teaching, if we are to win and hold our younger people. Of course we do not need this kind alone and all the time. It is judicious to vary the length of the bowling. But the point is this, that there is need, and particular need, for this teaching now, and especially in the Birmingham Diocese. The Primate seems hardly to be aware of what is going on (not in a few, but in several thousand parishes), and the tremendous difficulties with which anyone in

authority is faced who would try to check this highly organized, many-sided pro-Roman propaganda. A large, silent, indifferent and disgruntled body of laity has ceased to hope for improvement from the Church authorities. If anything can stir such malcontents to hope and interest, it is such teaching as Dr. Barnes is giving. His message in its scope and note is more for those without than for those within the Church, but who certainly would be within if large sections of the rank and file of its clergy had moved upward rather than downward intellectually during the last thirty years.

What Dr. Barnes is attacking is not the *sancta simplicitas* of the uneducated laity, but the superstitious teaching of a highly organized and powerful body of the clergy, whom Canon Simpson of St. Paul's rightly described as those

> 'who, so long as they deny the set terms in which the theology of Trent defines Transubstantiation, reduce the denial to an otiose rejection of a false philosophy by asserting a doctrine from which the same practical consequences may be deduced.'[2]

Modernists have no desire to beat the Protestant drum: sacramental controversy is the last kind of controversy in which we wish to indulge; but in view of the situation a few words of plain speaking may be permitted. The following letter by an old-fashioned High Church clergyman in the Birmingham diocese speaks for the situation in many other parishes besides:

> Sir,
>
> Each generation has to endure the clamour of the unlettered or prejudiced when a Columbus sets out on a journey or a Galileo gives to the world the fruits of his labours.
>
> Dr. Barnes will need no defence among men of thought, and he may be relied upon to be unmoved either by brawling or invective. But Dr. Gore's letter in *The Times* of October 20th calls for emphatic protest. In that letter Dr. Gore says, with regard to the 'Mass of Reparation,' that he supposes only that at a celebration of the Holy Communion according to the order of the Prayer Book the congregation was requested to give a certain direction to their prayers. That remark emphasizes the difference between Dr. Barnes and Dr. Gore. Dr. Barnes knows what is going on in his diocese and in the Church of England to-day. Dr. Gore does not know what his Anglo-Catholic friends are practising and preaching. He only supposes. May I enlighten him, from personal experience in his old diocese?
>
> This was one of the Anglo-Catholic parishes which joined together last year in rebellion against the Bishop of Birmingham. When I came here in January last I found in use upon the altar, not the Prayer Book of the Church of England, as Dr. Gore might suppose, but a Missal containing the 'Canon of the Mass.' Copies of this illegal

[2] *The Thing Signified.* Marshall, Simpkin & Co. 2nd ed. (1908), p. 21.

service had been specially printed and issued for the use of the congregation. Here are some extracts from the people's manual.

'The priest now offers to God bread and wine which are to be changed into the body and blood of our Saviour.'

'The Canon of the Mass in which the bread and wine are changed into the Body and Blood of Christ and offered to God the Father.'

'The Priest now takes the Ciborium from the Tabernacle and as the Communicants go to the Altar Rail he says, "Behold the Lamb of God," etc.'

As a natural sequel to such teaching, it did not appear strange when the Sacramental element was reserved in a Tabernacle in an enclosed chapel, and a peep-hole cut in the door to enable people to see where God was.

Is this the type of Eucharistic doctrine that Dr. Gore thinks is 'plainly covered by the Anglican Tradition'?

A further question rises to the mind. Does Bishop Gore remember what Canon Gore wrote in *The Body of Christ* in 1901?

There are those who dislike the Bishop of Birmingham's use of the word Idolatry. There are those of us who think, and thank God, that Dr. Barnes knows very well what he is talking about and has the courage to speak when he sees that the occasion requires it.

Yours, etc.,

R. H. McCall,
Vicar of St. Anne's.

Duddeston, Birmingham.

The Primate in his letter to Bishop Barnes seems to minimize unduly the need for the Bishop's incisive and provocative utterances, and to stress unduly the pain which the Bishop's utterances have given. There are many devout communicants of the Anglo-Catholic school who are not in the least offended by the Bishop's actual utterances—of course we rule out the wild misrepresentations of them. The following letter in the *Birmingham Post* deserves attention in this connection:

Sir,

As the officiating clergyman in Birmingham Cathedral last Sunday evening, I wish to dissociate myself entirely from the opinions expressed by the preacher, Canon Lloyd, Vicar of St. Augustine's, Edgbaston.

To be unable, as Canon Lloyd confesses himself to be, to see a gospel in the doctrine of evolution is a grave limitation in a Christian teacher to-day; it is a symptomatic confession of incapacity to Christianise the spirit of the age. The Primate, in his open letter, points out that the doctrine of evolution has been accepted by Christian teachers for the past fifty years. The point is that the acceptance has been so silent that thousands to-day are unaware of it. It is to the honour of Dr. Barnes to have confessed his acceptance undisguised by evasive phraseology; to have taught that the implications are destructive of certain traditional beliefs; and to have insisted with equal

vigour that essential Christianity remains unaffected, and that the purpose of evolution is revealed in the rational, moral and spiritual development of humanity.

Canon Lloyd expatiates on the supposed shaken faith and weakened hands of multitudes of simple folk. What has become of the virility of a faith which is not ashamed to make capital through protesting in public that its feelings have been wounded? I have read and re-read the Bishop's sermon on Sacramentalism delivered in St. Martin's. As a student of the mystics, and a daily communicant whenever possible for over ten years, I wish to state that I find nothing in the sermon outrageous to my thoughts and feelings. It appears to me one of the most beautiful and illuminating of the Bishop's utterances which I have read. One can only suppose that the outcry it has evoked in as far as it is not due to garbled reports, is the outcome of irrational prejudice and a misconception of the relation of Christianity to other religions.

R. D. RICHARDSON.

Birmingham Cathedral.
October 26th.

The Primate seems to claim that all Eucharistic doctrine which just comes short of asserting Transubstantiation is permissible in the English Church. As Modernists we are altogether on the side of such comprehensiveness, but whilst all this range of doctrine is permitted, it surely does not mean that criticism by Church teachers of much doctrine which has found shelter, or even honourable entertainment, within the Church of England, is not both needful and desirable. By this means theological development is stimulated and error dissipated. A comprehensive church like the Church of England must, in contrast to the Church of Rome, not only permit but even encourage criticism, and those who are criticized even harshly ought to be sportsmen enough to meet their opponents, not on the ground of whether their opponents are rude, but whether they are right. There is a great deal of eucharistic teaching to-day — largely responsible for the clamour for the Roman *cultus*—which is being given by notable teachers like Bishop Gore and which ought to be subjected to drastic criticism. Bishop Gore with some three thousand Anglican clergymen in June, 1924, presented a Declaration of Faith to the Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria, which contained the following statements :

'That the signatories affirm that they hold it to be the genuine doctrine of the Anglican Church that they have received Apostolic Orders through their Bishops *with the purpose that we should offer the unbloody Sacrifice of the Eucharist for both the living and the departed. We hold that by consecration the bread and wine are*

changed and become the true Body and Blood of Christ, and we hold that Christ, thus present, is to be adored.' [3]

Of this teaching Fr. Woodlock, S.J., asserts that it 'does represent the Pre-Reformation belief in England. It also represents the belief of the Catholic Church to-day. But to call it the historic witness of the Anglican Communion during the last 375 years, or to say that it is the expression of the official Anglican faith to-day, is to state what simply is not a fact.'

When Dr. Gore's book *The Body of Christ* was published, it seemed to some that he was trying to stand on a very slippery slope. His signature appended to this Declaration demonstrates the not unnatural result of such endeavours. Unfortunately he has also brought down thousands with him. Such a doctrine of the Eucharist is neither scriptural, nor Anglican, nor credible. It misrepresents the Divine Nature; it misrepresents the Atonement wrought by Christ; it misrepresents the Eucharist. When Bishop Barnes opposes it—for it is this, we believe, rather than the technical theory of Transubstantiation which he is opposing—he deserves whole-hearted support from his fellow-Churchmen, and not least from the Church authorities. There may or may not be in our present situation better ways of doing it than the Bishop has chosen; the future alone can show that; but what the Bishop has attempted ought to be done. It was this conviction which led the Council of the Churchmen's Union (with but one dissentient) to offer the Bishop their whole-hearted support in the following letter:

The Churchmen's Union,
Church House,
Westminster, S.W.1.
4th November, 1927.

My Lord Bishop,

The Council of the Churchmen's Union desire to express their sympathy with your Lordship on the constant attacks to which you have been subjected.

The greater part of the agitation is so obviously factitious and ill-informed that we do not suppose that you have allowed it to trouble you. But since some Churchmen in exalted positions have publicly associated themselves with censures upon your utterances, we wish to assure you that we support whole-heartedly the principles for which you are contending.

(1) You are blamed for preaching on evolution to general congregations. Now it is true that the accepted teaching of science on this

[3] These words are cited from Fr. Woodlock's *The Reformation and the Eucharist*, p. 42. The words in italics are the actual words of the signatories.

subject has long been familiar to educated people, who find no difficulty in reconciling it with the Christian faith. But the acceptance of evolution as a biological theory is often unaccompanied by any attempt to follow up the consequences of the theory in their bearing on traditional theological statements, and we believe that in making this attempt you are doing good service which is greatly needed at the present time.

(2) You are blamed by many for having used language about the Holy Communion which has wounded the feelings of many loyal Churchmen. We are convinced, after carefully reading the incriminated documents, that your object was not (as has been absurdly alleged) to deny the sacramental principle, but to reaffirm certain doctrines clearly laid down in the formularies of the Church, *viz.* that the Body of Christ in the Sacrament is given, taken and eaten only after a heavenly and spiritual manner, and that the theory of Transubstantiation overthrows the nature of a Sacrament, and has given occasion to many superstitions.

We further express our conviction that your downright rejection of the theory of Transubstantiation is in accordance with the promise made by all Bishops to drive away strange doctrines, and is eminently timely, inasmuch as a doctrine indistinguishable from Transubstantiation is explicitly taught in hundreds of churches both from the pulpit and by the language of ceremony and symbol.

We regard it as something of a scandal that you should receive no support from the spokesmen of the Bench in condemning this heresy, which, as openly taught by influential Anglican clergymen, is an offence to a vast body of loyal Churchmen; and that their censures should have been mainly confined to the manner and matter of your strictures upon doctrines which they have solemnly pledged themselves to banish, and 'both privately and openly to encourage others to the same.'

Assuring you, my Lord Bishop, of our admiration for your courage and of our unabated confidence,

We remain,

Yours very truly,

W. R. Inge (*President*).

Douglas White (*Chairman*).

The Christian World and a French Protestant newspaper hailed Dr. Barnes as a new Luther (*un nouveau Luther*). The Bishop would smile at such a claim. The words of an Oxford Greats' Tutor please us better:

> 'When I think of the Bishop of Birmingham there comes into my mind a remark which Aristotle makes concerning Anaxagoras: οἷον νήφιον ἐφάνη παρ' εἰκῇ λέγοντας, "like a sober man among men talking at random."'

The Primate's letter rebuking Dr. Barnes is no doubt intended to be a plea for tolerant comprehensiveness in the English Church. Many will read it as such. We believe that it is more correctly described by Mr. G. B. Shaw as 'a heartfelt plea for ambiguity.'

MODERNISTS AND THE MASS

THE sacramental issue has been raised, and Modernists are compelled to speak plainly. George Tyrrell believed that the Christianity of the future would have two dominant characteristics. It would be both mystical and eucharistic. Mysticism and the eucharist may take many forms, but unless the forms taken be dominantly ethical and practical, Tyrrell's Christianity of the future is not likely to have among its adherents the great bulk of the English people. It is here that the Modernist comes into acute conflict with the Mass-conception of the Eucharist. This conception seems to him to be definitely false and sub-Christian ; the survival of a pre-scientific conception of the Universe and a pre-Christian conception of religion. The Modernist has two great difficulties with regard to the Mass.

First, there is the *Miracle of the Mass*. The whole notion that the right man, pronouncing the right words with the right intention, over the right materials, can effect a miraculous change in those materials or elements is incredible. It is not unjust to say that the miracle is without proof. Various mediaeval legends sought to furnish proof, but they are quite discredited to-day. Surely a moral obligation lies on those who assert the Miracle of the Mass to furnish proof of it, and not call those who deny the Miracle heretics. Of course, it will be replied at once that to furnish proof of the Miracle is as unnecessary as it is impossible. The faithful Christian will accept the Miracle, not as the outcome of scientific proof, but because he believes in Christ and in the truth of His declaration. The Miracle of the Mass is effected by virtue of Christ's words of institution. Now such a statement appears grotesque in the face of modern New Testament exegesis. There is not only not the slightest proof of the Miracle being effected, but there is not, for an enlightened Christian theology, the slightest need for such a Miracle. The whole notion is not merely pre-scientific, but if it be not the sole outcome of a crudely literalist interpretation of New Testament passages, it has its roots in primitive magic and crude pagan sacramentalism. When Dr. Barnes pointed to the likeness between such beliefs and those

of Hindu idolators, he was speaking not without reason. We have no wish to be offensive either to the Romanist or to the Hindu in stressing this comparison, but the real question is whether this comparison is true or false. Those interested should consult J. N. Farquhar's *The Crown of Hinduism*, which we believe to be a thoroughly well-informed and impartial treatment of its theme. Farquhar cites Dutt as follows:

> 'The practice among the Hindus is that they first make an image of the deity they worship either with clay or stone. This image is not considered sacred till this ceremony is performed. It thus goes to prove that they do not worship the image, but the spirit indwelling it' (p. 322).

On p. 321 he quotes from *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*:

> 'We should believe in the Divine Presence infilling the Images of the Deity.'

The Madhva sub-sect of Vaishnavas (cited by Farquhar, p. 320) teaches that:

> 'In daily service, we worship God dwelling in a metallic image, after invoking God's presence therein. The invocation is the most important part of the function, to make sure of God's presence in the idol.'

We leave our readers to judge whether Dr. Barnes was not justified in his comparison, though he used no phrase, however true, as crude as that which Browning puts into the mouth of his Renaissance Roman bishop:

> 'To hear the blessed mutter of the Mass
> And see God made and eaten all day long.'

The teaching of the Christian Church needs to be purged from such perilous stuff if it is to be an effective means of advancing the Kingdom of God in this modern world, with its growing belief in science and its growing disbelief in magic. As for miracles, modern science is as clear as the Tudor Reformers that the priest has no more power to work miracles than has the layman.

The second great difficulty which besets the Modernist with regard to the Mass is the *Expiatory Sacrifice of the Mass*. The Romanist (and of course the extreme Anglo-Catholic) believes that at a rightly celebrated Mass, Christ is offered in expiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead. That the Mass has any expiatory value is a simply impossible belief for the Modernist. If it be asked, Why is the Mass regarded as expiatory? the

answer is that the sacrifice of Christ is believed to be expiatory. If one can no longer believe that Christ's sacrifice was expiatory, the expiatory sacrifice of the Mass vanishes. When Christians believed that God commanded expiatory sacrifice in the Old Testament, it was possible, and natural, and perhaps even necessary, to interpret Christ's Passion as expiatory. But one of the facts made clear by modern studies of the Old Testament is that Jehovah never commanded expiatory sacrifice, nor indeed any sacrifice at all. We see now that all the greatest prophets of Israel—Isaiah, Amos, Micah, Hosea, Jeremiah—were convinced that this was the case. Jehovah's covenant with Israel was an ethical covenant. It demanded whole-hearted loyalty to Jehovah : it demanded personal and social righteousness—justice and truth, mercy and loving kindness—but not sacrifices, human, animal or vegetable. The priests, the inheritors of the tradition of the old pre-prophetic Semitic religion—which we see widely spread in Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Phoenicia, and Carthage and her colonies—were convinced that God demanded expiatory sacrifices, and their belief triumphed over the prophetic religion of Israel. Nevertheless we must believe that the prophets were right and the priests were wrong. As Sir George Adam Smith once said to us in never-to-be-forgotten words : 'The treasure and the mystery of the Religion of Israel is its prophetism.' And Jesus Himself was in His teaching the successor and crown of the prophets. Historically, then, the claim that Jehovah demanded expiatory sacrifice is unsound. Theologically, such a claim presents God in a false and repulsive light. It denies implicitly our Lord's fundamental doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. Christ's life was one of sacrifice, but it was sacrifice, not in the form of expiation, but of service : its purpose was not to reconcile God to man, but man to God. In the light of this knowledge the interpretation of the Passion of Christ as expiatory becomes impossible, and the expiatory sacrifice of the Mass becomes utterly grotesque—a strange, and indeed terrible, pagan survival embedded in the very heart of the supreme Christian sacrament.

The English Churchman, due in part to the wonderful liturgical genius of Archbishop Cranmer, possesses an eucharistic service, happily named the Holy Communion, from which the Miracle of the Mass and the Expiatory Sacrifice of the Mass

have been purged out.[1] The English service and its action is concentrated on four great moral and spiritual realities.

The first is *Covenant.* Man is divinely called to enter into covenant with God, the living, invisible, moral, eternal Reality, the source and guide of the creative process. The call comes through the man's own personality; it comes through Nature; it comes supremely through Christ and the Bible and the Christian Church. The terms of that covenant, as Israel's prophets and the Saviour taught, are moral and spiritual. We English Churchmen enter into that covenant at Baptism, and accept full responsibility for its observance at our Confirmation: we renew that covenant, broken and weakened though it may have been by sin and faithlessness, at every Holy Communion. The idea of covenant is an integral part of the eucharistic rite. Jesus, according to the oldest Gospel, said at its institution as He blessed the cup of wine: 'This is my blood of the covenant' (R.V.), or 'This is my covenant blood.' According to St. Paul's account He said: 'This cup is the new covenant in my blood' (I *Cor.* xi, 15).

This brings us to the second great action of the English service. It is *Commemoration.* We remind ourselves of Jesus. We recall His institution of the Eucharist. We think of His Passion and its purpose. In thought we enter the Upper Room: we follow Him to Calvary. We, although most unworthy, belong to the historic body of His disciples—He, the historic Son of Man and Son of God.

The third great action of the English service is *Communion.* The first action is dominantly ethical; the second is dominantly historical; the third is dominantly mystical. In faith and humility we approach and receive the eucharistic elements as both the symbols and means of spiritual life. This mystical Body and Blood of Christ we eat as Johannes Scotus Erigena wrote, *non dente sed mente.* Our communion in this service is twofold. It consists in the realization of our fellowship with God our Father and with man our brother. This fellowship is most truly and deeply realized in and through Christ. In that twofold fellowship and its growing realization is fulness of life. It is Christ's gift to us.

[1] The occurrence of the word 'satisfaction' in the Prayer of Consecration, retained in the New Prayer Book, but happily explained away in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (pp. 277*f.*), is the only trace of its existence.

The fourth great action of the English service is *Consecration*. Inspired by the example of Christ, strengthened by His gift to us, we in the spirit of His sacrifice having offered up prayers and thanksgivings to God, now offer up ourselves to Him for the service of His Kingdom:

> 'And here we offer and present unto Thee, O Lord, ourselves, our souls and bodies, to be a reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice unto Thee.'

This is the sacrifice of the English service. It is after the example of Christ's sacrifice as portrayed in the Garden of Gethsemane and as explained in the *Epistle to the Hebrews*: 'I come to do Thy will, O God' (*Heb.* x, 5-10). It is ethical and spiritual, and is infinitely different from the expiatory sacrifice of the Mass.

The English service with its four great actions—Covenant, Commemoration, Communion, Consecration—is the Church's supreme act of worship. It is the great act of self-dedication and re-dedication for the service of the Kingdom of God. In an inspired moment St. Bernard wrote (cited in Westcott's *Commentary on St. John's Gospel*, p. 106):

> 'But what is it to eat His flesh and drink His blood, except it be to share His sufferings and to imitate the manner of life which He led in the flesh?'

In the English service conceived of in this way, there is nothing which advancing science or rising ethical standards can discredit. If, however, through sloth or cowardice or muddleheadedness, we allow the Roman doctrine of the Mass to represent the English Communion Service in this land, we shall, by dividing our community into two opposing camps of secularists and religious obscurantists, bring about a terrible nemesis. Our extreme Anglo-Catholics little realize what they are doing. It is possible that in no distant future the more enlightened Roman Catholic theologians will even disown some of their superstitious extravagances. It is told of the late Abbé Duchesne, who was an interested student of the English Church, that he was much puzzled as to the precise aim of the Anglo-Catholics. At last he received an illuminating exposition from an extreme member of that school. When it concluded, the Abbé exclaimed: 'Ah! now I see: you wish to introduce into the English Church many things which we wish to drive out of the Catholic Church.'

A PRESCRIBED LITURGY AND A FREE PULPIT

THE Church of England to-day is faced with the problem which faced the Church of Corinth in the days of St. Paul. That problem is the harmonizing of the respective claims of order and freedom in the public worship of the Church. The Church of Christ, which is a creation of the Spirit of Christ, rightly claims the freedom of that Spirit in contrast to the tyranny of legalism by which Judaism was enslaved: but this Christian freedom does not permit disorder and anarchy, and that because in the Christian life the spirit of freedom is subordinate to the spirit of love. Therefore the freedom of the individual must only be exercised so as to contribute to the welfare of the Church of which he is a member.

It was natural that the problem should first arise in Corinth, where the Church was very much alive. Conflicting reasons might rightly be assigned for this liveliness. A visitor to a certain Scotch city pointed to the number of churches in it as a testimony to the religious character of the inhabitants, to which his Scotch guide replied:

'It's nae releegion; it's cussedness.'

Self-assertion and self-conceit, and not 'the gifts of the Spirit,' were fundamentally responsible for the disorder in Corinth, and since then they have also been responsible for liturgical disorder elsewhere.

This problem of order in public worship became peculiarly acute in the English Church in the Reformation period. Before the Reformation great liturgical variety prevailed in the English Church, each bishop having the right to make rules for Divine Service in his own diocese. At the Reformation this diocesan variety was replaced by national uniformity. Henceforth throughout the whole of England, in every cathedral and parish church and chapel licensed by the bishop, all the services were to be exactly the same. Moreover, they were all to be in the English tongue: they were all to be read or said audibly: and a copy of all the services, printed in a single handy volume

and sold at a low price by Royal Command, enabled the laity to tell whether they were duly receiving what was provided for them. By this means the Church Services were not only popularized, but the conduct of them was put under the supervision of the laity, who had the right to complain (or 'present' their clergyman) if this order was not duly observed. Moreover, to ensure national uniformity and check liturgical corruption the bishops were deprived of their old liturgical rights, which were now limited to enforcing the Book of Common Prayer and to interpreting doubtful or conflicting rubrics.

This was the only way by which the Church Services could be guarded, on the one hand, from the insidious invasion of a powerful and propagandist superstition which had been crushed, but not killed, by the Reformation; and, on the other hand, it was the only way by which the Church Services could be delivered from the crudities, confusions and conflicts of Continental Protestantism and English Puritanism.

The Church of England laid down its liturgical policy in Article XXXIV and adhered to it. This policy had to face tremendous difficulties, and it led to various schisms owing to the conscientious objections of English Christians, who could not or would not conform to this national uniformity of public worship. The first Dissenters from the English Church were the English Roman Catholics, who, in 1570, were compelled by the Bull of Pope Pius V to cease attending service in their parish churches. Various bodies of Puritans followed. But until the rise of modern Anglo-Catholicism, uniformity of Divine Service was maintained in the English Church. With the rise of Anglo-Catholicism an organised policy was introduced of restoring to public worship customs and rites suppressed and abolished at the Reformation. Owing to the failure of the English bishops, partly through weakness, partly through laxity, partly through sympathy with the law-breakers, and partly through a bad system of discipline which looked suspiciously like persecution, the liturgical uniformity of nearly three centuries was hopelessly broken, and a period of disorder ensued.

To secure a remedy a Royal Commission was appointed in 1906, which reported in favour of Prayer Book revision. As a consequence we have had a new Prayer Book prepared which it

is proposed to authorize in addition to the existing Prayer Book. This new book makes large concessions to the Anglo-Catholics and judiciously allows a number of optional alternatives which, subject to the consent of the local church authorities, can be used in the public services after the Deposited Book has received the Royal Assent. If, however, liturgical disorder is to cease, the Deposited Book must be firmly administered, even to the extent of depriving liturgical law-breakers of their benefices. The present method of punishing parishes for liturgical disorder, by the bishop refusing to confirm in them or to licence curates is extremely unjust, as the parishioners have no power to get rid of their recalcitrant incumbent and were almost certainly not responsible for his appointment.

The more extreme of the liturgical law-breakers are such on principle; they are banded together to introduce Catholic practices into the English Church, and they set the authority of Catholic—really Roman Catholic—custom above the authority of the English bishops. Of course their policy is contrary to the principles of the Reformed Church of England. Moreover, they sin against true Catholicism, which is neither anarchic nor individualist, but stands solidly for order and unity, and that within a visible society. Distasteful, therefore, as it is to enforce order by prosecution, the bishops will certainly have to do it or else break their pledges. They are facing fanatics who are open neither to reason nor persuasion.

It is retorted by the liturgical law-breakers that insistence on strict obedience to a prescribed liturgy comes with a very ill grace from a Modernist: that such rigidity is contrary to the dynamic spirit of Modernism. To this it may be replied that Modernism is opposed to rigidity, if rigidity means refusal to revise the liturgy in accordance with new knowledge and new needs; but Modernism is not opposed if rigidity means obedience to a prescribed liturgy. If liturgical reform is to be secured, it must be by constitutional means: the Modernist is absolutely opposed to liturgical law-breaking as a means of securing liturgical revision.

Secondly, it is urged by the liturgical law-breakers that a policy that would secure liturgical obedience in the last resort by legal deprivation is contrary to that Christian love which the

Modernist maintains ought to be the motive of all our actions. The Modernist cannot see that there is anything contrary to Christian love in such a policy, unless Christian love means that everyone shall be allowed to do whatever he likes, or thinks right, irrespective of whether it is good for his neighbour or even for himself. Such a policy would be a serious sin against Christian love, which seeks, like democracy, not only the greatest good of the greatest number, but also, as far as it can, the good even of the minority which is opposed to it—and that good must in extreme cases take the line of reducing opportunities to do evil. What the English Prayer Book has done for the religion and morals of the English people is only second to that which the English Bible has done; but it has only done it where it has been respected and obeyed, and this reverence and obedience do not prohibit intelligent and constitutional revision.

Lastly, it is objected that those who are claiming, like the Modernists, great freedom for Christian teaching, and are even departing in their pulpit utterances from the traditional doctrines of the English Prayer Book, are guilty of gross inconsistency in urging that strong measures should be taken to secure liturgical obedience. In this charge we come to the heart of the matter. The Modernist, in pleading for obedience to a prescribed liturgy, and at the same time for a free pulpit, is guided entirely by the Pauline principle of edification. There is no use in charging the Modernist with illogicality in this matter. He is as impervious to that charge as was Edmund Burke. Like Burke, he believes, not in logical consistency, but in practical compromise.

The Modernist believes that this combination of obedience to a prescribed liturgy and the full exercise of rational, moral and spiritual freedom in the pulpit is what is greatly needed by the English Church in this age. Moreover, it is the English Reformed tradition, which goes back further even than Bishop Jeremy Taylor's plea for liberty of prophesying. Izaak Walton, of *The Compleat Angler*, in his very delightful lives of contemporary Churchmen (of late Tudor and early Stuart times), relates an incident in the life of 'the judicious Hooker' when he was Master of the Temple, and a certain Master Walter Travers was evening lecturer there, that as a consequence :

'The forenoon sermon spake Canterbury, and the afternoon Geneva.'[1]

This is a parable of the teaching of the English pulpit. No reader of the pulpit utterances of our great English divines can fail to notice their very varying doctrine, not only in different periods, but even in the same period. It is this freedom of the English pulpit which has preserved its prophetic power and has given us the homiletic treasures of Hugh Latimer, Jeremy Taylor, Thomas Fuller, Dr. South, Archbishop Tillotson, Bishop Butler, John Wesley, Lawrence Sterne, Thomas Arnold, John Henry Newman, Frederick Denison Maurice, Robertson of Brighton, Bishop Lightfoot, Canon Liddon, Benjamin Jowett and Dean Church, whose teaching is as variant as that of our English hymn-books. Some will say that this variety is due to the vast variety of human personality, or that it is due to the manifold inspiration of the Spirit of God. Doubless this is so, but it could not have manifested itself in effective and fruitful action if the pulpit of the English Church had been a tied pulpit or a tuned pulpit, and not a pulpit where Christian teachers have been allowed to exercise a freedom which in some cases bordered on licence.

Archbishop Temple coined the famous dictum: 'If the conclusions are prescribed, the study is precluded.' In this scientific age, when not authority but experience is that to which the teacher appeals, a pulpit which is only permitted to teach prescribed doctrines and to prove them, becomes increasingly uninteresting and ineffective. The most thoughtful of the Anglo-Catholic leaders to-day deplore the harm which their movement has done by casting discredit on preaching. They wish to revive the preaching-power of the English Church. One of the necessary conditions for that is a free pulpit: another is the rigorous education of the clergy. 'Do not gag the preacher, but educate him.' The Modernist certainly wishes to claim no privilege for himself which is not shared by Anglo-Catholics. He cannot think it desirable that many things which are taught by Anglo-Catholic extremists should be taught in English pulpits, but he would stoutly oppose those who would intervene to gag them.

[1] Dick's edition of Walton's *Lives*, p. 156. (Scott Library, 1899.)

THE PROPHETIC OFFICE OF THE EPISCOPATE

ONE of the most important issues arising out of the recent Church crisis concerns the right of a bishop to exercise the prophetic office. By the prophetic office is not meant, as in popular parlance, the function of prediction, but the utterance of moral and spiritual truth by one who feels entrusted with a divine message which he is compelled to deliver, however painful that message may be and however much it may wound zealous members of the community to which the prophet himself belongs.

We all recognize the right to exercise this prophetic function in the case of a prophet in ancient Israel, even if the prophet were a priest like Jeremiah or Ezekiel. We all recognize the right to exercise this prophetic function in the case of the great founders of the Christian Church, whether a St. Stephen, or a St. Paul, or a St. John the Baptist. We all recognize that the prophetic function was not the least important part of our Lord's ministry. We know quite well that in the primitive Church the two great orders of the ministry were 'first apostles, secondly prophets,'[1] when bishops were very humble folk in comparison with them. We know that by the year 200 A.D. the prophets had become discredited and the bishops had become supreme. But we also know that the bishops claimed to have absorbed the prophetic office—for instance, both St. Ignatius and St. Polycarp, who were bishops, claimed to be prophets as well, and Dr. Armitage Robinson asserts that 'in its most spiritual element the gift of prophecy may be said never to have become extinct in the Christian Church.' Though this be true, the bishops have almost ceased to exercise prophetic functions, or at least it is not expected that their utterances will be prophetic. There is a note of challenge, of criticism, of provocativeness, of exaggeration, of harshness, even of revolution, in the utterances of the prophets. Episcopal utterances may be weighty, judicious, cautious, conservative, paternal, edifying, or they may even be diplomatic,

[1] I *Cor.* xii. 28; *Eph.* iv. 11.

urbane, pompous, feeble, soporific, but they lack, save on very rare occasions, the prophetic note. It was this which probably led Archbishop Benson to observe that in the English Church it was unfortunate that it was so often the case that the men who had the force (δύναμις) had not the authority (ἐξουσία), and the men who had the authority had not the force. The authority of the prophet, in contrast to the authority of the official, is not derived primarily from an institution, or a tradition, or a legal system, or a literature, but from his own moral and spiritual consciousness. The prophet, in contrast to the priest, seems so often to turn against his church and its most sacred institutions and to denounce and even deride them. He does this, not because he hates them, but because he has a zeal for truth and righteousness, and he marks how far short his church is coming in these matters, and that its sacred rites are a hindrance rather than a help to its attaining the higher truth and righteousness. The prophet in consequence wounds his fellows, even more than the satirist, for he wounds them in their most sensitive and sacred feelings.

In the history of the Church seldom indeed does a bishop turn prophet. It is the Christian priesthood which has mainly produced the Christian prophets. John Wycliffe, John Huss, Joachim of Flora, Savonarola, Martin Luther, John Colet, John Knox, John Wesley, Frederick Denison Maurice, Thomas Arnold, Robertson of Brighton, and many more, were all Christian priests. Episcopacy goeth not well with prophecy. Although bishops do not exercise prophetic functions save in rare cases like Caiaphas, yet should any of them do so he ought not, as was Zechariah, the son of Jehoiada, the high-priest, to be stoned in the courts of the temple, but should be allowed by his fellow-bishops to exercise his prophetic spirit without hindrance or rebuke from them. His fellow-bishops may plead as a justification for stoning him the excellent reason given by Amaziah the priest of Bethel to Amos the prophet, that the land is not able to bear his words, and that if he is to be heard his prophesying must become more gentle and sympathetic. This is a very natural line to take, for it is not the hairy prophet like Elijah and John the Baptist, but the prophet who is a smooth man and has smooth things to say in a smooth way who

is best beloved. Nevertheless, Christ Himself said: 'Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you, for so did their fathers unto the false prophets.' It may, however, be claimed on the other side that Christ Himself rebuked the sons of Zebedee on one occasion and told them that Elijah's spirit must not be theirs; but an examination of the contexts will show that it was not the prophetic spirit of Elijah to which our Lord was referring, but the spirit of ruthless and murderous vengeance.[2] No one was more provocative than our Lord in His prophetic teaching. If anyone supposes that what Jesus taught did not wound, and wound most grievously, not simply irreligious men, but deeply pious men, he possesses very little historic insight.

For the prophet the truth is the supreme thing. For him the feelings of pious people, and even the peace and prosperity of religious communities, are matters of indifference in comparison with the proclamation of the truth. Now there is a tendency to-day in both press and pulpit to proclaim that a bishop turned prophet ought to be muzzled. A bishop, it is maintained, ought not to treat controversial moral and religious questions in a controversial manner, especially where many of the people in his diocese cannot and will not agree with him. In view of the fact that the episcopal office includes not only pastoral and priestly, but also prophetic functions, the bishop must on occasions exercise those functions even if he give dire offence, and his fellow-bishops ought not to intervene to check him. It is much more important that the truth should be taught than that the diocese should be united in kindly feeling to their bishop if he is allowing false teaching to prevail which he ought to strive to check. It is much more important that the people should feel that their bishop will speak the truth without fear or favour than that they should feel sure that he will certainly adopt as his line in any important controversial issue the rule of the vicar of the Deep Church party satirized by the late G. W. E. Russell:

> 'See all, from all men's point of view,
> Use all men's eyes to see with,
> And never preach what anyone
> Can ever disagree with.'

[2] *Luke* ix, 54; II *Kings* i, 10*f*.

Too often is the truth in danger, either from tradition and inertia, or from superstition and moral indifference, or from prejudice and passion. It is extremely important that our English episcopate should not sink into the easy routine of bureaucratic officialdom and deliver merely conventional teaching. It is needful for the Church's influence that they should combine prophecy with their pastoral, liturgical, and administrative functions. The English Church probably owes its very existence to-day to the prophetic power of the martyr prelates of Tudor times, who had the majority of their fellow-bishops against them.

Because the Church and nation never needed a prophetic ministry more than to-day, any attempt to suppress episcopal prophecy should be stoutly withstood. At the same time it must not be supposed that we do not value sweet reasonableness and good manners in a bishop, or that we hold that even in the exercise of his prophetic office he should not strive to combine it, where he can, with the *mitis sapientia* of a Father in God :

> 'A gentleness behind the law,
> A sweetness following on the awe.'

Should he ever be tempted to despise his fellow-men, at least he will do so after the manner of Anatole France's *abbé*, of whom his creator wrote : *Il méprisa les hommes—avec tendresse.*

RELIGION AND SCIENCE: THE PRESENT PHASE*

'Walk as children of light.—*Ephesians* v, 8.

THIS morning the boys of Westminster School come here for the first Sunday service since the vacation. Among them are many, newly come to the school, who, as the years go by, will gradually enter into its traditions and become proud of its association with this famous Abbey Church. I prophesy that among them there are not a few who will pass through periods when they distrust and dispute the religious message which this

*A sermon preached in Westminster Abbey on Sunday, September 25, 1927, by the Right Rev. E. W. Barnes, D.D., Sc.D., F.R.S., Lord Bishop of Birmingham.

building exists to proclaim. Our age is one of social and moral confusion, of inventions and discoveries which have marvellously altered the machinery of civilisation, of intellectual progress and unrest. So great is the turmoil that few landmarks seem safe and the religious beliefs and traditions of our forefathers are sharply challenged.

What advice shall I give to boys born to live in such an era? Shall I say 'Cling to the old faith'? I say rather, 'Seek truth. Rejoice that you live in one of the greatest eras of scientific progress in the history of humanity. Welcome new discoveries with an open mind. Reverence the great men who make them. But remember that behind all the new knowledge the fundamental issues of life will remain veiled. You cannot ignore these issues and fully live. You must approach them with faith, faith built upon reason. And I doubt if in the end your faith will be different from that of many who have preached or are commemorated within these walls.' But do not, I urge, yield to those who pretend to offer you short cuts to faith. Distrust special pleading. Shun the man who approaches you with some semi-magical religious nostrum. Religion is too solemn and weighty a matter for such associations. Seek truth: be honest and reverent in mind: be loyal to the high aspirations that arise in you as part of your heritage. Then there will dwell in you the Spirit of Christ.

To-day I would apply such general principles to the controversy raised anew by the address of the President of the British Association a few weeks ago. What should be our attitude to the biological doctrine of evolution? How should we who value religion, and especially the Christian tradition in our civilisation, approach the various questions which it opens? Shall we cloud clear issues with a haze of words? Shall we suggest doubts when in reality no doubts exist? Shall we falsify Christian history and use the falsification to commend Darwinism as though it were no novelty? Or shall we honestly welcome new knowledge, and admit that some traditional dogmas of Christian belief must be changed?

I plead for the latter as both the most honourable and the wisest course. Let us take the facts. To-day there is, among competent men of science, unanimous agreement that man has

been evolved from an ape-like stock. He arose, possibly a million years ago, from a tangle of apes which began to vary in different directions. In man, more significantly than elsewhere among the *Primates*, variation occurred in the brain, and especially in those parts of the brain known as the centres of association. Other apes developed in other ways. Chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans thus arose, and are man's first cousins. Whatever be the machinery by which evolution in general, and that of man in particular, has been effected, the fact itself is no longer denied by any of those whose opinion is worthy of respect. Darwin's assertion that man has sprung from the apes has stood the test of more than half a century of critical examination : increasing knowledge and careful enquiry have but confirmed its truth.

As a result the stories of the creation of Adam and Eve, of their primal innocence and of their fall, have become for us folklore. But by the men who built up Catholic theology they were accepted as solid fact. Man's special creation was one of the primary assumptions of the Catholic system. In it the Fall explained the origin of sin; and a horrible theory of the propagation of sin, reared on the basis of the Fall by Augustine, was accepted by official Catholic theologians. Darwin's triumph has destroyed the whole relevant theological scheme. Many of us rejoice, for we regard the assertion that any Church is infallible, as alike impudent and dangerous. When so much of Catholic theology has been dissolved, the Church which accepted it can hardly claim to be free from error. But naturally there are those who would rescue from the havoc wrought by Darwin and his followers something by which to justify pretensions to doctrinal infallibility. They press new claims and theories. Some are toying with the idea of a premundane fall—some calamity of disobedience in the heavens, prior to man's appearance on the earth, a tragic event which brought evil into the scheme of creation. That such an idea, for which there is not a jot of evidence, can be seriously put forward shows how amazingly unscientific in temper some of our theologians continue to be. Others who shrink from such flights of fancy are suggesting that, while man is physiologically a descendant of the apes, his mind is due to a special Divine act of creation. Such a contention

cannot be upheld. Mental capacity and power are directly associated with the development of certain regions of the brain. The mind and body of man can equally be made subjects of observation and experimental enquiry. Evidence for the gradual evolution of each is equally cogent. The human mind has been derived by evolution from the intelligence of lower animals, just as the human body has been evolved from the body of some primitive vertebrate. Probably in all evolution there has been physical and mental discontinuity: in other words, advance has come by small jumps and not by continuous change. Moreover, evidence for the cause of such jumps is lacking, so the man of science speaks of emergence. New qualities of being, powers, functions, animal types emerge in the process of evolutionary change. How they are produced we do not know. But what biological enquiry has definitely established is that much that is evil in man's passions and appetites is due to natural instincts inherited from his animal ancestry. In fact, man is not a being who has fallen from an ideal state of perfect innocence: he is an animal slowly gaining spiritual understanding and with the gain rising far above his distant ancestors. Further, it is quite impossible to harmonise this conclusion of scientific enquiry with the traditional theory of any branch of the Christian Church. The English Churchman is proud to know that his communion has enshrined among its Articles of Belief a statement that no Church is infallible. Even General Councils err: the wisest theologians make mistakes. If, then, opinions widely and even universally held turn out to be wrong, let us declare the fact, and we need not blush as we make our confession. The man of science admits his mistakes without trying to conceal his retraction behind elaborate and evasive formulae: the Churchman does well to follow his good example. We ought both to seek truth, and also to be so glad when we discover new truth that we feel no pain in rejecting old error.

When this happens some will cry out that the faith is in danger. Well, as I read history, the only times when it has not been 'in danger' have been those of complete intellectual stagnation. While some see danger to faith, others will plead that we must preserve Catholic truth. I reply that I know of no private brands of truth: the sole alternative to truth is false-

hood. Others will loudly proclaim that new ideas are heresy: we may answer with the commonplace that the heresy of to-day is the orthodoxy of to-morrow.

Already Christians who are not obsessed by traditional theology realize that the doctrine of evolution leaves Christ's teaching unaffected. If there be (as I believe) a God behind Nature *He can show His creative activity through the process of emergent evolution just as definitely as by special creation.* That He has used evil in His plan is obvious, and it puzzles us to reconcile this fact with His goodness and power. But there is no new problem herein. Christ knew that there was much evil in the world which God made—evil for which therefore God must be ultimately responsible. Christ did not offer the delusive explanation which many have thought that the Fall provided. But none the less He could affirm that God is the loving Father of us all. We may reject His belief as unfounded: but Darwinism does not make our reasons for rejection any stronger. Probably most men, as their experience of life widens, come to accept Christ's view. There is so much goodness in the world, such rich beauty, that we cannot believe that there is evil in the Creator Himself. But His ends, we are forced to conclude, are not our own. We normally seek happiness: it is not natural to us to scorn delights and live laborious days. God seems rather to be desirous of progress, alike in the individual and in the race. His ideal man is not the animal, well-fed and luxurious, but the eager seeker for righteousness and truth. There is, of course, nothing new in such a conclusion: it is as old as the doctrine of the Cross.

But I would reiterate that those of us who believe that God has been active throughout the process which men of science term evolution, hold that observed facts force us to this conclusion. Take, for instance, the gradual emergence of mind. We cannot believe that mind is merely a by-product of physico-chemical actions. Life apparently can only exist on the semi-moribund matter which results from the degeneration or break-up of a star. It is absurd to imagine that such matter by itself should be able to produce either thought or beings who think. So we conclude that when life and mind emerged on the cooling earth they were new factors: products of a creative activity con-

tinuous since the first primitive organisms arose, as it would seem, from colloidal substances. So vast has been the progress due to God's activity that we trace its connections with difficulty; and only the expert can bridge even the last gap between the low mental life of the ape and the moral self-consciousness of civilized man. But as the expert exhibits successive links of the evolutionary chain, he shows the results of God's creation: a process which still continues, the end of which no man can foresee, the purpose of which we can only understand by joining faith to reason.

Such a union of faith and reason is needed when we are asked whether the soul is immortal. The question forces us to consider whether man is an end in himself or but a transient link in a chain. The language in which it is asked has become archaic. We should now rather enquire whether personality survives bodily death. In regard to personality, we admit with the man of science that it grows as the body develops. In the new-born infant it hardly exists: in the adult it has been shaped by environment. We are what we are by virtue of our parents and surroundings; and the classical researches of Professor Karl Pearson show that the forces of heredity are far stronger than those of circumstance. Yet as all these forces come ultimately from God, it is He Who shapes us. Now, if in the personality thus made there is something of eternal value, may we not reasonably hold that it will have an eternal existence: that God will preserve what is worth keeping? Certainly a time will come when this earth will no longer support life; and, if there be no life beyond the grave, a philosopher from another planet would then conclude that in truth God had made all men for nought. In the belief that God's creation has a purpose, we are compelled to postulate the immortality of the soul.

So I would conclude that on the whole the modern scientific view of the origin of man's body and mind agrees well with Christ's teaching. But it cannot be reconciled with certain statements of St. Paul, nor with a belief in the infallibility either of the Bible or the Church, nor with the acceptance of some of the main strands of traditional Catholic theology. Yet are these facts of any importance? Why do men desire so often to preserve old errors? Why are religious people and their leaders so

frequently timid and obscurantist? Some, of course, hate the trouble of thought, and therefore welcome easy submission to authoritative statement. Others are afraid that if they begin to raise questions their faith will vanish and they will be left miserable. Others like magic a little disguised: a Book or a Church entirely free from error is to them a first-rate mascot. Naturally, the men of science to whom the quest of truth is one of life's greatest joys are contemptuous of such ignorance, magic and fear. We who profess to follow Christ ought to share their contempt. Our present cowardice in naming and commending reason is, said Hort, of modern growth. An evil tendency which he deplored in the Victorian era has become worse since the war. Pseudo-religious propaganda is now more shameless. Superstition is more prevalent. Sceptical orthodoxy more commonly joins hands with ignorant fanaticism. And so true religion, the religion of the Spirit of Christ, is harmed. The reaction is intelligible because war is demoralising. It breeds fear and contempt of truth and disregard of spiritual values.

Let us be thankful that amid so much decay science has preserved standards which organized religion has frequently failed to safeguard. In our thankfulness we can remember that men serve God when they bring enthusiasm and intellectual power to the service of science. In such service hard work and unswerving loyalty to truth are needed. Thus the great man of science usually proves worthy of respect for his moral qualities no less than for his intellectual eminence. Between him and those who seek spiritual realities through the guidance of the Spirit of Christ there should be no lack of cordial sympathy. Goodness and truth are natural allies. Knowledge grows most rapidly when righteousness preserves peace. Wisdom is God's gift, and through wisdom men are blessed. Art and science and religious understanding are all of the realm of the Spirit. Christ bade us seek that realm: it is the Kingdom of Heaven in which God's will is done and in which He reveals Himself. Our Master, we proclaim, is the light of the world. Let us then walk as children of light.

SACRAMENTAL TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD *

By the Right Rev. E. W. Barnes, D.D., Sc.D., F.R.S.,
Lord Bishop of Birmingham.

THESE dinner-hour services, at which men and women speak who are representative of almost all varieties of Christian opinion, make the Parish Church a sort of public forum for the City of Birmingham. Those who speak here naturally feel a greater freedom than if they were preaching at a regular Sunday service. Those who come to listen expect that the problems of religion and social life will be discussed with candour no less than with sincerity.

I welcome the fact that on such occasions as this we meet in an atmosphere of quiet seriousness. I am glad also that the inhibitions of conventional ecclesiasticism are absent. Smooth unctious platitudes may have a soothing effect, but they do nothing either to free men from the tyranny of mistaken beliefs or to create Christian enthusiasm for righteousness and peace.

I rejoice that repeatedly men and women from this pulpit have advocated specific causes worthy of Christian support; that here at all events the necessity for greater social righteousness has not been quietly ignored. But I believe that this pulpit is not adequately used unless from it there comes sound religious teaching, enquiries into the fundamental principles of our faith. The Parish Church of Birmingham ought to be a centre for religious teaching no less than a focus of social enthusiasm. There are some who will at once urge that religious teaching may easily be controversial. Of course it will be controversial if it deals, as it ought, with questions on which erroneous opinions are held. Only through patient argument can we reach truth and spread truth: and those who find that such argument cuts at the roots of beliefs which they hold dear will naturally desire to preserve the atmosphere of silence in which their errors can be quietly propagated.

*An address delivered at the Parish Church of Birmingham on Thursday, October 6, 1927.

To-day, then, I propose to be controversial. I intend to discuss sacramental truth and falsehood. I make no apology for my action because the English Church will break in pieces unless unity as to sacramental doctrines can be reached. Moreover, unless such unity is based on truth the Church will end by purveying non-moral, semi-magical beliefs which are a travesty of Christianity.

The idea of a sacrament is simple: it is the outward sign of God's presence. At its highest to know of God's presence is to feel the comfort of His care, to be assured of His loving power. Life is full of sacraments, great and small. Personally, I feel God near when the sunshine ripples over a corn-field, or when the wind blows over a grass-green upland. Music brings Him to others: it stirs them so that they know the world to have unseen rhythms of beauty which are the expression of God's perfection. Others find in poetry the thrill that makes the world expand till it embraces God and causes Him to show Himself in common things. To a mother her children are true sacraments, signs of God's creative power; and love has always been a sacrament, a symbol of that which is supreme in the eternal realm of spirit.

All of us have our sacraments—trivial little things, sometimes, that we do not speak of because others might mock or fail to understand. The Christian Churches have their sacraments —all except the Quakers and the Salvation Army. These communions have broken away from the general tradition of Christian worship; and we must all admit that, none the less, many of their members have shown the Spirit of Christ in their lives.

Our own Church emphasizes two sacraments, Baptism and the Holy Communion. Baptism is the outward sign of the grace which, as we believe, God gives to all who, as members of the Church, seek to be loyal servants of Christ. The Holy Communion is the service by which we reproduce, for memory and faith, the tragic supper which preceded Christ's death, and it is the sign of unity in Christ through self-sacrifice for righteousness' sake, the symbol of the Divine help which a good man gives to others when he is absolutely loyal to goodness and truth. So conceived the two great sacraments are valuable,

worthy of their place in the Christian tradition. But it is fatally easy to pass from the idea that sacraments serve to reveal God to a belief that through them we can mechanically bring God to men or cause Him to locate Himself in some object or place. Such a belief belongs to the realm of primitive magic. The priest-magician from time immemorial has been supposed to possess the skill to persuade his god to show his presence or his power in some unusual fashion. Pretensions to such magical skill are, of course, baseless. Yet the power of appeal of primitive religious fancies is strong within us; and there are always men ready to devise dexterous formulae to justify superstitions of which we ought to be ashamed. Take idolatry. The belief that a bronze idol should be worshipped is to us contemptible. But to many an educated Hindu such worship makes an irresistible appeal. Moreover, he has his argument ready. The idol, he avers, is nothing until it has been blessed by the priest. Then the god deigns to dwell within it; he gives to the image the honour of his real presence. If you ask for a proof of this assertion, an educated Hindu points to the ecstatic enthusiasm aroused among worshippers of the wretched idol: such psychological reality, he contends, is sufficient proof.

There are among ourselves to-day men and women whose sacramental beliefs are not far from those of the cultured Hindu idolator. They pretend that a priest, using the right words and acts, can change a piece of bread so that within it there is the real presence of Christ. The idea is absurd, and can be disproved by experiment. If there were a *physical* change in the bread, chemical analysis would enable us to detect it. All are agreed that this type of change does not take place. Yet if there be a *spiritual* change, it must surely be possible for man to recognize it by his spiritual perception. Now I assert—and who will gainsay me?—that there is no man living who, if a piece of bread were presented to him, could say whether or not it had been consecrated. Personally, I find it hard to attach any meaning to a spiritual change in dead matter; but if it exists there must surely be some living person who can perceive its existence. If there be no such person, belief in such a change is an idle superstition.

Let me reiterate to make my point clear. If a physical change exists it can be physically perceived. If a spiritual change exists it can be spiritually perceived. We should not accept the word of a man who affirmed the existence of a physical change which no physicist could detect. Similarly, if a man affirms the existence of a spiritual change which no man can recognize by any form of spiritual perception, we deem his statement false. I am quite prepared to believe in transubstantiation when I can find a person who will come to the chapel of my house and tell me correctly whether a piece of bread which I present to him has undergone the change for which believers in transubstantiation contend.

It is well-nigh incredible that at the present day, when experimental psychology has become a science, there should be a recrudescence of the sort of sacramental magic which by that science can be demonstrably discredited. Let us keep to a simple, wholesome, and true understanding of what sacraments really are. Not seldom I have come away from a small gathering of Christians — it happened especially during the War — with the certainty that, when two or three are gathered together in Christ's name, He is in the midst of them. I should be the last to doubt that the Real Presence of Christ can be with men in the service of Holy Communion. But the whole service is the sacrament. Through the whole act of worship, with its solemn memories of our Saviour's passion, we get the grace of His Presence, provided — and the proviso is important — provided we come in the right spirit. Christ gives Himself to His faithful servants: to those who worship Him in spirit and in truth. Such is true sacramental doctrine. But let the fancy take root that a piece of bread can be magically suffused by His presence—the very conception is magical—and men will naturally and logically assume that whoever eats the bread receives Christ. My friends, it is a solemn truth that the Lord cannot be gained by such mechanism. We must life up our hearts if we would have God come and dwell with us. Moreover, it is a harmful superstition that a Church in which consecrated bread is kept is for that reason the more holy. Such a belief can only be upheld by the valueless arguments by which the Hindu

defends idolatry. The Divine Spirit of Christ is everywhere: He cannot be located in material things. Wherever the spirit of man rises to enthusiasm for goodness and truth, Christ's Spirit is present. Christ dwells not among things that are cold and inert, but with the living Christian struggling, seeking, waiting upon God. We understand sacramental grace in its fulness and power, not by foolishly speaking of bread as if it were God Himself, but when the heavens open for us and for a moment we see the whole of creation as the expression of God's purpose and He Himself in wisdom, might and love the goal to Whom our striving leads and the end where man's restless spirit has peace.

CONSTRUCTIVE MODERNISM

A PERSONAL IMPRESSION

By the Rev. HERBERT EDMONDS, Rector of St. John's, Deansgate, Manchester.

'CONSTRUCTIVE MODERNISM.' What do I mean by 'Modernism,' and why do I emphasize the adjective 'constructive'?

I know of no exact and comprehensive definition of Modernism. Like other terms describing an attitude of mind, a temper and an outlook—*e.g.*, Liberalism and Conservatism—it will be expressed differently by different men. There is no accepted formula: no concrete body of doctrine or belief, no set of theological affirmations or negations which constitute Modernism: it is rather an attitude of mind, a temper and an outlook.

Its most salient features are a welcome to all new knowledge, a fearless confidence in truth, a belief in continuity, and, generally, a distrust of the dichotomy which finds expression in such antitheses as secular and sacred, natural and supernatural.

A welcome to all new knowledge. Please note the word 'welcome.' It is in this, and not in the mere acceptance of new knowledge, that the Modernist's attitude consists. Look back over the history of scientific advance when it has seemed to impinge on theological traditions, from the days of Galileo to

that of Darwin, and from Darwin to our own time. Or think of the progress and movement of criticism, first of the Old Testament and then of the New, passing through stages of speculation and surmise, gradually becoming assured of results, as scientific conclusions, which have given a new significance and value to the Bible for our own day. Or, in this realm of history — in the comparative study of religions — we have seen men exploring the avenues which the spiritual instinct of man has followed, apart from and prior to the Hebrew and Christian Revelation. And it has taught us much.

We look back now on all this advance of knowledge and recall (sometimes with a sense of the humour of the situation) how it won its way despite the resistance of those who thought that, at every stage of that advance, faith was greatly imperilled. Almost everything that the champions of a supposed orthodoxy so strenuously resisted is now acquiesced in. The most conservative have learned to utilize it in a new Apologia. The *acceptance* of new knowledge comes inevitably in course of time : even the Die-hards die at last ! The difference between the Modernist and the Traditionalist is that the one thankfully welcomes the new light while the other fights a rearguard action against it and finally accepts defeat.

Let me anticipate a criticism of this. It may be supposed that I am making a plea for the hasty and ill-considered acceptance of half-proved and questionable speculations. But that will be entirely to misconceive my meaning. I make no plea for the acceptance as fact of unproved hypotheses. By all means be prudent, cautious, critical. The man of science is always this when a new hypothesis is presented to him. I only want that Christian teachers shall have the open mind, the candour, the love of truth which the man of science has when he approaches some new contribution to the realm of knowledge.

There is all the difference in the world between grudgingly accepting what you can no longer dispute and giving a glad welcome to truth for its own sake, even when traditional conceptions may have to be modified in consequence of that welcome.

I have said that the Modernist has ' a fearless confidence in truth.' He believes that God has always something fresh to teach us if we are teachable, that the Master has still many

things to say to His disciples if they are able to bear them, that the guidance of the Spirit into all the truth is the Church's endowment for all the ages—unexhausted and inexhaustible.

It may be replied that the Traditionalist also loves truth and has a fearless confidence in it, only he believes that the whole body of truth has been given to him. He conceives it to be his business to defend the 'deposit,' while the Modernist rather thinks of himself as engaged in a quest.

The 'deposit' for the Modernist is no formulated body of doctrine, but the Incarnate Life. He hesitates to believe that the final interpretation of that life and all its significance is to be found in the discernment of past ages. He is always looking for new light and fresh knowledge. This governs his attitude and his outlook in the face of all new problems as they arise. Wordsworth says that 'Nature never did betray the heart that loved her.' The Modernist believes that the spirit of truth may be trusted with equal confidence.

A belief in Continuity. Liberal thought has always been reaching out towards this. In the pre-Darwinian days there was always the hope that God's revelation of Himself in nature, in history and in Christ would prove to be, somehow, all of one piece. Later developments and applications of the Evolution doctrine have made this hope more central and more sure. We catch now more than a glimpse of man's origin, growth and destiny. From the beginnings of cosmic history up to its destined completion in the perfect man, we see the continuous unfolding of the divine purpose. We see man first emerging from a condition less than human, destined to pass through struggle and failure to his goal; bearing the handicap of his inheritance; compassed by infirmity, dimly conscious of duty, faintly capable of aspiration, taught by experience and by the intimations and intuitions brought 'from that imperial palace whence he came': then enlightened by the visions of the seer and the messages of prophets, and in the fulness of the time by the complete revealing of the divine purpose and process in the Incarnation, and all the while—and still with greater fulness—the Spirit bearing witness with his spirit that he is the child of God, partaker of the Divine nature.

The Modernist thinks he sees continuity in all this, one increasing purpose running through the ages. 'Irruption' and 'invasion' are not terms of his choosing. He thinks of God's processes as all of a piece. The natural and the supernatural seem never to be very intelligible terms of distinction, and as they approach intelligibility the dichotomy becomes less and less satisfying.

This is, perhaps, the place to say something about the Modernist's attitude to miracle. Miracle is very largely a matter of definition. Everyone is agreed that the world is full of *Miracula*. If a definition is preferred which lays stress on the abnormality of occurrences, then (I think) the view of the Modernist is that he does not find additional evidence of divine activity in the mere fact of abnormality. And even if abnormal occurrences could prove anything it would not be anything of religious value. Matthew Arnold's humorous quip about the pen and the penwiper embodies a good deal of wisdom.

The Modernist never says that miracle cannot happen. He is too conscious of the marvel of the Universe to say that anything cannot be merely because of its wonder or its strangeness. He only thinks that it is a mistake to suppose that God is revealed more in the strange, the incalculable and the abnormal than He is in the ordinary course and process of His working.

As to whether any alleged happening really took place, that is a matter to be determined in the court of historical inquiry. He only urges that if the evidence should prove to be inadequate, that inadequacy should not be countered by the plea that the abnormal is more congruous with religious expectation.

Now I pass to my adjective '*Constructive*.' I emphasize the word because it is often suggested that those who have the modern outlook are in their methods and activities destructive. In a measure this is true, and necessarily true. Let us be quite frank about it. The Modernist is bound to be destructive. There is so much in possession of men's minds which is antiquated, obsolete and untrue: it needs to be cleared away. This is the tragedy of so much modern unbelief. Men suppose that they are rejecting Christianity, or at least that they are unorthodox, because they are unable to accept the misconceptions of a

generation ago, or, it may be, the misconceptions which can plead a prescription of centuries.

Bishop Gore would not wish to be called a Modernist, and no one could strive more assiduously than he to be constructive; but he finds that he cannot make headway as a constructive teacher of the Bible without publishing a vigorous polemic against 'the doctrine of the Infallible Book.' Crude conceptions of Christian faith, which few in these days would positively teach, are part of the traditional heritage of the man in the pew. I do not say that he believes them: he probably does not; but he thinks that the parson does, or at least that he is supposed to.

There is first his composite portrait of God: largely Hebrew, partly pagan, very imperfectly Christian. This is the incongruous background of all his other beliefs. It is really necessary to have explicit repudiation here. It has to be said, with unmistakable clearness, that no conception of God can be true which is unlike that picture of Him made known to us in Jesus Christ. But that means the destruction of a good many 'graven images.' There is need for the Iconoclast.

But although it is true that to some extent the Modernist is bound to be destructive, repudiating explicitly the false and the obsolete, it would be a sorry business if that were the whole of his endeavour. It is necessary to clear the ground of derelict buildings; but the final end of this is that on the cleared ground the builder of to-day may do his constructive work.

But lest this simile should mislead, let me here say that when I use the word 'constructive' I am not thinking of the building up of any theological system. It would be presumption on my part to attempt a construction of that sort; and, if I were capable of undertaking it, it would have very little to do with what I am concerned about in this paper. My purpose is something different.

I want to meet the misgiving of those who are disposed to say, 'You Modernists may be useful for an intellectual minority, for those whose faith is more a philosophy than a religion; but what message has it for the man in the street? Has it a spiritual challenge? An awakening power? Can it make a vital and authentic appeal to the thousands who 'live and die unknowing of the greatness of their lives'? Can it help the

prodigal in the far country? Can it hold out hope to the despairing, and show the way of life to those who are dead in trespasses and sins?' If it cannot do this it is no gospel for the modern world.

What then is the positive message which the Christian of modern outlook wants to deliver to mankind?

The fundamental part of this message is its doctrine of God, and for the moment I mean by that phrase only that the love revealed in the Incarnation and by the Cross is the true and complete expression of the Divine character. The Modernist tries to express this in the most unequivocal and uncompromising way. He pictures God as the Father of the prodigal son, and sees there the hope of the penitent. He never wants to qualify or amend this portrait: never suggests that God is love but also something else. That fearless proclamation is the most fundamental part of his message.

Next in importance is his doctrine of man. This shares with all other presentations of the Gospel message in a clear recognition of sin, of an estrangement from God, of feebleness in spiritual desire, of weakness and failure in spiritual endeavour. It recognizes to the full that only by the grace of God—that is, by the Divine indwelling—can any progress upwards and onwards be made.

All this it has in common with that doctrine of man which the Evangelical or the Catholic world formulate. And yet there is a difference: to some extent only a difference in emphasis, but in some measure a difference more radical.

A good deal of conventional Christian teaching—especially of that sort which finds expression in mission preaching—is urgent in its endeavour to produce a 'conviction of sin.' This is stressed with much emphasis to make a proper background for the doctrine of Redemption. Man is born under a curse; rebellion and malignity are his inheritance; his righteousness is as filthy rags. Irrelevant phrases culled from the poetry of the prophets are chosen for a pictorial description of his natural state—'wounds and bruises and putrifying sores.' If in an honest introspection he thinks he can discern something cleaner and more benign, he is bidden to remember that the heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. The dark

shadow of Augustinianism rests oppressively on the preacher's anthropology.

Now I suggest that the perspective here is all wrong. It seems to be assumed that the essential thing about man is his sinfulness. But the truth surely is that the essential thing about him is the Divine image with which he is stamped and the glorious possibilities of his manhood.

I am not forgetting man's proneness to sin—the sins of the flesh and the yet graver sins of the spirit. A conflict has to be waged and a victory has to be won; but I do not think that we stimulate to that conflict best by insisting that men shall realize how bad they are, instead of urging on them how much better they are meant to be and might become: to what a gloriously transfigured life they are called and destined.

It has been said that the modern man is not thinking about his sins. That is probably true; but it is largely because we have gone about the wrong way to make him conscious of them. He is too sincere to call himself a worm and vile earth, and week by week (despite reiterated absolutions) to go on calling himself a 'miserable sinner.' It is no audacious pride, but just a humble remembrance of his high lineage which makes him readier to respond when he realizes that God is not calling on him to abase himself in the dust but rather is saying to him, 'Son of man, stand on thy feet and I will speak with thee.'

God and Man: then the Interpreter of both. Central in the Modernist's message is the fact of Jesus Christ. No speculation or deduction about the unfathomable mystery of His pre-incarnate being; but the *fact* of Jesus Christ as the manifestation here in history and experience of the utmost man can know about God, and of his own relationship to God and to his fellow-men. Believing as he does that the deepest need of every human soul is to know God (and in that sense to have a true theology), and that the plain need of human society is the guidance of a true ethic and the inspiration of a constraining loyalty, for both—for the knowledge of God and for the understanding of men—he finds his message as simple and direct as that which St. Paul took with him on his first visit to Corinth: 'I determined not to know anything amongst you save Jesus Christ and Him crucified.'

Someone may suggest that I am missing or ignoring theological implications, avoiding what is termed 'definite teaching' by the use of general and indefinite phrases. I am not concerned to deny it. I think I have already made it clear that it is the message of religion rather than the science of theology that I am discussing. The charge of vagueness does not trouble the Modernist much. He is often agnostic about many things where others speak confidently as if they knew. His soteriology, for example, is often large and indefinite; but he is quite clear that it is God's will that all men shall be saved and shall come to the knowledge of the truth: saved from selfishness and sin and enabled to make response to the upward calling of God. And he sees both the incentive and the power for this in the Christ of Calvary and the indwelling Christ, or Holy Spirit, of experience. Of the Atonement he most probably would say, with Canon Wilson, that 'the Incarnation *is* the Atonement.' He finds his thought running in the tradition of Abelard and Rashdall; but he is content to express it in the large general Pauline phrase, '*God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.*'

His whole message to the world is, as I have said, Christocentric. Everywhere and always he points to Jesus Christ. He does not greatly care with what preconception men approach that Life, or whether their interpretation of it accords strictly with tradition. At best, he knows, they will very imperfectly understand it either as a fact of history or of experience. But he is quite sure that *there* is the centre of all spiritual truth and the source of all moral power.

That is the message of good news which he wants to deliver: a doctrine of God and a doctrine of man. God, a loving Father, unlimited in beneficence, overflowing with generosity, making His sun to rise on the evil and on the good and sending rain on the just and on the unjust.

And man, His child—even the prodigal in the far country—yes, and more amazing still, even the unlovely elder brother who never transgressed a commandment — man: with all his failures and his sins, and with all his upward longings and that innate conviction which he has that he is meant to be something better than he is: to him the Gospel appeal comes.

And what is that appeal? To secure his personal safety? To escape Hell and win Heaven? These are the traditional ideas of the Church's evangel. They strike the wrong note. To the Modernist the 'Gospel trumpet sound' is the call to a great adventure: to fill life with a great purpose: it is the appeal to all that is most manly in manhood for loyalty and love for self-forgetfulness and service.

Here I was about to stop. But it occurs to me that someone may ask: 'What has the Modernist to say about life beyond the grave?' I answer that the Modernist, as I know him, combines a fundamental confidence with a chastened reticence. He does not feel at liberty to indulge in that licence of affirmation which has characterized some other forms of Christian propaganda; but he sees all temporal things in the light of eternity and believes that God is not the God of the dead but of the living, for all live unto Him. His confidence that the Divine life, with its infinite potentialities is in every man—even though it be but a spark, waiting to be kindled into flame—leads him to indulge the further hope that the destiny which seems to be inherent in the Divine purpose for each will not ultimately be frustrated, although he is quite sure that it can never be accomplished except through each man's willing co-operation with that purpose. He realizes that 'souls are in the making,' and that in our patience, our endurance we have to win them; but he cannot, so easily as the Dean of Chester, think of any of them as finally without 'survival value.' He does not dogmatize, but he cherishes the hope that 'at last far off, at last to all,' in the infinite patience of God and in the boundless resources of Divine discipline, love will be shown to have power to subdue all that is loveless in God's estranged children.

PETER ABÉLARD

By the Rev. A. Henderson, Vicar of St. John de Sepulchre, Norwich.

PETRUS ABAILARDUS, the most brilliant thinker of his age, was born at Pallet, near Nantes, in 1079. Of noble family, but preferring the scholarly to the knightly career, he gave himself up to the study of philosophy, going from school to school and sitting under the best masters of the day. When scarcely twenty years of age, he attended the lectures of William de Champeaux at the Cathedral School of Notre Dame in Paris. William, a disciple of St. Anselm, and founder of the great Abbey of St. Victor, and later Bishop of Chalons, was a thorough-going Realist. One day, Abélard stepped forward from amongst the students, overcame the master in discussion, and thus commenced the long controversy which ended in the downfall of the Extreme Realism, which, until then, had been the dominant school of philosophic thought. Perhaps it may not be amiss to explain this statement. The Realists maintained that Universal Ideas, *i.e.*, abstractions such as humanity, whiteness, etc., are objective realities, having an existence independent of the intellect. Their opponents, the Nominalists, asserted that they are merely words, things of thought, mere subjective representations. Abélard maintained that Universals are neither merely words nor objective realities, but generalized Ideas. It was his realistically tempered Conceptualism which resulted in the Moderate Realism which produced a practical unanimity amongst the later Scholastics, and is thus summed up by St. Thomas: 'A Universal is in the Many; and is a One outside the Many.' In these words he points out the twofold being of a Universal, namely, its Being in things, and its Being in the Mind.

At the age of twenty-two Abélard opened a school of his own at Melun; but in 1108 he returned to Paris, where, renewign the discussion on Realism, he came out victorious. For a time he presided over a school at St. Genevieve; then, turning his thoughts to theology, after attending, at Laon, the lectures of a master named Anselm — not, however, the future Archbishop of Canterbury—he stepped into the chair of his former

master, William de Champeaux, at Notre Dame, and, though only in minor orders, was nominated a Canon of the Cathedral. Of splendid presence and cultured delivery, Abélard attracted students from the whole of Europe. It is said, indeed, that there was no building in Paris large enough to accommodate, at one time, all who came to hear him.

Then came the unfortunate incident of his love for his pupil, the beautiful and learned Heloise—one of the most touching romances in history—which ended so miserably in Heloise taking the veil in a convent at Argenteuil, while Abélard assumed the habit of St. Benedict in the Abbey of St. Denis.

But such a mind as Abélard's could not remain long inert, and so we find him, at forty, once more resuming his lectures and regaining his former influence. Publishing his *Introduction to Theology*, he brought upon himself the hostility of St. Bernard on account of his rationalistic treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity. Condemned by the Council of Soissons, though no one seems clearly to understand the precise reason,[1] he was again obliged to retire to a monastery—that of St. Medard, at Soissons. At last, permitted to withdraw from the convent, he secluded himself, living as a hermit in a lonely place near Nogent-sur-Seine. But his retreat was soon discovered, and students flocked to him, living in tents and huts in the waste places round about. His scholars built an oratory for him, which he named 'The Paraclete,' and here he found consolation in teaching. His *Historia Calamitatum*, written about this time, in which he recounts the misfortune of his life, drew from Heloise, now Abbess of a Community of Nuns, those three letters which will ever stand as amongst the most beautiful expressions of womanly faith and devotion.

But Abélard was not to be allowed to remain in obscurity. Returning, at the earnest solicitation of his followers, to Paris, he again came into conflict with his enemies. His work *Sic et Non—Yea and Nay*—caused serious misgivings in many minds by showing, under a hundred and seventy-five heads, how the

[1] It has been suggested that, puzzled by his dialectic, the Council found it difficult to determine which of two heresies—Monarchianism or Tritheism—he really held. They contented themselves, however, with condemning him for having published his book without the Pope's consent.

Fathers of the Church contradicted each other, and how impossible it is, from patristic evidence alone, to obtain absolute unanimity in the statement of doctrine; maintaining that the Fathers are to be read in a discriminating temper, and how men must be exceedingly careful how they brand as heresy every deviation from an accepted standard. William, Abbot of Thierri, wrote a letter to St. Bernard full of violent denunciation. 'The works of Abélard,' he said, 'cross the Alps and the seas, and his pupils are to be found amongst the most powerful in the Court of Rome.' St. Bernard, at once roused to action, bitterly assailed Abélard as one who, having formerly juggled with dialectics, had now turned to rave against the Sacred Scriptures (*De Erroribus Abailardi*, cap. i). Great was his horror that the dogmas of the Church should be thrown open to discussion, and that 'all over France, not the scholars of Paris merely, but ignorant boys and fools (*stulti*) should every day, at street-corners, in hall and in cottage, be discussing the Mystery of the Trinity' (Letter 370). 'On the Trinity,' he says, 'Abélard thinks with Arius; on Grace, he is Pelagian; on the Incarnation, he is Nestorian'—*Cum de Trinitate loquitur, sapit Arium; cum de Gratia, sapit Pelagium; cum de Persona Christi, sapit Nestorium* (Letter 192).

Bernard wrote to Abélard admonishing him; Abélard replied with a challenge to discuss the points at issue before a council of bishops. Bernard, the most powerful man of his day, caused a council to be summoned to meet at Sens, and getting the bishops together on the evening of the day before the first session, in Abélard's absence, he caused a list of propositions taken from Abélard's writings to be drawn up for condemnation. Whether Bernard was afraid to meet his skilful adversary in disputation is an open question; but when Abélard was informed of the private proceedings of the previous evening, he refused to defend himself and appealed to Rome. The propositions were duly condemned, and St. Bernard wrote at once to Rome to forestall Abélard's appeal; with the result that Innocent II confirmed the action of the council, Abélard being condemned unheard. It was at Cluny, whither Abélard had arrived on his way to Rome, that he learned that his appeal had been anticipated and judgment already pronounced. Worn out

and broken down by his constant struggles against so many and bitter enemies, and broken-hearted by the unfairness of his condemnation, he remained for a time in the Abbey of Cluny, and then, taken by friends to the Priory of St. Marcel, near Chalons, after lingering awhile, he died on April 21st, 1142. At first he was buried at St. Marcel, but Heloise had his remains removed to the 'Paraclete,' where she had formed a small community, and where she herself died a few years later. From place to place the bodies of the devoted pair were moved, until they at last found a resting place in the Cemetery of Père la Chaise in a double tomb, which to this day rarely lacks decorations of fresh flowers, the offerings of those who regard it as the shrine of blighted love.

CUI SOLI PATUIT SCIBILE QUIDQUID ERAT.

(To whom alone was manifest whatever is knowable.)

Such an encomium as that inscribed on the tomb of the great Abélard may seem extravagant, but it is difficult to speak in terms too high of one whose chief fault—if fault it were—was that he towered above his contemporaries as an intellectual giant, thereby drawing upon himself—perhaps also by a certain haughtiness and dogmatism—the persecution of smaller minds than his own. It may be that it has been reserved to our age to do justice to the memory of this great and fearless scholar. It is not the present writer's province to express an opinion concerning the main results of Abélard's teaching; but of his treatment of the doctrine of the Atonement it has been well said that, at the present day, what was judged as Abélard's 'heresy' would be welcomed 'as the very heart and essence of Christ's good news by Christians of almost every shade of ecclesiastical and theological opinion. It is the love of God revealed in Christ which really wins the human heart. The Abélardian doctrine was held by William Law, and was the main cause of the rupture between Wesley, whom he had so greatly influenced, and himself. Abélard, in the twelfth century, seems to stretch out hands to Maurice, Kingsley, and Robertson.'[2] Of this doctrine, three points may be noted:

(1) There is no vicarious punishment.

[2] Hastings Rashdall, *The Abélardian Doctrine of the Atonement*, in *Doctrine and Development*, chapter iv.

(2) The atoning work of Christ is not limited to His death, but includes His whole life and teaching.

(3) The justifying effect of Christ's work is a real effect, not a mere legal fiction; for, says Abélard, 'I think that the purpose and cause of the Incarnation was that Christ might illumine the world by His wisdom, and excite it to the love of Himself.'

Such was Abélard's answer to Anselm's question, Why did God become Man? How strange that such a doctrine should have been solemnly included in a list of Abélard's 'errors' by the writer of that precious hymn, *Jesu, dulcis memoria!*

One other important contribution to exact thought, in part ethical, in part theological, was that made by Abélard in regard to the doctrine of Actual Sin. Our ordinary conceptions, inherited from the Schoolmen through the Casuists, are in certain respects defective. We speak glibly of sin as 'mortal' or 'venial,' as 'formal' or 'material,' and we classify sins according to their *gravitas*, or *parvitas materiae*. It would seem, however, that we are in danger of stereotyping these distinctions, and no little harm is done by attempts to draw up lists of sins as either objectively 'mortal' or 'venial,' with little regard to the subjective aspect of the question. The Schoolmen were not always correct in their interpretations, and were apt to be too cut and dried in their distinctions. We know that any act, to be either virtuous or sinful, must have its root in the deliberate act of the Will. Here Abélard, with his usual acuteness, laid stress on the morality of the *intention*, rather than on the objective distinction between good and evil actions. It is not, he said, the physical act itself, nor any imaginary *injury* to God, that constitutes sin, but rather the psychological element in the action, the intention of sinning, which is formal contempt of God. The modern thinker will not be tied by the 'legalism' which is so prominent a feature in Moral Theology, but will, following Abélard, deal with the question of sin rather from a subjective than from an objective standpoint.

Although Abélard, in his own day, was accused of exalting reason at the expense of faith, he was by no means an innovator in this respect. And though he was censured by his contemporaries, yet the Schoolmen of the thirteenth century took up

his method, and 'with a fearlessness equal to his own, gave full scope to reason in the effort to expound the mysteries of the Christian Faith (*Catholic Encyclopædia*, Art. 'Abélard').

The most important of Abélard's works were:

PHILOSOPHY: *Dialectica. Liber Divisionum et Definitionum.* Glosses on Porphyry, Boetius, and the Aristotelian Categories. De Generibus et Speciebus.

ETHICS: *Scito teipsum, seu Ethica.*

THEOLOGY: *Sic et Non. Tractatus de Unitate et Divinitate Divina. Theologia Christiana. Introductio in Theologiam. Dialogus inter Philosophum, Judaeum, et Christianum. De Trinitate. Sententiae.*

AUTOBIOGRAPHY: *The Story of my Calamities.*

CHRISTIAN UNITY AND CHINESE CHRISTIANS*

By the Rev. TIMOTHY TINGFANG LEW, Ph.D., D.D., S.T.D., of Yen-ching University, Peking.

THE subject assigned by the Conference for this evening is: 'The Necessity of Christian Unity for the Missionary Enterprise of the Church.' I shall first present to you the message of the Chinese Church concerning the necessity of Unity. In 1922 there was held in Shanghai the National Christian Conference of China, the greatest Conference of its kind ever held in China. One thousand delegates, five hundred Chinese and five hundred missionaries, representing every Protestant communion, were assembled. That Conference issued a message to the Christian Church. The very first passage of the message is entitled, 'The United Church.' It reads as follows:—

> 'We Chinese Christians who represent the various leading denominations express our regret that we are divided by the denominationalism which comes from the West. We are not unaware of the diverse gifts through the denominations that have been used by God for the enrichment of the Church. Yet we recognize fully that denominationalism is based upon differences, the historical significance of which, however real and vital to the missionaries from the West, are not shared by us Chinese. Therefore denominationalism, instead of being a source of inspiration, has been and is a source of confusion, bewilderment and inefficiency. We recognize also most vividly the crying need of the Christian salvation for China to-day, and we firmly believe that

*An Address delivered to the Lausanne Conference on Faith and Order and published in *The Chinese Recorder.*

it is only the united Church that can save China, for our task is great and enough strength can only be obtained through solid unity. Therefore, in the name of the Lord, who prayed that all may be one, we appeal to all those who love the same Lord to follow His command and be united into one Church, catholic and indivisible, for the salvation of China. We believe that there is an essential unity among all Chinese Christians, and that we are voicing the sentiment of the whole Chinese Christian body in claiming that we have the desire and the possibility to effect a speedy realization of corporate unity, and in calling upon missionaries and representatives of the churches in the West, through self-sacrificial devotion to our Lord, to remove all the obstacles in order that Christ's prayer for unity may be fulfilled in China.'

Having presented this message, my humble task is to try to indicate to you the trend of thought among Christians in China, so far as I can ascertain them, concerning the desire for the Unity of the Christian Church as expressed in that message.

The necessity for Christian unity is clearly expressed in the message which I have just quoted. The necessity has become even greater than ever before, particularly in the following aspects.

First of all, the magnitude of the work of evangelization continually demands a united Church. There are in China over four hundred million souls, only four hundred thousand of which are members of Protestant communions; that is, only one in a thousand. There are about one million and a half in the Roman Communion, which is only one in two hundred and sixty. There are over two thousand walled cities in China; the Gospel has only been carried to two-thirds of these. Among the hundreds of thousands of villages and small towns, a large number have not heard the Gospel. There are provinces as large as the whole of France or Switzerland which have no permanent churches.

Facing such a field, we see what an amount of work there is to be done, what a crime it is to waste any strength, to misdirect any energy on anything other than the absolute essentials! But how can we avoid such waste unless there is true unity?

Secondly, not only the magnitude, but also the nature of the work is urging us with increasing force for unity. It is the glory of the Christian Gospel that it has been presented to China not as a mere system of philosophical thought, or a mere set of theological doctrines, or a mere system of ecclesiasticism, but

as a life of service. Christianity is known in China through its magnificent service rendered by its devoted servants in educational, medical and other forms of social uplift. Christian schools and colleges, hospitals, dispensaries and many other institutions of social service, have stood as the living message of the Gospel and an eternal monument of the Christian Church in the hearts of the nation. They exemplify the spirit of the Son of Man, who came to minister. The various missions which entered China severally inaugerated work on different lines. In recent years their experience has compelled them to unite in these endeavours, because only unity can give efficiency to their task, and only unity can make it possible for such institutions to maintain decent standards, guarantee their growing life and assure their continual progress.

Thirdly, there is rising in China an all-powerful nationalism which challenges Christianity. Underneath all the civil strifes and disturbed conditions in China, there is a fundamental unity of the Chinese people—a unity which has never been impaired. This unity is speaking through the leaders of the national movements ; it is crying for the fullest expression. The Chinese people are following their leaders, laying down their lives, strenuously working against tremendous obstacles for the speedy realization of complete national unity. Anything that either interferes with the effort to attain such unity, or may threaten its permanency after they have attained it, is looked upon as the very enemy of their nation. Christianity is being looked upon with grave suspicion at this moment in China, because while it professes to teach love and unity, it is divided against itself. Some national leaders have pointedly asked, 'Can Christianity, which has caused and supported so many wars in Western history, which is at present minutely divided in its own household, be a factor of help to China at all in her present life and death struggle for national unity? Can one guarantee that Christianity, with all its divisions, will not be a constant irritating and dividing factor in the body politic of the new China?' Only a united Church can meet such a challenge.

Facing this great necessity for unity, Chinese Christians are praying for a common confession of Faith. Such a common confession of faith must conserve all the fundamental elements

of the Christian religion as once delivered to the Saints and transmitted through the living Church throughout the ages. Chinese Christians plead for serious consideration of three particular aspects.

This common confession of faith should not be a mere intellectual statement. It should not merely be based on our Gospel, but also be identical with it. Thousands of Christians gave up wealth, health, livelihood, social standing, life-careers, and everything that human beings crave for and hold dear, in order to accept Christianity and to confess their faith in Jesus Christ. Some of them did so at the cost of their lives and died martyrs' deaths. They have entered into the eternal glory with Christ, such glory which saints of any confession will be proud to share. But the confession of these Chinese Christians usually consisted of *John* iii, 16, together with the great Commandment and the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount and the Lord's Prayer. These they learnt from the Bible and understood in the light of the revelation they received through prayer. It may be a surprise to you, if not a shock, that most of the Chinese Christians knew neither the Apostles' Creed nor the Nicene Creed. Their confession was the Gospel itself, learnt from the Word of God and made real by the lives Christians lived.

The second aspect of this common confession of faith is that it should not fail to give explicit interpretation of the human relationship in terms of the divine. The Chinese as a race and as a nation have been preserved by the grace of God for five thousand years. Our philosophy of life is based upon ethical human relationships. Chinese Christians believe that in confessing faith in Jesus Christ they confess their faith in the Saviour who came to fulfil and not to destroy. We wish to know how our faith in Him fulfils the need of all human relationships. For example, the relationship between men and women, whether in marriage or in friendship, is a problem vital to the growth and happiness of every human being ; mistakes in such relationship lead to misery and sin. In this modern world of freedom, every man and woman urgently needs more definite spiritual guidance from our faith. Chinese Christians would heartily join the Bishop of New York in his plea before this

Conference for a definite stand on the question of marriage and sexual morality.

Then there is also the relationship between employer and employees, upon which rests not only the prosperity of nations, but even the peace of the world. The issues arising out of this relationship are knocking at the door of the Church demanding explicit answers. Such a demand is loudly heard in China today, for China is facing a great social and industrial revolution. There is also the relationship between parents and children. Filial piety has been the source of all loyalty and devotion in China, and it has been a potent force in preserving China throughout all these centuries. In recent years, Chinese Christians are facing this problem with renewed interest, for Christianity has never given a very satisfactory answer to the Chinese on this great issue. We cannot pass without mention, in this World Conference, the relationship between nations. Finally, then, if our Christian faith is faith in the Prince of Peace, we must in our common confession make unmistakably clear the issues relating to national loyalty and international goodwill.

Chinese Christians see in the Incarnation of God the possibility of making human relationships Christ-like. They hope to have a common confession of faith which will not merely confess their faith in the divine, but also explicitly confess their faith in the regenerating life and in human relationships made divine by Christ.

It is an open secret that the Christian Church is losing its hold upon the old members of the congregations and is not altogether successful in winning the younger ones. The causes of this failure are, of course, complicated. But among all the factors stands out prominently the unwarranted indifference and unintelligent timidy of the Church's attitude towards Science. Our daily life—Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant alike—has been gradually but steadily changed by the increasing knowledge of science and its effect upon our environment. Our conception of the Universe, the fundamental philosophy of life, have all been profoundly, though unconsciously, affected. Many scientists have followed the lead of God, moved on, and are able to understand more clearly and fully the truth concerning

God's creation, His wisdom and majesty. Yet we theologians, ministers of the Gospel—we who claim to understand God and are entrusted with the grave responsibility of teaching men about God—have not taken courage and moved on. We have not grown in the understanding of God's Universe. And we have not endeavoured to follow the Spirit of God, to find out the significance of these newly discovered scientific truths, and show their relation to our faith in God. We seem to be content to let the world go on heading toward a materialistic faith, and the materialistic and mechanistic interpretation of the Universe has bewildered many a Christian in the Church and is holding back many who might have entered the Church, but have passed by. This is not only the peril of the West; it is also the peril of the East. The peril is staring China in the face to-day. It cannot be overcome by mere contemptuous indifference, or unintelligent dogmatism. It can only be overcome by a united confession of faith on the part of all Christians, a confession which understands Science and spiritualizes it. I think it is not a mere coincidence, but a part of the Divine Guidance, which we prayed for, that without any conscious choice this World Conference on Faith and Order should hold its full sessions in the up-to-date, well-equipped Hall of Science of this University of Lausanne.

Looking from a long distance at the Church in the West, many Chinese Christians are inclined to believe, so far as the Churches in the West are concerned, that questions relating to Order seem to present more difficulty to unity than questions related to Faith, and they believe that it should not be so. There are two outstanding thoughts in the minds of Chinese Christians concerning Order: they have seen in the last hundred years men from different nations who came to China with the sanction of different communions, under different orders, and some from communions that give no formal ordination. They have watched their work and their lives; they have found in every communion both saintly servants and also others who are unworthy of the order they claim. The same is true of the Chinese ministers who receive ordination from them. Chinese Christians, with all their appreciation and traditional respect for institutional form and symbolic authority, fully realize the

problem of apostolic succession, yet they can only set little value on the *mere* formal sanction of the ministry by external authority. What they do emphasize is the Divine call which the Apostles heard directly from the Master—'Follow Me.' What we want out in China are Christlike men, men who are redeemed, men who have a message, men who truly follow the Master in unselfish service to the suffering millions. To such men will come influence and authority, because they live with God. Differences in external rite will neither add nor subtract anything. For, as the Bishops of the great Anglican Church said in the famous Lambeth Appeal, their ministers are 'manifestly blessed and owned by the Holy Ghost as effective means of grace.' *The great majority of Chinese Christians will not ask how a man is ordained, but how he lives, how he preaches and how he serves.*

There is just one other important trend of thought among Chinese Christians concerning 'Order' which I wish to touch upon. In the development of the Chinese Church we find that women have played a very important part. To an increasing number of Chinese Christians of this generation, there is a definite hope that in the completely united Church of God there should be nothing that can be interpreted as 'prejudice against women.' They shall serve the Church in every capacity so long as they are qualified for it. There shall be equality between men and women in all opportunities and offices of the Church, according to the coming day.

The vision of the united Church is very real to Chinese Christians. May I share with you a few glimpses of it?

First of all, the united Church should be a Church richer in spiritual grace. Three weeks ago I attended the Conference of the United Methodist Church in England, and saw that great Communion busy with the task of the Kingdom. I deeply felt how much that great leader Wesley meant to them and to the Methodists all over the world. Two weeks ago I was in Constance (Germany), where Huss was tried and sentenced to be burned. I worshipped in a church where his name was a real spiritual inspiration. To-day I stand here where Calvin once stood. I feel that I again stand on another holy spot from which has radiated to all parts of the world a great spiritual power.

We are standing now at the threshold of a new era of the Christian Church. Looking forward, we see a vision of the United Church. We cannot help but glance back at the roads by which we have severally come. There we see that the path of division was stained with the tears of the Saints, and sanctified by the crimson blood of the martyrs — those Saints and Martyrs who heard the Voice of God and offered themselves to make the specific messages of God clear to their own generation. They feared no man and they scorned death. Their witness testifies to the richness of the all-embracing truth of an infinite God. We stand, therefore, in the presence of these historical facts with wonder and awe; we see how God has raised in Divine power what we sow in human weakness. We must preserve those testimonies heroically made. We must treasure the riches which they have bequeathed to us. I believe that I am voicing the sentiments of the Chinese Christians when I say that the united Church must be a Church richer in God's grace, and fuller in the understanding of His Will, than any single communion heretofore has ever attained alone.

Secondly, the united Church should be a growing Church. The centre of our Gospel is Jesus Christ. He is not only the Way, the Truth, but also the Life. Life is never static: it either grows or declines. The united Church shall more than ever make the headship of Christ real. She shall be, in her united career, capable of imparting life to all. She herself must have a divine vitality for continuous growth. She shall be free from all the shackles of narrow traditions which often stunt growth. She shall steadily outgrow all the partial interpretations of God's truth. She must continually 'grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ.' I believe I am again voicing the sentiments of Chinese Christians that it is only with such capacities of all-round, complete, and never-ceasing growth that the united Church can for ever be united and never again suffer divisions as she has in the past.

And finally, the united Church should be a Church not for a section of the world, but for the entire world. The peoples in the Far East were prepared by God for the revelation of Jesus Christ through the Sages and Prophets of their own race. They have their own spiritual and religious inheritance, which are in

some aspects different from those of the races of the Western nations. Their inheritance helps them to understand the purpose of God in Jesus Christ in their own way. It may give them a certain insight and understanding which the West has not yet achieved. There is among the Chinese Christians now a felt command of God to interpret Christianity in terms of the spiritual inheritance of the Chinese race. They believe that such interpretation, when made together with their own spiritual experience, should find a wider expression. It does not belong to them alone, but should become the possession of the whole Church Universal. Just as the Churches of Judaea, of Asia Minor, of Egypt, of Greece, or Rome, and later of the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon races, together with other races have successively poured into the common treasury of the spiritual experience of the Church Universal their special racial genius and religious endowment, both in thought and practice, so should the great races of the Far East make their future contribution. The movement for an indigenous Church is growing more audible and more persistent in China. It is the hope of the Chinese Christians that the united Church will be enriched by the contribution of the indigenous churches, not only of China, but also of Japan, India and other lands.

Can such reunion be realized? Are there not many difficulties in the way? Yes, there are. The Chinese Christians are not unsympathetic to the difficulties of our task. But these can be overcome. They can be overcome if we truly make Jesus Christ the centre of everything. This does not mean mere lip confession. It means complete surrender of ourselves to Him.

Fellow Christians, to achieve our unity we must follow our Master into the Garden of Gethsemane once more, facing the cup of complete self-denial, and pray with one accord : 'Father, Thy will, not mine be done.' To achieve unity we must follow the Saviour all the way to Golgotha, and there nail on the Cross all our personal preferences, individual habits, group prejudices, petty jealousies and deeply entrenched interests. To achieve unity we must die with Him and rise again. We must follow the risen Lord to Mount Olivet—there to acquire a new outlook, an outlook that takes in the entire world.

KANT AS A RELIGIOUS THINKER

By the Rev. F. L. Cross, M.A., B.Sc.

IN 1924, the bi-centenary of Kant's birth, Professor Webb delivered a course of lectures at Oxford devoted solely to the consideration of Kant as a religious thinker. These lectures have recently seen the light in a more permanent form.[1] Based on a study of those works of Kant which deal with religious subjects (including the recently published, and highly important, *Opus Postumum* edited by Prof. Adickes), these lectures form a contribution to a side of Kant which appears not to have been specifically treated before in English: they manifest that wide yet unobtrusive learning which we have come to expect from the writings of Professor Webb; and, since the lectures refrain from any extensive treatment of present controversies on the Kantian philosophy (controversies which centre in the main in Kant's theory of knowledge and only subordinately bear on his philosophy of religion), and since there is no attempt to offer any evaluation except such as would be universally accepted of the positions which Kant advocates, the treatise is likely to remain for a long time our classical text-book on the attitude of Kant to the problems of religious philosophy.

For the philosopher in particular undoubtedly, for the learned world as a whole probably, Kant is the most important figure in European thought since the Renaissance. The favourite word by which he designated his position was the word 'critical.' His attitude to life, to philosophy, to ethics, to religion, all found expression in that word; and his three *Opera Magna* all bore the title of *Critiques*. Yet Kant was not merely a critical thinker; he was also a constructive genius. If he was critical of the traditional philosophy of the *Aufklärung* (which was, in Germany, little more than the philosophy of Leibniz run to seed) and equally critical of the sceptical philosophy of David Hume, he yet laid the constructive basis of a new era of philosophy which is not yet closed. If he criticised all the traditional proofs of God's existence, he constructed a new type

[1] C. C. J. Webb: *Kant's Philosophy of Religion.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926. Price 12/6.

of argument based on moral experience and a new interpretation of the Universe grounded in value, both of which have been of great significance in subsequent theistic thought, as illustrated by the writings of (to mention only living English writers) Professors Sorley and Pringle-Pattison and the present Bishop of Manchester. The greatness of Kant lies mainly in the fact that in him the critical and constructive faculties (if I may use this favourite word of his which has since come into disrepute among psychologists) were singularly and equally developed.

In consequence of his critical attitude, Kant never built up a *system*. The philosopher in general tends to be actuated by two distinct motives—that of paying regard to the manifold facts of experience (taking the word 'facts' in the widest sense), and that of attempting to find the unity behind those facts. These may be designated the 'scientific' and the 'unitive' tendencies respectively. In so far as the unitive tendency is absent, a man has perhaps no right to be called a philosopher at all. Yet, to judge by the history of philosophy, if the unitive tendency be allowed a real place, there is necessarily a certain distortion of some apparently obvious facts. If the unifying factor in the Universe be conceived as Spirit, the seeming reality of the external world has to be explained away as 'appearance.' If the unifying factor in the Universe be simply matter, the seeming reality of mental experience has to be likewise explained away by some such formula as 'compresence.' Whether or not such distortions are a necessary and justifiable sacrifice need not be discussed here. The point to be observed is that there is always a tension between the scientific tendency, which makes sure and certain knowledge the goal, and the unitive tendency, which makes system the goal. Now there can be no doubt that it was the former motive which dominated Kant. It is only necessary to read the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to be convinced. His aim was to bring metaphysics into 'the sure course of a science.'[2] Wherever Kant found a difficulty, he never glossed it over. He invariably faced both sides of an antinomy, and often preferred to

[2] *Den sicheren Gang einer Wissenschaft.—Kr. d. r. V.*, ed. Valentiner, p. 30.

leave them unreconciled rather than to give a facile but obviously distorted 'resolution' of them. We find again and again, as Professor Kemp Smith[3] has so strongly insisted, two or more mutually irreconcilable proofs of the same proposition.

Anyone looking casually through the table of contents of any of Kant's greater works might be somewhat surprised at this; he would observe that everything appears to be arranged thoroughly systematically. These skeletons, however, are deceptive. They are not the synopsis of systematically developed lines of thought, but only pigeon-holes into which the philosopher's views on various topics could be placed. Often there are contradictions within the same pigeon-hole, and still more frequently contradictions between the contents of one pigeon-hole and those of its neighbours. A further point to notice is that something had to be placed in every pigeon-hole, whether or not there was useful material to hand for it; in this way there is frequently needless, and sometimes misleading, repetition in the *Critiques*. This structure of Kant's works—to which, it may be observed, their author seems to have been peculiarly attached—is usually termed their 'architectonic.' When its presence has been recognised, we have gained, to a large extent, the key to the understanding of Kant's writings.

That stern ascetic regularity which we are accustomed to associate with the life of Kant manifested itself in his religion.[4] He was brought up in a family which held strictly to pietistic principles, and must have been much influenced by Pastor Schultz, who was both the headmaster of his school at Königsberg and also as *Pfarrer* responsible for the spiritual care of the Kant family. But from an early age Kant seems to have doubted the value of that pietistic faith, and soon to have abandoned what would ordinarily be designated personal religion. It is well-known that he thought that any man would be ashamed if he were discovered by another in the act of saying his prayers. He himself never attended public worship in

[3] N. K. Smith: *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.*

[4] De Quincey, in his famous essay on *The Last Days of Immanuel Kant* (Everyman's ed., pp. 162-209), gives many details (derived mainly from Wasianski) of the *personal* history of Kant, in which he 'takes it for granted that all persons of education will acknowledge some interest.'

mature life except when Rector of his University; and, as Professor Webb notices,[5]

> 'he even remarks, in a note on Prayer communicated to a certain Professor Kiesewetter who came to Königsberg to sit at his feet in the years 1778-9 and 1791, that with a real advance in goodness there goes a disuse of prayer—an observation (adds Prof. Webb) which it would be hard to justify from a considerable survey of Christian experience.'

Kant's religion, like his later Theism, was not that of his contemporaries.

His reflections on questions of religion can be traced back a long way in his life—to his first published treatise, *The General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755). Here he recognizes the value of the 'physico-theological' (*i.e.*, teleological) argument for God's existence, yet he holds that it is not irreconcilable with the strictly mechanistic conception of the Universe. The teleological argument, however, was soon abandoned, for in 1763 he published a treatise, *The Only Possible Ground of Proof for a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, wherein he defended the so-called ontological argument (in a modified form) as the 'only possible' argument, though even that argument was not 'necessary.' This argument, it will be remembered, was first formulated by Anselm in his *Proslogion*, but its rejection by Aquinas led to its being generally discredited in the later Middle Ages (as it still is by modern Neo-Scholasticism). Descartes revived it in a slightly different form[6]; and, with further modifications, it was accepted both by Spinoza and Leibniz. Kant thus appears to have believed that the traditional Cartesian argument was at least possible; though he concludes the treatise in question with the characteristic remark:

> 'It is altogether necessary that we should be convinced of the existence of God; but it is not equally necessary that we should demonstrate it.'

Nevertheless the book was placed on the *Index* at Vienna.[7]

[5] *Op cit.* p. 23.

[6] This difference is important, since the criticism directed against the argument in the *K.d.r.V.* on the basis of Kant's theory of the judgement is distinctly more damaging to the Cartesian than the Anselmian form. It should be noted that Kant describes it as 'the ontological (or Cartesian) proof.' *Cp.* A. E. Taylor, s.v. 'Theism' in *H.E.R.E.*

[7] *Cp.* Vaihinger's edit. of the *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Einleitung*, p. xv.

Passing over what Professor Webb describes as 'perhaps the most entertaining' of Kant's writings, his 'Dreams of a Ghost-seer' (the Ghost-seer was Swedenborg), we come to the last of the works of the Pre-Critical period. This was his inaugural professorial dissertation entitled *De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis* (1770). This writing is in a sense 'semi-critical.' We find here the world of appearance and the world of reality, the world of sense-perception and the world of pure thought, sharply differentiated. Knowledge of the latter as it is in itself is possible by means of the concepts of the understanding, of the former only through the forms of space and time. Professor Webb interestingly observes[8] that at this point of his career Kant's views appear to have approximated to those of Plato more closely than at any other.

The development of Kant's mind between the years 1770 and 1781 has always been a fascinating subject, for within that period he published practically nothing; yet within those years he progressed from the pre-Critical to the Critical standpoint. We are not without some hints as to the road along which his ideas developed, for careful study of the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows unmistakable differences of view, differences which it is difficult to believe that the philosopher ever held simultaneously. There has arisen in consequence a *Quellenkritik* of that book, the principles and results of which are to be seen in Professor Kemp Smith's *Commentary*. As the Biblical student knows well enough, the first problem is to separate the sources; the second problem to arrange them in chronological order; and the third to find, if possible, their absolute dates. In the case of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the scholar is unfortunately not assisted by differences of style (this remains uniformly difficult). Yet the result of these eleven years' meditations was the most influential work in philosophy since the Renaissance; and a work whose influence was not least in the sphere of the philosophy of religion.

The knowledge of the noumenal world which Kant had still allowed in the dissertation of 1770 was now finally rejected. All knowledge was only of the phenomenal. We can never know things as they are in themselves. Not only the cosmo-

[8] *Op. cit.* p. 39.

logical and the 'physico-theological' arguments, but also the 'only possible' argument of 1763, are now abandoned. The cosmological and teleological proofs in any case (argued Kant) clearly needed supplementing by the ontological argument; for even if the former proofs led to the conclusion that a First Cause or a Designer of the Universe necessarily existed, they did not of themselves suffice to prove that that First Cause or that Designer was God. Only the ontological argument implied this last conclusion. And now, by the famous argument of the hundred dollars, this was rejected. It is impossible, urged Kant, to pass from concept to existence, from the concept of God to the existence of God. Existence is not a predicate which can be attached to reality like the other predicates:

> 'By whatever and by whatever number of predicates—even to the complete determination of it—I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement, this thing exists. . . . If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing exists—if it exist at all—with the same defect as that cogitated in its conception; otherwise not that which was cogitated, but something different, exists.'[9]

From the idea of God, therefore, we can never pass to the fact of the existence of God. The 'only possible' proof of the existence of God must suffer the same fate as the other two; and speculative theology must be relegated to the same place as astrology and magic. Of the central Ideas of religion—God, Freedom, and Immortality—we must remain in eternal ignorance.

In the decade following the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant produced several treatises. The *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and the *Critique of Judgement* (1790) both appeared, which, together with the first *Critique*, constituted the great triology dealing (at least in their architectonic ideal) with science, ethics, and art respectively. In many respects the last of them, the *Critique of Judgement*, attempted to bridge the sharp cleavage which had been so strongly emphasized in the other two between knowledge and morality, between the understanding and the reason. In 1787 appeared the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; here Kant considerably modified (in Schopenhauer's opinion, for the worse) some of his earlier views, and some of the sections were entirely recast.

[9] *The Critique of Pure Reason*, E.T. (Bohn's ed.), pp. 368*f*.

Kant said, in a famous phrase—it occurs in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*—that he had 'to remove knowledge in order to make room for faith.' In the first *Critique* knowledge was adequately 'removed.' God, Freedom, and Immortality had been shown to be only 'regulative Ideas'; they played no part whatsoever in the 'constitution' of experience. But in the second *Critique*, Kant sets before us another sphere, that of the noumenal world, where different principles prevail. It is the sphere the existence of which we become aware through the *moral consciousness*. This moral consciousness, the 'stern Daughter of the Voice of God,' reveals to us an imperative, a Categorical Imperative, which says to us 'Do this' and 'Do not do that.' This Imperative can be justified only on the supposition of the reality of the three Ideas, God, Freedom and Immortality. With Freedom, this is evidently the case. And the fact of the wicked prospering like a green bay-tree necessarily leads on to the further belief in God and Immortality. For on the one hand the Categorical Imperative reveals to us certain duties which we feel bound to perform irrespectively of the consequences and yet we often find that the wicked prosper; on the other hand, the moral consciousness reveals that in the Universe ideally there should be a proportionate distribution between virtue and happiness, that the wicked man should not prosper, and that ultimately righteousness should receive its reward. The only guarantee of such a distribution as morality in the end implies is the existence of a future life where a proper distribution of rewards will be made, and a God who will be there to make such distribution. God, therefore, like Immortality, is a necessary Postulate of the Practical Reason.

The subject of the second *Critique* constituted for Kant the essence of religion, since for him religion and morality were to all intents and purposes synonymous. And it was in morality that his real interest lay. Here, of course, he differed from his predecessors of the *Aufklärung* (*e.g.*, Leibniz), who tended to see the goal of human existence in the intellectual culture of the *élite*. An interesting passage, quoted by Professor Kemp Smith[10] from Kant's *Remains*, is the following:

> 'I am by disposition an enquirer. I feel the consuming thirst for knowledge, the eager unrest to advance ever further, and the delights

[10] *Op cit.* lvii.

> of discovery. There was a time when I believed that this is what confers real dignity upon human life, and I despised the common people who knew nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This imagined advantage vanishes. I learn to honour men, and should regard myself as of much less use than the common labourer if I did not believe that my philosophy will restore to all men the common rights of humanity.'

A full account of the *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* (*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, 1793) is given by Professor Webb in his lectures.[11] It is essentially a treatise for the student, and should be embarked upon only by those who have learnt what Kant's attitude to religion is from his other works. It is a valuable supplement, however, to the earlier works; and, as might be expected, is mainly concerned with a re-interpretation of religion from the standpoint of ethics. It appears on the surface to deal much more specifically with the problems of traditional Christian theology than is actually the case. Nearly all the leading ideas of Christianity, such as 'original sin,'[11a] 'the Kingdom of God,' 'the Son of God,' 'grace,' have a place in it; but they are re-interpreted in the light of the Kantian ethics, divorced from all that is exclusively religious. At every step the book manifests Kant's fear and dread of pietism; yet this moralism is not without its merits:

> 'There is in Kant a singular lack of the unction which, in some writers on religion, and even in some philosophers, kindles and feeds in their readers the flame of pious feeling. It is . . . part of the value of his work that it lacks an attraction, the presence of which has too often served as an apology for lack of thoroughness in thought.'[12]

Here and there in the treatise are scattered notes of considerable interest on isolated points, such as Miracles (pp. 95-101), the Virgin Birth (pp. 90*f.*), the Nature of the Church (pp. 114-117).[13] Though miracles are not inherently impossible at the end of one dispensation (Judaism) and the beginning of another (Christianity), belief in them is not a meritorious act in the sight

[11] *Op. cit.* pp. 87-177. There does not appear to be an English translation of the book in print.

[11a] The phrase which Kant uses for 'original sin' is *peccatum originarium* instead of the more usual *peccatum originale*, a fact which suggests that Kant's 'familiarity with the official theology of his country was not much more intimate than his acquaintance with the interior of its churches' (N.P. Williams: *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin.* Bampton Lectures for 1924, p. 499).

[12] Webb, *op. cit.* p. 115.

[13] The references are to Vorländer's edition of the *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft.*

of God. No one seriously believes that miracles happen at the present day.

> 'The judge (however much credence he gives to miracles when in church) listens to the delinquent's assertion of the diabolical temptations he has suffered as if nothing had been said' (pp. 98*f.*).

The characteristics of the true Church are unity, purity, freedom, and unalterability; these 'notes' are discovered on the basis of the four groups of categories—a curious instance of Kant's 'architectonic.'

That such an account of the nature of religion has many elements of permanent value in it is obvious. In his concluding chapter, Professor Webb states and develops what he considers to be three such elements of truth. These are (1) the implicit rationality of Religion; (2) the implicitly ethical character of Religion; and (3) the ethical or ethically rational character of the Christian Religion. With regard to the first point some care is necessary. There are many passages in Kant which lead to the view that he was 'irrationalist'; and, if 'rational' be understood as an epistemological, as opposed to a logical, attribute,[14] the outcome of Kant's position was doubtless Irrationalism. Yet the very title of the second *Critique*—*The Critique of Practical Reason*—is sufficient evidence to show that Kant regarded morality, *i.e.* (for him) the sphere of religion and ultimate reality, as rational. In its very essence, Christianity was ethical and Christianity was rational. For a further discussion, the reader must be referred to Professor Webb's book.

Yet, in spite of the merits of Kant's philosophy of Religion, it had very considerable limitations, limitations which for the philosophy of Religion in general are sufficiently serious, but which for the philosophy of the Christian religion are even more so. Four of these will be singled out here.

(1) First and foremost among them is the complete absence in Kant of any historic sense.[15] He grew up in an age which had little interest in the historic individual and which considered as the proper object of study the universal. Humanity was an abstract whole, called upon to fulfil an abstract Impera-

[14] For the importance of this difference, see Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis.*

[15] *Cp.* Webb, *op. cit.* pp. 208-210.

tive; and no place was found for the concrete conditions of human life. Yet in a philosophy of the Christian Religion some genuine place has to be found for history. Christianity is a religion which has its roots in a historic Incarnation, in an event which took place at a definite moment in the time-process, in an event which had never taken place before and which will never take place again; such an Incarnation was possible in view of what Troeltsch has designated the 'onceness' (*Einmaligkeit*) as a characteristic of events in the historic process. A philosophy which is based ultimately on universals can never give any adequate place to the essence of the Christian teaching. How such a synthesis is to be effected between the temporally-conditioned historical event and the demands of the universal and absolute principles which are implicit in religion, is the greatest and most baffling problem with which the philosophy of Christianity is faced. It was recognized as such by one who probably devoted more attention to it than any other modern teacher, Professor Ernst Troeltsch;[16] and though he has collected invaluable material and contributed much himself to the elucidation of the problem, he never discovered a satisfactory answer. In England (largely under the influence of Troeltsch), the late Baron von Hügel attacked the problem; some account of his studies are to be found in the recently published Second Series of his *Essays and Addresses*. If the problem is that of the individual and the universal under a different guise — a problem which goes back at least to the time of Plato—it needs to be recognized that there are difficulties connected with the *historical* individual which are absent from individuality in general. If there be any truth in the contention of Oswald Spengler that we are living in a 'Faustian' age, which is peculiarly capable of understanding the past, it may be that the solution of the problem is a vocation to which the present age is called, for in virtue of our Faustian *Weltanschauung* it may be that we are peculiarly favourably constituted with a view to its solution. It should be noted that the problem is not merely academic. The answer given to it determined the difference in significance attached to the historic Jesus by the Liberal Pro-

[16] See especially *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (*Ges. Schr., Bd. III*); and, more briefly, *Christian Thought, Its History and Application.*

testantism of Professor Harnack and the Catholic Modernism of the Abbé Loisy; and the practical implications of this difference are sufficiently obvious.[17] At whatever conclusions he may arrive, it is impossible for the Christian philosopher to take up an attitude to history such as is the necessary outcome of the philosophy of Kant.

(2) And just as the meaning of history was a closed book to Kant, so too was the nature of the religious consciousness. Kant attached no importance to, and probably never even understood, what Baron von Hügel describes as 'the mystical element of religion.' No doubt this was the case largely in reaction from his pietistic upbringing. He seemed to possess what modern psychologists would doubtless describe as a *Schwärmerei* complex; and the attitude which he took up towards Swedenborg in his treatise of 1766 was but an expression of his general attitude towards specifically religious experience. If it is true, as Professor Webb points out, that the moral law tended to evoke in Kant a sentiment closely analogous to religion, yet in theory, at any rate, religion tended to centre for him in a reasonable morality. The identification of religion and morality, however, does not correspond with the specific nature of the religious consciousness, which, when analyzed, is found to be completely different in nature and in content from the nature and content of moral consciousness; and it corresponds no more with the fact (if it be thought to throw any light on the question) that, as far as the question of origin is concerned, religion and morality appear to be independent. The religious consciousness is, as it has been generally recognized since the time of Schleiermacher, something *sui generis*; and religion has its basis in an activity of the spirit which, however closely it may in Christianity be bound up with morality, is something which is fundamentally different from it. Professor A. E. Taylor, in one of the best popular defences of Theism of recent years,[18] shows that the moral method of approach is indeed one method of approach; yet the highest method of approach is by the path of religious experience, 'from God to God.'

[17] The problem is interestingly discussed by Troeltsch, *Ges. Schriften, Bd. II: 'Was heisst "das Wesen des Christenthums"?'*

[18] I refer to his essay entitled 'The Vindication of Religion' in *Essays, Catholic and Critical.*

(3) And further, even the ethics of Kant are defective. Two points will be considered: (*a*) their formalism, and (*b*) their asceticism.

(*a*) Is it possible from the Categorical Imperative to deduce any *content* for the moral law? The essence of morality was determined by Kant to consist in appealing to and following the categorical demands of conscience. But there arise 'cases of conscience' when from the complexity of the facts of concrete life that appeal gives no answer; in such 'cases,' the 'casuist' is needed to supplement the Categorical Imperative. Kant recognized this fact and proposed three maxims which should aid in the application of his principles in particular cases. These maxims were not altogether happily propounded. They tend to be either mere tautologies or else to be inconsistent with the principles of the Categorical Imperative. The examples which he gives in illustration of the first maxim: 'Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature,' are singularly unsatisfactory. When suicide is forbidden because if it were to become a universal law there would be no one left to commit suicide, he fails to see that the maxim similarly applied would condemn the hero's death. And the objection urged against borrowing without intention to repay—that if such were to become a universal practice borrowing would naturally cease—is hardly more convincing. The plain fact is that on Kantian principles it is impossible to deduce any content for ethics. Kant was convinced that ethical principles (like all other principles) could be *a priori* only if they were formal, that is, devoid of content.[19] In maintaining that the principles of ethics were *a priori*, he was undoubtedly justified, as against all forms of Hedonism and Utilitarianism. Yet the equation of the field of the *a priori* with that of the formal is no longer possible, still less necessary. Recent developments in mathematics have sounded the death-knell to this illusion; though not these alone. That orange lies in the scale of colour between red and yellow; that of two different notes one must be higher in pitch than the other; that love is a higher value than justice; these are cases of *a priori* re-

[19] A powerful criticism of Kant's ethics from this standpoint is to be found in Scheler: *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wert-Ethik.*

ationship which are as far from being merely 'formal' as they ould be.

(*b*) The strong dualism between the sensuous and the ational, between the understanding (*Verstand*) and the reason *Vernunft*), is reflected in the Kantian ethics. Kant held that ı all actions which a man does naturally and with delight he is ctuated by the desire for pleasure. Consequently (so Kant rgued) in the sphere of reason, of true morality, we are never ctuated by a desire for pleasure, but always the reverse. As a esult there is a strong ascetic strain which runs through the hole of the Kantian ethics. Schiller's epigrammatic caricature f the Kantian position is well-known:

> 'Now a man can be sure at last he is doing his duty, when he does it with aversion';[20]

nd in his essay entitled *Anmut und Wurde* he writes:

> 'In the Kantian moral philosophy, the idea of duty is expounded with a rigour . . . which could easily tempt a weak understanding to seek moral perfection by the road of a dark and monkish asceticism.' 'Man not only may,' continues Schiller, 'he *ought* to bring pleasure and duty into union; he ought to obey his reason with joy.'[21]

Kant's interesting reply to these criticisms is quoted at some ngth by Professor Webb.[22] Yet, whatever the Königsberg hilosopher may have admitted in theory, his morality still re- ıains largely that of the policeman.

(4) And finally, all through the Kantian system there is a rong element of the 'subjective.' Kant was seeking through- ıt for *a priori* principles, and he inherited a tradition which ıw the *a priori* solely in the 'subjective.' The twelve cate- ɔries, being *a priori*, were concepts of the understanding, *ormungsprincipien*. In the words of Professor Kemp Smith,[23] ɔr Kant

> 'not passive contemplation but active judgment, not mere conception but synthetic interpretation, is the fundamental form, and the only form, in which our consciousness exists.'

nd so too in his morality. The only way in which the moral w could be conceived to be absolute was by assuming that it ıs 'autonomous'; any non-subjective basis for morality was cessarily 'heteronomous.' Both as regards knowledge and ɔrality Kant's theory here conflicts with the facts of experience. nowledge claims to be the apprehension of something which

[20] Quoted by Webb, *op. cit.* p. 96.
[21] Quoted, Vorländer, *op. cit.* p. lxi.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 97*f.*
[23] *Op cit.* p. xlii.

is objectively present, not the construction of something by a process; morality claims to be action in accordance with an absolute non-self-imposed law, not action in accordance with a law imposed by the self.[24] Still less can such 'subjectivism' satisfy the demands of religion. Von Hügel has done much to show the importance which the element of 'Givenness' plays in all religion. Religion involves the apprehension of the supra-subjective, of the objectively real. It is concerned primarily with the Other, and only secondarily with the self (as Otto rightly points out against Schleiermacher).

Kant has profoundly influenced subsequent religious thought, but this influence has not been exercised through the *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*. Schiller, after reading the book in proof, wrote:

> 'Neither theologians nor philosophers (at least, none of the great mass of either) will render thanks to the author of this treatise, which nevertheless is quite worthy of him.'[25]

And history has verified his prediction. The great influence of Kant on the philosophy of religion has been in his theory of knowledge and in the sections on Theology in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: and, of course, in his ethical teaching. Through Hegel, he profoundly influenced the philosophical interpretation of Religion; and, through Ritschl, the religious interpretation of philosophy. Whether or not the 'results' which Kant reached have been beneficial or otherwise is a question about which there is room for much difference of opinion; on the whole, we are inclined to believe that the defects which we have pointed out above tend to outweigh those merits of his teaching which are stressed by Professor Webb in his concluding chapter.[26] But the Kantian *method* has been of inestimable value. It has taught us to dig down to the foundations and has stimulated that free investigation into the problems of religion which is a characteristic of the modern world. Only by drinking deeply of the Kantian spirit can we hope to bring the philosophy of religion into the 'sure course of a science.'

[24] On this point, see N. Hartmann: *Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus*; in the *Jubiläums-Heft* of the *Kant-Studien* (Bd. xxix; 1924).

[25] Quoted, Vorländer, *op. cit.* p. lx.

[26] Prof. Webb also singles out two defects in Kant's philosophy of religion for discussion: (i) Its unhistorical and individualistic character; (ii) Its hypothetical (*als ob*) character.

THE MEANING OF THE RESURRECTION TO PAUL

By the Rev. C. H. Dodd, M.A., Mansfield College, Oxford.

WHEN Paul reviews the 'evidence for the Resurrection' in I *Corinthians* xv, he names a number of persons who can say beyond a shadow of doubt that they had personal dealings with Jesus Christ after the date of the Crucifixion. He ranges himself among them, implying the substantial identity of the experience to which they laid claim with that which he describes as his own. For him, this personal dealing with Christ meant a powerful sense of touch with the Divine ('. . . the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ'; '. . . His Son in me'), through which his whole life was changed. Something of the same kind Paul recognizes as having been the experience of Cephas, James, and the rest.

The question of the 'objectivity' of such experience is on one side simply the question of the objectivity of *any* experience of the Divine. Such experience eludes our analysis in the last resort. Psychology may treat it as subjective through and through, and yet something remains which no religious man will ever regard as anything but objective, and that because it changes his life.

But no touch with the Divine is in the strict sense immediate. 'No man hath seen God at any time'; *i.e.* God in His essence is not an object of human experience. Always the Divine is mediated. Isaiah 'saw the Lord' in forms supplied by the cult of the unreformed Temple at Jerusalem (his vision being no less 'objective' for that). So Paul and the others saw God in forms supplied by their experience of a living man who had strangely died. They saw the divine glory 'in the face of Jesus Christ.' Now Cephas and 'all the apostles' knew Jesus very well indeed. It is more likely than not that Paul had seen Him in the flesh; at least he must have had a pretty vivid conception of His personality through the Christians whose talk had exasperated him to fury. The united certainty, therefore, of Paul and the rest

that the human Form in which they had seen God was absolutely continuous with Jesus the Carpenter of Nazareth, crucified at Golgotha, is of great significance—however we may express that significance. In any case, this continuity, or identity, is *given* in the experience to which Paul appeals. For us, it is not so given, but needs support. Such support it finds in the fact that the ethical-religious life produced in those who had the vision was specifically that for which Jesus had stood.

Here then is Paul's *datum*: Jesus, who died, is alive, and to 'see' Him is to be in the presence of God for good and all. What then had happened after Calvary? For a Greek in the Platonic tradition it would have been easy to say that, the mortal body of Jesus having died and been buried, his 'soul,' being by nature immortal, continued to live in the unseen world. Paul could not take this view. He was a Jew. For the Jew there was no complete duality of body and soul: there was a body animated by soul. When the body ceased to be animated, the man was dead and done for. *Something* doubtless survived in Sheol, but it was certainly not the 'soul' in the Platonic sense, the better part of the man. Sheol was the abode of the inanimate, the unconscious, the entirely impotent. 'The dead praise Thee not, neither they that go down to Sheol.' If therefore the question is raised, 'If a man die, can he live again?' an affirmative answer can only be given if there is a power which can cause that which is dead to live. Later Judaism came to believe that God, the original Creator of life, could and would in certain cases actually perform this miracle of causing a dead man to live again—to live, of course, as an animated body—how else?

If therefore Jesus died and is alive, it must be that after He died (and 'descended into Sheol,' as our Creed has it) 'God raised up Jesus from the dead.' That which was raised was a body—but of course not the body of flesh and blood which was crucified and buried, for 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God.' In I *Corinthians* xv Paul elaborates an argument to show that there may be bodies of all kinds; there are bodies of flesh and there are bodies of light or 'glory,' such as those of the sun, moon, and stars. Even among bodies of 'glory' there are different kinds. And so (we may conclude)

though we cannot know exactly what kind of 'body of glory'[1] Christ has, there is no difficulty in the world in believing that He was raised in a 'body,' without any suspicion of crass materialism. But further, we ourselves may, according to Paul, expect to be raised in a 'body' which, while it is as different from this body of flesh as a plant is from a seed, is yet as continuous, and indeed in a deep sense identical, with this, as the plant is with the seed from which it has developed. So (we may conclude) the resurrection body of Christ is continuous with the body in which He died, and yet totally different from it in all but identity of being. One sees Paul working out a conception of 'body' in which that term stands for the concrete individual entity, which may exist without loss of continuity in many phases, using for its self-expression various kinds of 'substance,' much as our physical body continues self-identical throughout all change of its material particles.

In harmony with all this we should expect Paul to hold that after the dead body of Jesus was put in the grave, its material particles were completely replaced by some inconceivable but real kind of substance fitted for habitation in the spiritual world, the 'body' or concrete individual entity, remaining self-identical. If he had heard the story of the Empty Tomb (as he may well have done) he would have had no difficulty in accepting it; it was exactly what he would have expected. But we observe, nevertheless, that he never uses the Empty Tomb as 'evidence.' The evidence was of a superior order—the direct witness to personal dealing with the living Christ on the part of those who had known Jesus well.

Much of this is very strange to our thinking, and certainly no one to-day need feel obliged to accept Paul's curious metaphysics. But we shall never understand the significance the Resurrection had for him if we insist on reading his language in the light of Platonic notions of a natural 'immortality of the soul,' instead of in the light of Jewish thought, for which all resurrection is miracle, being the bringing to life of that which was really and truly dead.

For Paul, this scheme of metaphysics made it possible to hold rationally a belief of which he was religiously convinced—

[1] *Phil.* iii, 21.

that Jesus was alive as a power in the spiritual world, and without any loss of personal identity: 'it is Christ Jesus who died —nay rather who is risen again—who is at the right hand of God.'[2] But being at the right hand of God does not involve any separation from us. He is in us, and we in Him. Within the sphere of spiritual relations He is in the closest touch with us. For there is a sense in which we too are 'in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus.'[3] There is a strange interpenetration of two worlds. Paul is here equally removed from the robust 'this-worldliness' of the prophets and from the pessimistic *schwärmerei* of apocalyptic, with its sharp separation of the life of this age from the life of the age to come.

To appreciate this remarkable position we must again dig into Paul's Jewish past. In the later centuries of post-exilic Judaism there had been an increasing tendency among Jewish thinkers to depreciate the world of actual experience, a tendency quite easily to be understood in the circumstances. The reality of God's rule they never doubted; but all enjoyment of its benefits they postponed to the future. *Then* all the religious blessings promised by God to men will be revealed and will be the lot of the righteous; *until then* they are laid up in heaven, inaccessible to men. The present age in which men live is an evil age, in which no good is to be looked for. (See especially IV *Ezra*: there is no Jewish writing which does so much to make clear Paul's pre-Christian outlook.) In particular this age is the age of death. The older faith of Israel held that death is the end, and had been content with the religious blessings that this life affords. Centuries of crushing misfortunes had broken down this contentment. Death came to be felt, not as the natural close of a life rich enough in blessing, but as a horrible seal upon the essential evil of this life. But there was no help for it—until the new age should dawn. Then there would be for men a life worth calling life—'the Life of the Age to Come.' Then at last the righteous dead, who meanwhile, like the wicked, 'are not,' would be called into existence by the sovereign word of God, to inherit all the unfulfilled promises of their religion.

This belief Paul had held. Then he discovered that one who had lived as a man, his own contemporary, and had died,

[2] *Rom.* viii, 34. [3] *Eph.* i, 3; ii, 5, 6.

was alive. What conclusion could he draw but that the 'Age to Come' had dawned? The power of death, the head and front of all evil, was broken by the power of God; broken, too, in a signal instance, where death and evil had *seemed* victorious over a life all good.[4] He had always believed that in the long run God would prove more powerful than death and all evil; now he knew it by an incontrovertible sign. He, Paul, was living in the age of miracle, the age of unfettered divine action. Naturally the Messiah, the Son of God, is the 'first-fruits' of the new era; but, once begun, the Age must run its full course, and 'each in his order' will enter into life.

The inference from the resurrection of Christ to the resurrection of Christians (in I *Corinthians* xv) seems to many of us to-day forced and not wholly convincing. That is partly because we tend to think in terms of 'the immortality of the soul.' If we believe in that doctrine, it is unlikely that we believe in it because of a prior belief in the resurrection of Christ. But Paul, as we have seen, did not think in these terms. Nor, when he looks forward to the resurrection of Christians, is he expressing the conventional belief of late Judaism that the righteous 'will rise again in the resurrection at the Last Day.'[5] The age of resurrection is here, and the process of resurrection is already begun, even for living Christians.

Here Paul's 'Christ-mysticism' is of regulative significance. This is not the place to discuss the meaning of the pregnant phrase 'in Christ Jesus.'[6] It is enough to say that it implies the closest possible union between Christ and His people. The fellowship of Christian believers 'in Christ' is such that it constitutes for them 'the Life of the Age to Come.' The 'gifts of the Spirit' had always been expected in the age of miracles. Well, now they are here, and 'the Lord is the Spirit.' Here is the sign that Christians have already 'translated out of the dominion of darkness into the Kingdom of the Son of His love.'[7] Indeed the 'body' in which Christ now lives is, mystically speaking, His Church, the fellowship of His people. To be a 'member' of that 'body' is to be 'one Spirit' with Christ

[4] *Rom.* vi, 9; *Col.* ii, 15.
[5] Cf. *Jn.* xi, 24-26, which is in complete harmony with Paul's thought.
[6] Deissmann's monograph on the subject is still the standard work.
[7] *Col.* i, 13.

whose 'body' it is.[8] There is, logically speaking, a metonymy here; but we are out of the sphere of logic. We are in the sphere of mystical ideas, which find fitting expression only in sacrament. The bread which we break is a communion of the body of Christ. The outcome of it all is that we do not merely hope that 'at the Last Day' the faithful dead will live again; we share with Christ here and now a life already victorious over the power of death. So certain is this for Paul that he can believe that many Christians will pass from the phase of 'flesh' into that of 'glory' without any interruption.[9] His expectation that this would be so gradually waned, but it was always for him a possibility, and this in itself shows how relatively unimportant physical death had come to be.

Behind this mystical sense of life lies the experience of 'death to the world'[10]—a moral break with the past, felt as a sharing in the passion of Jesus. That, however, is preparatory; the substantive thing is 'newness of life' in the Body of Christ and therefore 'in Christ,' or 'in the Spirit'—'eternal life' as a present possession. Empirically, indeed, the 'resurrection' out of sin and death into newness of life is incomplete. Our real life is a hidden life—it is 'hid with Christ in God,'[11] but it is not the less real for that. Out of the hiding-place, 'with Christ in God,' flow the energies by which the empirical life is being transformed. Everything follows from the conviction that the fellowship of a risen Saviour is a fellowship in the Age to Come —the age of triumphant divine power.

Little has been said here of the Christological aspect of Paul's belief in the resurrection. It is true that he makes the supremacy of Christ as 'Lord' a sequel of the resurrection; but this is not a case of cause and effect. Christ is not 'Lord' *because* He rose again. He is 'Lord' because, being risen and alive for evermore, He is such as He is—the One whom to see is to see the glory of God. Nor is it probable that Paul's own belief that Jesus was Messiah was a direct inference from belief in His resurrection. Of course, he could hardly have believed

[8] I *Cor.* vi, 17.
[9] I *Cor.* xv, 51; cf. *Rom.* viii, 11.
[10] *Rom.* vi, 1-11; viii, 1-11.
[11] *Col.* iii, 1-3.

in a dead Messiah ; but it is not clear that the simple fact that Jesus had risen would have carried for a mind of Paul's antecedents the whole weight of a necessary inference to His Messiahship. His real grounds of belief in this article were other. On the other hand, the belief in the Lordship of the risen Jesus certainly affected the interpretation and valuation of His historic life and death.

To conclude, I conceive the two principal permanent elements in Paul's gospel of the Resurrection to be these : First, the supreme and final mediation of the Divine is henceforward through a living Person for ever identical with 'the Jesus of History.' This guards Christianity against exalting any impersonal, pantheistic, or vaguely 'spiritual' forms of religious experience, and equally against dependence on a dead tradition of the past. It keeps it to that thoroughly distinctive apprehension of the Divine in Jesus Christ, as historical and yet eternal, which is of its essence. Secondly, that which happened after the death of Jesus meant the beginning of a radically new relationship between the world of common experience and the world of eternal divine energies. It really was a new age that was initiated by the manifestation of Christ to His disciples after His death; and things can never be the same again. The distinctively Christian outlook is neither this-worldly, nor wholly eschatological, nor merely mystical. Though the Christian life is lived 'in the flesh,' it is yet 'hid with Christ in God,' and fed continually by 'the power that raised up Jesus from the dead.' In some measure this has become part of the subconscious outlook of all Christians, so that they scarcely realize how distinctive it is. But it is only to be maintained and promoted by 'the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave Himself for me.'

PROF. JULIAN HUXLEY'S RELIGION*

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

LESLIE STEPHEN was in the habit of saying that all sensible men had the same religion, though none of them would say what it was. Professor Julian Huxley is less enigmatic, and we may be grateful to him in consequence. He not only tells us what are the doctrines in which he believes, but gives us an account of his own religious development and experience. His doctrines he expresses in a somewhat negative form by declaring that he believes neither in a supernatural revelation nor in a personal God.

Professor Huxley's method of approach to religious truth is interesting and characteristic of the times. The approach through 'the so-called revelation of Scripture' he rejects as 'simply an appeal to mythology.' All metaphysical approaches he regards as defective because 'the God which they claim to reveal has no relation, so far as can be observed, with the various gods or aspects of God which humanity in its thousands of millions has actually worshipped.' That is to say, the God of philosophy is not the God of religion. There remains a third method, 'humbler, simpler, but perhaps surer.' This is the method of Natural Science; it consists

> 'in the refusal to accept authority as such, in an insistence upon the study of facts, and upon inductive reasoning from the facts as its main method, and therefore in a rejection of all purely *a priori* schemes or those which start with deduction before they are ready with an inductice basis.'

The pursuit of this inductive method led Professor Huxley to conclude

> 'that man has actually worshipped certain aspects of the powers which he sees and feels operating in and through outer nature and his own life. Some of these powers turn out to be the blind forces of Nature; others the ideals and emotions of his own soul; others are the half-mechanical, half-personal forces of society.'

Thus divinity—that which is worshipped—must be 'stripped of the personality which man had projected upon it from himself,' and will be found to consist in 'the sacred' or 'the holy' in

**Religion without Revelation.* By J. S. Huxley. (Benn: 8/6.)

things. And the religious sense or sentiment is the 'sense of the sacred.'

> 'From this as standing-point all religion takes its flight, and only gradually (though inevitably) do the moral and the intellectual become attached to it and fight their battle for completeness and unity.'

Professor Huxley's own experiences certainly seem to indicate that a belief in a personal God, as found in the traditional religions, is not an indispensable basis of religious experience. In fact, it would follow that it is an *interpretation*, and not a basis at all. He wrote his autobiographical chapter—no easy or pleasant task—purely for the purpose of proving this :

> 'I am only concerned to show that, contrary to the express or implied assertions of many upholders of revealed religion, belief in revelation or in a personal God (let alone the details of orthodox Christian theology) is in no way indispensable to religious experience, religious struggle and religious development.'

With regard to Professor Huxley's repudiation of the idea of a supernatural revelation, it may be assumed that as a man of science he finds an insuperable difficulty in the supernatural events (*i.e.*, *contra naturam* miracles and fulfilled predictions) which traditional theology regards as guaranteeing that revelation. The phrase 'supernatural revelation' is patient of diverse interpretations, but if by that is meant a supernaturally revealed dogmatic system, then the Modernist is whole-heartedly with Professor Huxley, since historical research has revealed the fact that no such supernaturally revealed system exists. The orthodox theology has grown up by a gradual and natural process of accretion and assimilation—the product of reflection on a growing experience.

Professor Huxley is not blind to the need for some new method of reaching religious truth to replace the now discredited idea of a system of miraculously revealed dogmas. The new theology, he tells us, will rest on a threefold basis : agnosticism, evolutionary natural science, and psychology. These suggestions seem to us in some ways admirable, in some ways defective; but we may proceed to examine them.

Agnosticism is a wide term extending from an habitual inability to make up one's mind upon any speculative subject to the definite and dogmatic position that all things beyond the range of the five senses are unknowable. If the new theological method is to be based on this technical sort of agnosticism, it will

not lead far. It may consequently be assumed that this radical agnosticism is not meant, but rather an attitude of mind which is hostile to all dogmatism; in a word, the attitude of the man of science suspicious of all *a priori* theories. The Modernist in search of a new method would agree that this sort of agnosticism must form part of its basis.

With regard to evolutionary natural science, by this we may presume Professor Huxley to mean, not the mere fact of man's animal origin, but what may be termed an adhesion to evolutionary modes of thinking. Such a passage as the following clearly typifies this method:

> 'Religious systems which were inevitable products of humanity's childhood or of his adolescent thinking, which may indeed have been the necessary scaffolding for some better building, are not for that reason final. Ideas which in their time and season meant immense advance . . . may actually become harmful when circumstances alter and the old ideas are found to be hindering the progress of new and better ideas.'

This thinking in terms of development is characteristic of the Modernist attitude, and it is safe to say that it will dominate the ideas of the future. Yet, rightly used, it does not result in relativism, *i.e.*, the idea that what is true to-day was not true yesterday, and will not be true to-morrow. What develops is our comprehension of truth, not the truth itself.

There remains psychology, a most dangerous word and thing. Yet if the new theology is to be based, as it surely will be, upon experience, psychology, which is the analysis of that experience, will be a *sine qua non* of theological method. In his most valuable and fascinating chapter, *Personalia*, Professor Huxley with great candour and entire simplicity gives us an account of his own religious development:

> 'Once the magic doors were opened and my adolescence became aware of literature and art and, indeed, the whole emotional richness of the world, pure lyric poetry could arouse in me much intenser and more mystical feelings than anything in the church service . . . . It was some of the purely aesthetic feelings which were aroused, or not they only, but a special feeling. The mysteries which surround all the unknowns of existence were, however dimly, contained in it, and the whole was predominantly flavoured with the sense of awe and reverence.'

He speaks also of a kind of revelation of vision which once came to him with 'a complete sense of outside givenness':

> 'This of mine had no connection with morals or religion; it was a seeing with the mind, a seeing of a great slice of this earth and its

> beauties, all compressed into an almost instantaneous experience. Mozart describes something of the same sort with music when he would experience an intense pleasure in an interior "hearing" of the whole work simultaneously.'

It will be seen from these extracts that Professor Huxley is not one of those men of science who denounce, or patronize, religion without having the least first-hand knowledge of it; hence it is more than a little disappointing to find him falling into the psychological fallacy of assuming that because these experiences can be 'explained' in terms of nerve-physiology, of sub-conscious psychology, or what not, they are consequently devoid of objective validity. He says of his experiences:

> 'They and my reading also convinced me that the revelation of the mystic vision is revelation only in a psychological sense, not literally. There need be no supernatural being or force making the revelation, nor is the revelation one of an external reality.'

The last sentence is a trifle ambiguous. The vision of 'a great slice of the earth' may have been an hallucination in the sense that there was no such material object hanging in mid-air. But this does not mean that the vision was devoid of objective validity: it was a visualized perception of something real, *i.e.*, the infinitely diverse beauty of the world. This is probably exactly the sort of 'revelation' that the prophets received in their 'visions'; nor need we suppose that they were deceiving themselves when they felt that they actually had seen deeper into reality at those moments than at other more normal times. Professor Huxley appears to overlook the fact that it is the business of psychology to analyse, but not in the last resort to estimate and value. What kind of truth, if any, is made available to us by means of mystical insight, and whether this truth is similar in kind to aesthetic or moral truth, are extremely interesting questions which Professor Huxley does not deal with here—because he is not a metaphysician and has no place for metaphysics in his epistomology.

The characterization of the specifically religious feeling as 'predominantly flavoured with the sense of awe and reverence' is of very great interest. And the question immediately suggests itself whether this 'awe' was aroused by some quality *in* things appealing to that same quality (or the sense of it) in Professor Huxley. Why should not the things which aroused awe, actually have been deserving of awe? And what quality

in things is it that arouses awe, or which arouses the instinct of worship? Otto calls it the *numinous*, a term which Professor Huxley quotes with approval. One objection to this term is that it seems to us to involve an element of hostility and inscrutability, even of sinisterness (if we may coin a word) in things. But this seems a dangerous conception—one which commended itself to Schopenhauer, and which to-day commends itself to Mr. Thomas Hardy. But if the power behind things is thus terrible and sinister, are we not back at the level of primitive religion? Shall we not one day be sacrificing our first-born to this implacable, capricious and hostile power? Is not the Christian conception of a *rational* background and source of things an advance? Professor Huxley rejects the idea of a personal God; but is this idea the primitive superstition, the crude anthropomorphism, he takes it to be? Why not interpret the creative power in the light of its latest product, rational man? As Canon Streeter has recently observed:

> 'Unless we are to conceive that Life (of the universe) as less vital than our own, we must ascribe to it that element in personality which makes it a focus of synthetic activity, originative, directive, co-ordinative. We must not think of It as an "ocean of life," or even a "stream of consciousness," but as a closely-knit, highly centralised, self-consistent, fully self-conscious, eternally creative unity' (*Reality*, p. 137).

Professor Huxley's able, sincere, valuable and fascinating book is a sign of the times. It would be no derogation of the deep moral and spiritual vitality of the great T. H. Huxley to say that he could never have written it. Since his day two great new sciences have developed—the psychology of religion and comparative religion. As a consequence of this, men of science take up a different attitude towards religious problems. They regard religion as human, but as a vitally interesting and significant thing, as much so as art, even as much so as science itself.

The quarrel at present, as Professor Huxley observes, 'is not really between science and religion at all, but between a certain kind of religion and some particular conclusions of science.' But is Christianity that 'certain kind of religion'? That, of course, is the question. Some of its official exponents wish to make it so; but things are what they are, and not what some people choose to represent them as being.

IN MEMORIAM

BY the death of Miss Alice Gardner, the sister of Professor Percy Gardner, the Modernist cause has lost one whose great learning and whole-hearted interest were a source of strength. While her health permitted, she shared with Canon John Gamble official responsibility for the activities of the Bristol Branch of the Churchmen's Union.

The long obituary notice in *The Times* paid a well-merited tribute to her services rendered both to historical research, particularly in the sphere of Byzantine history, and to the higher education of women, mainly during her thirty years as tutor and lecturer at Newnham College, Cambridge.

Miss Gardner (like her distinguished brother) also made her contribution to theological thought and religious reflection. As might be expected her mode of approach was historical and practical. In ecclesiastical history the more philosophical types of Churchmen attracted her. Her sympathetic studies of *Synesius of Cyrene* and *John the Scot* should be read by all Modernists. Her books of practical religion, *The Conflict of Duties* and *Within our Limits*, reflect her deep seriousness and conscientious moderation—her ἐπιείκεια—as a religious teacher. Her most valuable contribution to theology was undoubtedly her *History of Sacrament in Relation to Thought and Progress* (Crown Theological Library, Williams and Norgate, 1921). It is a fine example of the right treatment for persons of education of this important theme, both in its method of approach and in its breadth of conception. Neither the dogmatist and the fanatic, nor the materialist and the sceptic, can estimate or interpret sacraments rightly. It is only the teacher of noble mind, perpetually conscious in all existence of the eternal behind and within the natural, who can present sacraments aright.

The Churchmen's Union has also lost by death another of its members, the Rev. J. H. Maude, Fellow of Hertford College, Oxford, for twenty-five years, and Dean from 1881 to 1899. A noble simplicity of character and a very real regard for sound learning and true religion distinguished him in the eyes of those who had the privilege of knowing him.

H.D.A.M.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE IMPATIENCE OF A PARSON.*

'Laugh, and the world laughs with you; weep, and you weep alone,' is a true saying, and Mr. Sheppard is likely enough to experience its truth in the reception accorded to his book, *The Impatience of a Parson.* There is a prophetic note running through the volume, and the prophets, unless they happen to be false prophets, exist only in little groups or as isolated individuals. Nevertheless, whether Mr. Sheppard has few or many who agree with him, it does not mean that he can be safely ignored. When writing of the Church of England he deserves serious attention, not because he can claim to be either a theologian or an historian, but because he is generally acknowledged to have been the most influential and successful parochial clergyman in the modern world. All know something of what he has accomplished at St. Martin's-in-the-Fields. How he did it, is the problem. Perhaps the secret is contained in Shakespeare's saying:

'Nothing ever comes amiss,
When simpleness and duty tender it.'

Courage, tact, insight, simplicity, consecration, a true sense of values divine and human—have all combined to help him to accomplish it. If the proverb *Pectus facit theologum* be true, Mr. Sheppard is a great theologian.

But why is Mr. Sheppard impatient? It is because the promise of the war period is failing: noble ideals are being squeezed into narrow ecclesiastical moulds; strong souls are being tamed by office; the nation, which it once seemed might have been won to a splendid Christian life, is sinking down into frivolity and sensuality. Things are going wrong with the nation, but this is because they have first gone wrong with the Church. And the main reason why they have gone wrong with the Church is because the Church is always thinking of itself first. The Divine Father, the Eternal Son, the Kingdom of God, all should come before the Church, not only theoretically but practically. Moreover, the Church seems to mistake its functions. It is not a society for the preservation of ancient opinions, nor for the propagation of old-world superstitions, but for the furtherance of living religion. The Church ought to exist to establish and maintain sane human relations with the Eternal and to promote sane relations among human beings—and these sane relations are essentially moral, rational and spiritual—but this the Church of England is failing to do. The reason for this is that the Church is not putting itself under the tuition of Jesus Christ and re-thinking its religion in terms of His Gospel. This is the essence of Mr. Sheppard's prophetic message. If he halted there, many would agree with him: or at least they would not dare to contradict his principles. Mr. Sheppard, however, proceeds to apply his principles, and it is there in the applications that the difficulties arise. The applications take the form of eighteen resolutions to be passed at the Lambeth Conference of 1930. 'Do I think my proposals will be listened to?' asks Mr. Sheppard; and, knowing his Church and his world pretty well, he replies, 'No, I do not.'

Our readers must go to Mr. Sheppard's book for his eighteen resolutions. We fancy that most Modernists would support them, though they might take exception to a few phrases. There is practically nothing in them from which the writer of this review dissents save the suppression of

**The Impatience of a Parson.* By H. R. L. Sheppard. (Hodder and Stoughton. 1927. Price 6/-.)

the present mode of addressing the episcopate. We are sure the bishops are quite indifferent, but many laymen and clergymen would be sorry to abandon a mode of address which testifies to a very deep respect for a historic office and, not seldom, also for the holder of it. Surely 'My Lord' is to be preferred to the American form 'Bish,' which to scholarly eyes immediately suggests the Evil One.[1]

Mr. Sheppard has many sound things to say. He recognizes the impossibility of securing reunion with Rome. He cites, as typical of the Roman spirit, the words used by Cardinal Bourne at York in November, 1926:

> 'To Anglicans who would ask us to join in Morning Prayer or Evensong, we have but one answer to make—that of the blessed martyr, Margaret Clitherow, "I will not pray with you, nor shall you pray with me; neither would I say *Amen* to your prayers, nor shall you say it to mine."'

There are two things urged by Mr. Sheppard which need sympathetic criticism. He seems to think that it would help the English Church and the Anglican Communion if the Archbishop of Canterbury became much more of an Anglican Pope and less of a *primus inter pares* than he is at present. We venture to dissent. Things are best as they are. A great man in a great position always prevails: a small man in a great position is better kept in check. It is not the official authority but the personal force of the episcopate which we desire to see increased.

Mr. Sheppard stresses the great importance of self-sacrifice on the part of a religious communion. It is important, very important, but sacrifice to be of real and permanent influence must be united with high intelligence. Our Lord sacrificed Himself, but modern critical study of the unveiling of the Messiahship in the Gospels shows the extreme caution and high intelligence exercised by our Lord so that that sacrifice should have its full effect. There is much sacrifice which, because it is divorced from intelligence, is really folly and produces the most baneful results, even though it saves the soul of him who makes the sacrifice. Mr. Sheppard would do well to stress this. Dean Rashdall's *Conscience and Christ* teaches no shallow and cowardly utilitarianism, but is a plea for that combination of reason with moral conviction which foolish moral men and foolish immoral men seem only too ready to divorce. H.D.A.M.

MODERNISM AS 'THE WAY.'*

Modernists are nowadays not infrequently charged with arrogance in so designating themselves; that is to say, for accepting a title with which they were originally and opprobiously branded by ecclesiastical authority. In reality they are simply people who feel keenly the conflict which ensues on the application of scientific method to the study of all that concerns the Christian religion, and more particularly to its historic, doctrinal and dogmatic formulations. They wish to remove this conflict and its causes. As to the best means by which to proceed to this desirable result there are differences of opinion. Some there are who maintain that the only proper course for those who do not believe the Creeds in the sense in which they were originally written is not only to say so plainly, but also to urge their abolition as statements of the doctrine now held in the Church: others,

[1] *Bish* is in the Targums the Jewish Aramaic for Satan.

**The Way of Modernism and Other Essays.* By J. F. Bethune-Baker, D.D., F.B.A., Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. (Cambridge University Press. Price 7/- net.)

who feel just as keenly the categorical imperative of the demand for intellectual honesty, feel the demands of other loyalties as well; they recognize the excellence of the Creeds in the *Weltanschauung* to which they belong, and that they are more than mere statements of supposed historical, psychological and metaphysical truth; that they give classical expression to certain experiences of religion and to certain permanent values which Christian theology must continue to maintain and to foster. Here are two attitudes of mind and heart. Though they are neither necessarily nor always antagonistic, yet sometimes the contention becomes so sharp between them that they separate the one from the other, to the great detriment of both.

The great value of Professor Bethune-Baker's Modernist apologetic lies in the fact that it is free from one-sidedness. He is no iconoclast: his sympathies are manifestly with the ideals of the Catholic Modernists, though he never argues for the indiscriminate preservation of whatever has been traditionally asserted, irrespective of truth and falsehood, on the ground of supposed values for faith. He approves the Catholic Modernist abandonment of the intellectualist conception of dogma *and* its recognition that, intellectually, dogma has a negative value:

> 'The dogma of the Resurrection teaches nothing about the mechanism or the manner or kind of the second life of Jesus, but it excludes some conceptions as that death put an end to the action of Jesus on the things of this world, so that He no longer had any part in our life, or had it only as a thinker whose influence still remained lively and productive, and of whose work effects could still be found. It says that death was not for Him, as it is for the generality of men, the definite end of practical activity.'

Dr. Bethune-Baker emphasizes, as he has previously done, that what is of real importance in a doctrine is not its intellectual exactitude or the implied or explicit reference to history in it, but

> 'the values or meanings for conduct and the attitude to life which those particular beliefs conveyed or expressed for the men of old who had them.'

In other words, continuity of spirit and of aim is more important than continuity of opinion. Dr. Bethune-Baker adds:

> 'To me it seems that this is the only way in which we can reconcile our traditional system of theology with modern knowledge and thought. If we follow this way we part company from our forefathers as to beliefs about many things which were the basis, or the framework, of their doctrines. Now and again we may have to repudiate a doctrine. But in general we are able to make the same affirmations of faith which they connected with their particular formulations of fact.'

These are fundamental principles which determine the treatment of the subjects dealt with in this collection of essays—The Use of the Bible, Evolution and Christian Theology, Incarnation and Christology, The Doctrine of Man and Traditional Formularies. Professor Bethune-Baker is a life-long student of Christian doctrine, and there is a breadth and solidity about these papers which reveal at once the author's knowledge and mastery of his subject, which is set out without a trace of heaviness and illuminated with many a dash of dry humour. The familiar criticism that Modernists have very imperfect understanding of beliefs which they do not hold cannot possibly apply to Professor Bethune-Baker. Over a long period of years he was himself satisfied by the arguments with which

raditional formulations of Christian doctrine are still defended: he has ound them inadequate, and he now writes of Modernism as

> 'the point of view which, with the growing experience of life, I have found increasingly satisfying to mind and heart and will.'

Throughout his work, Dr. Bethune-Baker is concerned with Modernsm within the Church of England to which, as a Catholic, he is essentially nd explicitly loyal. He has little sympathy with those whose Catholicism s little more than an affectation of the name, and certain beliefs and ractices of the Roman Church, while they themselves acknowledge the uthority of no visible Society with which they can be in practical relations. 3y this volume he has added to his many past services to the cause of beral theology in the Church of England. Our readers will welcome the pportunity of reading some new papers of his, and of possessing in a ollected form some of his valued contributions to our Annual Conferences.

J.S.B.

A MODERN CONFIRMATION MANUAL.*

Modernist Christianity needs to-day a number of Modernist middlemen ho will write simple, helpful, practical books. Mr. Luce, Master of the ing's Scholars, Westminster, has produced several of this kind. His test is *A Modern Confimation Manual.* It strikes us as a very useful ook: a book for parents and religious teachers, and also for the older nd more thoughtful kind of boys and girls of the educated classes. The eadmaster of Harrow (Dr. Norwood), who writes the Introduction, says f the volume:

> 'It can be usefully placed in the hands of a thoughtful boy or girl: it will be still more valuable as a suggestive guide to clergy and to schoolmasters in their Confirmation classes. It is so written as not to conflict with modern knowledge or modern scholarship. It sacrifices no essential of the Faith: it is frank in what it says, and has no dishonest silences.'

The headings of the chapters will best suggest the scope of the volume: he Offering of Life, Jesus the Pattern, The Fellowship of Love, The uty of Thought, The Apostles' Creed, The Commandments, Prayer, The oly Communion. We should have been glad to have seen a chapter on he Bible and its Use.

We congratulate the Junior Section of the Churchmen's Union on havg arranged for this manual's publication, and we hope that it will have n extended use. It certainly seems to us the very best for its particular ose that we have handled.

H.D.A.M.

SEMITIC RELIGION.*

These lectures on *The Religion of the Semites* were first published in 399. The book became a classic from the first, and, despite the lapse of me, it remains indispensable to all serious students of the Old Testament. ndeed, Dr. Cook is justified in claiming that 'it would be difficult, if not mpossible, to find elsewhere so stimulating an approach to the serious udy of Religion.' Professor Robertson Smith was a pioneer. He was ne of the founders of Old Testament criticism, and of much more.

**A Modern Confirmation Manual.* By H. K. Luce, M.A. With a Preface by the eadmaster of Harrow. (Longmans. 1927. Price 3/6.)

**The Religion of the Semites.* By the late William Robertson Smith, M.A., LL.D. hird edition. With an Introduction and Additional Notes by Stanley A. Cook, Litt.D. . and C. Black, Ltd. Price 12/6 net.)

'Brilliant and original' was the description by Professor Cheyne of the first edition of the present work. He also wrote, 'If the author has sometimes based a bold theory on evidence of uncertain value, this cannot obscure the many results which are in a high degree probable.' Since then, Semitic Religion and its institutions have been re-examined and further investigated, and new light has been thrown on many of the problems which Professor Robertson Smith opened up. Accordingly in the present edition Dr. Stanley Cook, while leaving the text of the book intact, has contributed an Introduction of some 38 pages, has introduced footnotes of reference to relevant literature, and has added a number of additional notes. These greatly increase the value of the book and increase its paginal content by some 150 pages. They treat of myth and ritual, the kinship of gods and men, marriage of gods and men, monotheism, the *jinn* and totemism, ancestor-worship, unclean animals, etc., etc. Thus the unexhausted life of a great book receives a new impetus; but that the original work should have outlived so much that has been written since is due to the fact that the author clearly distinguished between origins and whatever caused new departures or developments; and also because of his sympathy with 'the mystical or transcendental element in religion,' which it is crass obscurantism to reject and intellectual suicide to accept uncritically. Like Hort, Professor Robertson Smith received a good training in scientific method in physical science, and this, combined with care, insight and a sincerely religious attitude of mind, produced work which is an inspiration to all who labour at similar tasks. J.S.B.

THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON FAITH AND ORDER.*

The Reports of this Conference (published by the Secretariat p.o., Box 226, Boston, Mass., U.S.A.) are worthy of study, and the impressions of Canon Douglas (who was present at the meetings) published in the Autumn Number of the *Christian East*, 1927. The Conference was the outcome of a strongly growing feeling among professing Christians that a much better response ought to be made to Christ's prayer: 'that they all might be one as thou Father art in me, and I in Thee, that the world may know that Thou hast sent me. The preamble, unanimously adopted by the full Conference, states that

> though we recognize the reports to be neither exhaustive nor in all details satisfactory to every member of the Conference, we submit them to the churches for deliberate consideration. We thank God over agreements reached. Upon these we build. Where the reports record differences, we call upon the Christian world for earnest reconsideration of present conflicting opinions.'

The 'Call to Unity' was unanimously adopted 'by the full Conference. The 'Message to the World,' called the 'Gospel,' was described in language received by the whole Conference: so, too, was the description of 'the Nature of the Church,' 'the Common Confession of Faith,' 'the Ministry,' and 'the Sacraments.' The Chairman's final statement included these words:

> 'We have finished our immediate task. Our statements are the products of the minds of men who earnestly desired, and strove to keep themselves under, the guidance of God's Holy Spirit. We have not finished our whole task. We have but taken a step in a long journey.'

*Switzerland, August 3rd to 21st, 1927.

There seem to have existed among the promoters some hope that a hristian unity might result, leading to something resembling what already xists between the Eastern Orthodox and at least one section of the nglican Church. And a fear arose that this might result, in the case of odies so far apart in their lines of thought, in a boneless Christianity, icking definite convictions. But as Canon Douglas writes: 'The Eastern rthodox Church saved the situation.' It laid down quite definitely what considered essential for intercommunion. It stated that it could not gree to ambiguous compromises in matters of faith. There must be no iminution in the number of the seven sacraments; there must be one fixed ecumenical creed. But it was rightly, and wisely, added that this did not ean that the Orthodox withdrew from co-operation with the Conference. n the contrary, they advocated a federation of churches on the lines of ne Oecumenical Patriarch's Encyclical of 1920 'for the stemming of naterialism and the advance of the Kingdom of Heaven.' In the realm f Faith and Order they felt compelled to stand aloof. Meanwhile, hurches of like principles should unite, and so prepare the way for dis-ussion of reunion with a single Church, with a single faith (see *Christian ast*, p. 116). The result was that the Reports were not adopted, but eceived and passed on to the home authorities for consideration..

This decision of the Orthodox Church seems, of all that was done at he Conference, the most statesmanlike, but it leads on to further serious uestions. While the Orthodox Church has been built up in the East, hristianity has also had its Western development. We may not ignore he Reformation, largely brought about by the aid of a Pope who substi-uted the Greek Testament for the Vulgate; the rapid advance of modern cience, which fought successfully against the almost unanimous opinions f the leading Churchmen of the day, who excommunicated Galileo, burnt runo, and without a dissentient in Convocation condemned Colenso for pinions now almost universally adopted. If God uses divers means to raw men's hearts to Him, must He not necessarily make use of Western s well as Eastern minds, and science as well as theology, as channels of His revelation? The Orthodox decision has rightly put its foot on an ttempted unity in matters where there is none, but the question still re-hains whether there is not a genuine basis on which a genuine unity can e established without sacrifice of principle.

If we want to understand Christianity, we must go back to the teach-ng of its Founder: and Christ said, 'I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and rudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.' At the root of the Gospel vhich we received from the Saviour there is something very simple, very lear, which the babe can understand. On this underlying essential, all-mportant truth there can be, and there ought to be, absolute concord mong professing Christians: and this absolutely essential element might urely become the basis on which Christian unity is built.

Why should not this be the central rock on which all Christian hurches are built, and on which, if they are not built, they ought to be uilt? All who strive to build on that rock might fairly belong to a uni-ersal Christian Empire; while within this Christian Empire churches or ommunities, united by this central bond, might be left, without let or indrance, to work out their own salvation on such particular lines as ppeal to them. Of such a Christian Empire it can at least be said: '*Hic ipis esset Lydius, ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur.*'

BERESFORD POTTER.

MODERNISM IN RURAL PLACES.*

The Grip of the Ages seeks in true Modernist manner to achieve a working compromise between tradition and truth. This is related in a simple narrative of the keeping of Christmas in the good old-fashioned way in a part of rural England in which scenery, and men, and manners, and, last but not least, women, are still unspoiled by the less attractive influences of modernity. The period of the story is that of the Kikuyu controversy—and although it seems a long time ago, yet its problems are still with us and but little nearer solution. The manners and atmosphere are Victorian.

The author has done well to select an English rural parish as the scene for his action. Modernism may be congenial to the universities and the metropolis; it may easily find its home in a cosmopolitan society, but it seems sharply incongruous in an ancient English hamlet dominated by its village church and feudal customs. The tale exhibits in a sympathetic and judicious manner the difficulties of the situation. We are allowed to see that there is a kind of Modernism which can enter into such an environment, and can transform it, but it is not a crude or rude or half-baked modernism. Its manners are good, its heart is kind, its reverence great, and its sense of values just. *The Grip of the Ages,* although it does not stress the continuity of Christian thought, does stress the continuity of Christian devotion, and social and aesthetic feeling, especially in English life in country places. That is why the keeping of Christmas is very happily selected as the central point of the action of the story, for Christmas is pre-eminently the festival of these things.

Our author would do for the English Church what every wise man would do for an ancient and beautiful country-house he had inherited. He would leave its exterior untouched, but transform its interior. He has a strong desire to retain the ancient customs and ritual of the Church, but he would change her whole intellectual outlook, her whole manner of presenting the Christian tradition in its relation to reality as we understand it to-day. He who can do that successfully, may enjoy to the full the rich heritage of the past and the equally rich gifts of the present. But he who would undertake the task must be a free man, and freedom is only gained by seeking the truth and by making it paramount. We commend this little book to country clergymen who do not read modern theology.

H.D.A.M.

ANOTHER REVISED PSALTER.*

Churchmen have reason to be most grateful to the Bishop of Truro for his Liturgical Psalter. We heartily approve the Bishop's principle of selecting from the Psalter what is of value for the devotional use of a Christian worshipper and excluding what is not. Obviously there is much in the Psalter which does not express the devotional feeling of a Christian. Hence the Bishop rightly adopts the principle of omission. We are delighted, therefore, to find that the last two verses of Ps. li are omitted, and we have the very appropriate conclusion, 'The sacrifices of God are a contrite spirit: a broken and contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.' Those who use the Bishop's Psalter are not asked to repeat

**The Grip of the Ages.* By One of the Free, Alfred S. Chovil. (Wells, Gardner, Darton and Co. Price 3/6 net.)

**A Liturgical Psalter.* Arranged for use in the Services of the Church by the Bishop of Truro. (Mowbray and Co. Price 6/-. 1926.)

the last three verses of Ps. cxxxvii, words which, in the writer's opinion, ought never under any circumstances to pass Christian lips, and Ps. cxxxix is not marred by the inclusion of verses 19—22. From Ps. lxix and cix, which are noteworthy for their maledictory character, the objectionable verses are removed. In the former, we pass from verse 22 to verse 30, and in the latter verses 5—19 of the Prayer Book Psalter are omitted. In Ps. lxviii verses 21—23 are omitted. The Bishop shows his judgment in making these omissions. Some Psalms he wholly omits, *e.g.* xxxv, lviii, lix, lxxxiii, and quite rightly. In Ps. lx the worshipper is no longer asked to say that Moab is his wash-pot or that he will cast out his shoe over Edom, verses 6—10 of the Prayer Book Psalter being omitted. So far our words have been only of praise, but now we ask why the Bishop did not carry out his own principle more consistently. His object, he says (page viii of the Introduction) is 'to put into the mouths of, say, a Sunday evening's congregation such passages only as it could find edifying and real.' And he adds with justice 'that the present practice leads to a great deal of unreality and consequent indevotion.' The Bishop claims to omit (page ix) 'passages which express the pessimism of the outlook that saw no hope of any future life, and yet he asks Christian worshippers to stand up and solemnly repeat 'The dead praise not thee, O Lord: neither all they that go down into silence,' words which directly contradict our most cherished Christian convictions, and to the writer it is amazing that after writing his introduction he can let the words of Ps. lxxxviii stand:

> 'Wilt Thou show wonders among the dead:
> or shall the dead rise up again, and praise Thee?
> Shall Thy loving-kindness be showed in the grave:
> or Thy faithfulness in destruction?
> Shall Thy wondrous works be known in the dark:
> and Thy righteousness in the land where all things are forgotten.'

Again the writer deplores the fact that the Bishop has not omitted the last three verses of Ps. xcv, as the American Prayer Book does. Prof. C. A. Briggs, in his commentary, gives it as his opinion that the concluding verses are from a separate psalm, and Cheyne thinks likewise. On this subject Dr. P. Dearmer writes: 'The *Venite* itself should be de-Judaised by the omission of the discouraging verses about the temptation in the wilderness, and Jahweh swearing in his wrath. In America the revisers have wisely omitted these verses. . . . I think the man who first sang that splendid psalm must have finished there, and that some priestly improver thought it was too cheerful and pagan, and dragged in the gloomy references to the forty years; just as some such person spoilt the glorious ending of the *Miserere* by tacking on the concluding lines about burnt-offerings and bullocks. If the revisers now at work in England do not help us by paragraphing that anti-climax separately, and giving us a perfect Christian *Venite*, we shall know that we are not fit as a Church to confront the intelligent people of the present century.'

The Bishop has not only been most wise in adopting the principle of omission, he has also shown his wisdom by adopting the principle of improving the translation of obscure passages to make the meaning clearer. He writes (page vii): These (changes) 'justify themselves because they make obscure passages clear, or prevent misunderstandings.' We are delighted to find the correct translation of verse 2 of the *Jubilate*: 'Be ye sure that the Lord He is God: it is He that hath made us, and His we are.' Again, in Psalms xlii, xliii, which may be treated as one, we find the refrain correctly given and clearly marked in the midlde and at the end of

Ps. xlii and at the end of xliii: 'Why art thou so vexed, O my soul, and why art thou so disquieted within me? Put thy trust in God, for I will yet give Him thanks: which is the saviour of my countenance, and my God.' In Ps. xlii, 9, water-pipes becomes waterspouts, and doubtless a careful and detailed examination would reveal many other improvements. In Ps. cxlv, 3, the comma which Coverdale unfortunately inserted after the word 'marvellous,' and which misled the editor of the *Cathedral Psalter*, is of course excised. 'Marvellous' in this verse simply has the force of the superlative. We admire the Bishop for his courage as well as his scholarship in giving the correct translation of Ps. xlv, 7. Every Hebraist knows presumably that where the word 'Jehovah' stands, the original probably was a part of the verb 'to be,' and the Bishop, undaunted by *Heb.* i, 8, translates: 'Thy throne endureth for ever and ever: the sceptre of thy Kingdom is an upright sceptre.' What we have to deplore is that the Bishop has not applied his principle more thoroughly. We are surprised to find in Ps. viii the old translation, 'Thou madest him but little lower than the angels.' Here the Hebrew has the ordinary word for 'God.' Dr. Driver translates 'And thou hast made him lack but little of God.' Wellhausen's rendering, however, brings out the meaning more exactly: 'Thou hast made him in rank little less than divine.'

In Ps. lxv the Bishop has missed an opportunity that we should have expected him to welcome. In this Psalm, which we usually sing on the occasion of a Harvest Thanksgiving, there is a glorious promise of deliverance to the man who is experiencing a moral conflict and fighting against a besetting sin. This is evacuated of its meaning in the Prayer Book Psalter by being turned into a petition. The Bishop here follows the Prayer Book Psalter, thus ignoring the more correct translation of A.V. Dr. Driver renders the verse 'Manifold iniquities are too strong for me: as for our transgressions *thou* wilt cancel them.' A more literal rendering is 'The things of iniquity are too strong for me: as for our iniquities *thou* wilt efface them.' The verse is to the Psalmist an assurance of release from the power of sin, and it is well that in A.V. at least the meaning is not obscured.

The Bishop improves upon Coverdale's rendering of the concluding verse of Ps. xx by writing, 'O Lord save the king: and mercifully hear us when we call upon Thee.'

The Bishop rightly corrects the rendering of Ps. ix, 17: 'The wicked shall be turned into hell,' which suggests to the uneducated the thought of the place of future punishment, into 'The wicked shall be turned into Sheol.' The psalmist means, of course, to say 'The wicked shall suffer the penalty of death.'

The correct translation of Ps. lxviii, 17, is given: 'The chariots of God are twenty thousand, even thousands upon thousands.' Dr. Kirkpatrick writes: 'The A.V. "angels" is traceable ultimately to the paraphrase of the Targum, suggested by such passages as Deut xxxiii, 2, but resting on no philological basis.'

Ps. civ, 4, is rendered 'He maketh the winds his angels.' This rendering is more correct than that of the Prayer Book Version and of A.V.; yet clearer is that of R.V.: 'Who maketh winds his messengers.'

We would conclude this review by saying that, while we heartily approve of the principles enunciated by Dr. Frere, we hope that he, or someone else, will bring out a Psalter in which these principles are carried out more thoroughly and consistently.

R. F. Bevan.

CORRESPONDENCE

MISS ALICE GARDNER.

SIR,

In Miss Alice Gardner's character there was one grace to which I esire, if possible, to bear particular witness. It was the beautiful humility nd generosity of her friendship with people far less educated than herself.)nly real scholars are able, I fancy, to achieve this noble condescension. shall never forget it, or the delicate kindness of her hospitality. Now nat her frail form will be seen among us no more, I beg to be allowed to ay at the foot of her memory these few words of gratitude.

HUBERT HANDLEY.

November 21st.

THE PRAYER BOOK MEASURE.

SIR,

In the Conference Number, p. 410, you write :—

> 'The Modernist sees clearly the terrible danger which accompanies a reunion which is the outcome of skilful ecclesiastical compromise rather than the full and free affirmation of Christian principles. Better far to have no reunion than a reunion of that kind.'

It is just here that many of us find ourselves up against the contentious arts of the revised Prayer Book, so that we feel we cannot accept a book hich gives us an alternative Communion Service which practically reverts) that of the first Prayer Book of Edward VI, which Cranmer found, by xperience, was still being interpreted in the Roman sense, and therefore ubstituted for it the 1552 Prayer Book, which is almost identical with the resent authorised service.

The 1549 Prayer Book, that is, was an 'ecclesiastical compromise' hich was found so dangerous that it had to be superseded; and to-day, hen many of the clergy are openly, and without episcopal censure, re- erting to pre-Reformation teaching and practices, it is, I think, impos- ble not to agree with Dr. Bethune Baker in his conclusions that 'while ey were assured that no change of doctrine was meant or intended by ie new order of Holy Communion, he could not but believe that doctrine eliberately rejected at the Reformation now became inferentially per- issible.'

If the new Prayer Book only 'inferentially' permits a Roman interpre- tion, we may be quite sure that such will be put upon it, in the future, y those clergy who are already doing so.

This becomes a painfully practical question for Modern Churchmen, as the experience of many it is increasingly difficult to find churches where ie Holy Communion is not celebrated in a manner which infers (if not ransubstantiation) at least a change in the elements themselves, after onsecration. So that devout Anglicans who cannot tolerate a position, ot only un-scriptural, but which violates science and common-sense, in- reasingly find themselves practically ex-communicated.

It is no want of Christian charity, but whole-hearted devotion to the ause of 'true religion and sound learning,' which drives us into opposi- on, both to the alternative Communion Service and also other features of ie new Prayer Book which, 'inferentially' (as Dr. Bethune-Baker says),

permit 'doctrine deliberately rejected at the Reformation'; and because we feel that the Church and the nation, as a whole, are not yet alive to this, we take it that it is our duty, as Modern Churchmen, to oppose the passing into law of the Revised Book as it stands.

EDITH S. STIFF.

37 Eccleston Square, London, S.W.1.

UNITARIANS AND MODERNISTS.

SIR,

As a Unitarian minister, I would venture to express my appreciation of the very fair editorial reference to Unitarianism which appears in the Conference Number of the *Modern Churchman*. A phrase here and there perhaps I would prefer to have seen stated differently, but these are of minor consequence. Most Unitarians would agree that there are certain important differences which distinguish their position from that of the Modernists, but which the critics of both do not seem readily to grasp, maybe because they have no particular desire to. It may, perhaps, be an advantage to state the most important of such differences from the Unitarian point of view.

You are undoubtedly correct in stating that, whilst Modernists find no difficulty in worshipping Christ, most Unitarians do. At the same time I think your statement of the case scarcely does full justice to our difficulty in this respect. You say 'the Unitarian does not worship Him (Christ) because he holds that it is unlawful to worship a man, for the child of God may only worship God. The Modernist worships Him, but not as a man. What the Modernist worships is the Supreme Unveiling of the Divine Nature in Jesus.'

Very few Unitarians, I fancy, would find it difficult to use the traditional phraseology of Christian worship and address their worship to Christ were they satisfied that the affirmation made in the concluding sentence of the quotation really justified them in so doing, but their trouble is that they do not feel that such an affirmation really meets the case. We (*i.e.* Unitarians) can worship God in Christ, but we do not feel that we can worship Christ as God, which is what the traditional phraseology of Christianity demands. We can worship the Spirit of God which in Christ revealed itself as working for the reconciliation of the world. We can worship 'the unveiling of the Divine Nature' in the world, in history, in man, but we should not feel justified in worshipping the world, or history, or man, as God. God is the ultimate objective Reality Who stands beyond, yet reveals Himself through, all His partial manifestations, and though we may agree that in Christ we find the 'Supreme Unveiling' we cannot agree that the Unveiling is to be identified with the Reality in the absolute sense which Trinitarian theology demands. If it were, then we should want, not a Trinitarian Theology, but an 'Infinitarian' Theology.

So far from holding that our position is derogatory to the person of Christ, we would hold that modern critical research has confirmed the opinion of the earlier Unitarians that to the mind of the historical Christ the worship of his fellows would be actually abhorrent. It seems to us that the Christ which orthodoxy (and Modernism) worships is not the Christ of Nazareth, but a metaphysical abstraction, or at best metaphysical interpretation of that Christ, partially formulated in the Johannine and Pauline writings, but not fully developed until the Fourth Century, a period in which historical accuracy stood in inverse ratio to metaphysical subtlety.

For many Unitarians, as for Modernists, 'the Christian Religion is essentially Christocentric,' for in Christ they see the significance, the potency and the beauty of divine revelation made supremely real, but we sincerley believe that the only Christ which history knows would have us look beyond himself to his God and our God, to his Father and our Father.

There are other important questions upon which Unitarians differ from Modernists, most notably perhaps the question of the ethics of credal conformity and the degree of individual interpretation applicable to traditional dogma, but I have already trespassed on your space long enough.

On these and other matters time and reason will judge as to whether the Modernist or the Unitarian points of view are the more consistent with the established facts of history and scholarship. In the meantime we should do well to understand each other and not minimise differences which undoubtedly exist.

HERBERT CRABTREE.

Unitarian Christian Church, Brixton, S.W.2.
2nd November, 1927.

[It is better to minimize the differences between Christian bodies than to magnify them, and we desire, if we err, to err on that side. We are glad of our correspondent's elucidation of certain points, particularly the one dealing with Christian worship. Whether the worship of Christ would be 'actually abhorrent' to Christ Himself is a difficult question to answer, and an impossible question to answer briefly; furthermore, we do not think that it is a question which a Unitarian should ask. The form the question ought to take is this: 'Would the worship of Christ be "actually abhorrent"' to the Father?' Is the Unitarian convinced that the answer to that question is Yes. If he cannot give that answer, is he justified in departing from the age-long practice of the Christian Church?

The Modernist certainly prefers to speak of worshipping 'God in Christ,' rather than of worshipping 'Christ as God.' This absolute form (as God) is retained for the Father as in the *Te Deum*. The phrase 'to worship God in Christ' has the advantage that it is more in harmony with New Testament usage, and also that it precludes Tritheism. When Pliny the Younger writes of Christians in his province worshipping Christ as God (*quasi Deo*), he is no doubt reproducing the phraseology of simple Christians; but the more philosophical will prefer to speak of worshipping God in Christ.

We have no space to discuss at present whether an Infinitarian Theology is superior to a Trinitarian Theology. That is possibly a question for the future. The point at issue is whether a Trinitarian Theology is superior to a Unitarian Theology. We see no convincing reason for not holding that the Trinitarian Theology preserves and possesses greater values than a Unitarian Theology. There is, we venture to think, nothing in the Trinitarian Theology which in any way precludes those who hold it from looking beyond the Christ to the Father, though we prefer to speak of beholding the Father in and through Christ.

We think our correspondent's letter gives indications of movement from the older Unitarian positions, just as he appears to observe that the Modernist has also advanced from Traditionalist orthodoxy. This double movement is largely due to the influence of historical criticism, comparative religion and evolutionary science. This fact seems to promise that neither party will stand still, and that we and many others now divided may all meet on a higher plane of Christian truth in no far distant future.

It is probable that we shall make most progress if we keep looking forward rather than looking back, and if we feel that whatever advance we make is due to the divine impulse and guidance rather than due to ourselves.—Ed., M.C.]

A SUFFERING GOD.

Sir,

I note that Dr. Leonard Patterson, in his admirable address 'The Scholar-Saints of Antioch,' published in your last issue of October 15th, observes: 'Unfortunately there is a tendency, both among Modernists and Catholics, to speak of a suffering God.'

I do not wish to appear captious, especially as I have had the privilege of sitting under Dr. Patterson in days gone by. I therefore hasten to disclaim controversial motive. While not unconscious of those grave dangers, Patripassianism and Theopaschitism, which Dr. Patterson justly mentions in connection with the tendency 'to speak of a suffering God,' I yet venture to suggest that the tendency to which he alludes is not wholly to be deplored.

If we are to maintain the doctrine of the Redemption of the World through Christ, if we are to purge away those forensic ideas which hamper us in setting forth the doctrine of the Cross, if we wish to prevent the isolation of one incident in the Redeemer's Redeeming life, we must emphasise the truth that the whole life of Christ is to be regarded as the revelation of God's nature in terms of human experience. 'The Revelation of Eternal Love' expresses to us 'Divine Givenness.' If one may say so, there seems to be a Divine Necessity implied in the Incarnation. God could but express Himself in the way He has; this too appears to harmonise with that which one feels must constitute the inner life of the ever Blessed Three. One dare not say more. Can it be that Divine Love implies suffering? The facts of life seem to point to an eternal Cross. I submit that 'enlightened anthropomorphism' is in this case a reflection of that which is declared to us in the face of Christ. In Christ, the sufferer, we perceive 'a suffering God.' Jesus Christ confirms the law of life, 'Die to Live.'

To love is to give and to really give implies self-abnegation. The finest feeling in man finds its expression in giving out from self; the root of this lies in God; the perfection of it in Christ points to that.

May I reverently suggest that the idea of a suffering, giving God has its foundation in a deep conception of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity such as the late Dr. Hastings Rashdall propounded. To Dr. Rashdall directly and indirectly we all owe a debt of gratitude in this matter.

The At-One-Ment is the Incarnation, not a fragment of it. The Incarnation conceived in terms of a whole life carries with it the supreme implication of the Gospel 'Die to Live.'

The Cross expresses in human terms the cost of taking man 'in Christ' back into the eternal purpose; it was the culmination of a life lived in order to manifest the eternal verity 'God is Love.'

I submit that the supreme factor in life is love, and that this love, which is to be found in imperfect fashion in the sons of men, reveals something of the nature of God. I am certain that we are justified in holding it to be the reflection of an eternal verity. Again, we are unable to disassociate from love positive suffering: the highest we know in this life is necessarily conceived in terms of 'Love suffering.' We find this perfected in Christ and expressed by Him on Calvary. May we then not speak of 'a suffering God'? Is not the idea of a suffering, giving God congruous

with the conception of the One God who leads a threefold personal life? Surely there is that within us which confirms that which we see set forth throughout the life of Christ and supremely manifested by Him on the Cross?

In the light of the Incarnation we discover the 'Eternal Givenness' of God, we discover in Christ purpose, hope and joy through suffering.

It is this which the Resurrection vindicates; it is this which we set forth in the Eucharist; it is this which enables us to enter into the life of the ever Blessed Three and understand that all life really lived out on the basis of love is of necessity Eucharistic.

'Tu devicto mortis aculeo: aperuisti credentibus regna coelorum.'

IVAN R. YOUNG.

18 Tennyson Road, Harpenden, Herts.
18th October, 1927.

AN INJUSTICE TO SCOTLAND.

SIR,

In the current number of *The Modern Churchman* I see Westcott cited as the author of the phrase 'the expulsive power of a new affection.' I have always heard it attributed to the great Dr. Chalmers.

Perhaps some Scots reader can say whether this is correct.

C. M. HUDSON.

Dingley, Hindhead, Surrey.
August 18th.

[We believe the words are Chalmers' and apologise for the error.—ED., M.C.]

THE PROBLEM OF JESUS.

SIR,

I have only recently read the article on the 'Problem of Jesus' by the Rev. C. J. Wright, and I should like to make a few observations on it in regard to the *deeper issues* involved. Our Christian religion is based upon Scriptures which we all of us believe to be divinely inspired, for if they are not inspired no special religion could come out of them. This being so, the question of their being historical or not is a quite secondary one. Yet Mr. Wright makes history the first of questions, and entirely ignores the primary element of inspiration. We have the Scriptures displayed before our very eyes, with their divine inspiration undisputed. Very different is it with *history*, which is merely an obscure set of ideas in our minds about which we can have no certain proof of correctness. But even if we do concede correctness to some of these ideas, they are only parts of dead-and-gone history, and not the living Scripture which claims our first attention and our devoted investigation.

What I am trying to make clear is that the *fact* of the undoubted existence of inspired Scriptures stands in credence far above any implied and doubtful *items* of history that the Scriptures may seem to express. Yet Mr. Wright plunges at once into the historical question as if it, and not inspiration, were at the foundation of the Christian religion. But supposing we do account history to be of vast importance, how then can we reconcile the Divine Wisdom with the indisputable fact that the evidences for the truth of this history are so meagre and inconclusive? Obviously this fact is in plain contradiction to the Divine Wisdom, for if this history is of such tremendous value as to concern the eternal salvation of our

souls, the Divine Wisdom would, of its very nature, so direct its human agents that there should be ample, sure and incontestable evidence forthcoming for the truth of this history.

As there is only *doubt* and no certainty in the ancient history we are supposed to have before us in the Gospels, this alleged history cannot possibly be regarded as the *sure* foundation of the Christian religion in the light of the Divine Wisdom. History is not religion, as Dean Mansel pointed out. We have to look in another direction to see and know that our religion has an entirely sound basis in the divine inspiration of its own Scriptures, and this inspiration can be recognised and understood if the historical illusion does not block the sight.

Of late years the problem of Jesus has greatly changed in character. In its new form it is no longer in the question 'Is Jesus a Myth?' but 'Is Jesus a name for the manifest God—"the first-born of all creation"?' Those who really believe in the name of Jesus find the Divine Reality within them, ready to save and bless. This conception is in the non-historical view of the Gospels which is now making headway.

G. A. GASKELL.

SIR,

I have no confidence that I understand the precise purport of Mr. Gaskell's letter. He seems to hold that Christian *history*—which, by the way, is very curiously regarded as 'merely an obscure set of ideas in our minds'—is a question quite secondary to 'the primary element of inspiration' in the books which purport to record that history. His trouble therefore seems to be that, in a paper the aim of which was confined to setting forth my reasons for believing in the historicity of Jesus, I should have said nothing about this 'deeper issue,' *viz.* inspiration.

What Mr. Gaskell's conception of inspiration is I have no means of knowing, apart from the suggestions in his letter. Nor do I know how he has been able to arrive at the conclusion that the 'divine inspiration' of the Scriptures is 'undisputed.' It would seem that to him it is more important to believe that the Gospels were 'inspired' than that they contain any historical narrative. It was at one time customary to conclude the historicity of the Gospels from their 'inspiration.' Mr. Gaskell seems, on the contrary, to conclude from their 'inspiration' either their non-historicity or the 'secondary' nature of this question.

Is it that Mr. Gaskell does not accept the historicity of Jesus? I can only regret that I have not been able to convince him. Or is it that the question does not matter to him? In such case, the writers of the mythical school must regret that a question of sufficient importance to lead them to write considerable volumes is to him so secondary.

With one remark of Mr. Gaskell's—perhaps in his mind the chief point—I find myself in cordial agreement, *viz.* 'History is not religion'; and because of that agreement I cannot agree with his other remark, *viz.* that the Christian religion 'comes out of' a book, which had, whatever else it had, a *history*. But I cannot refrain from asking myself what Dean Mansell would have had to say to Mr. Gaskell's use of the former somewhat trite remark.

C. J. WRIGHT.

'PRESERVE THY BODY.'

SIR,

Possibly someone else has written about Mr. Park's letter, 'Preserve Thy Body,' in your August number. If Mr. Park comes across a little book by C. E. Rolt, entitled *The Spiritual Body*, I think a great deal of

s difficulty as regards the words of Administration will largely disappear. , as Mr. Rolt suggests, the spiritual body exists as a germ in the natural dy, the words in the Holy Communion Service take on a fuller and more nderful idea.

No one, surely, imagines that the Resurrection body will be put on, like suit of clothes, at the last day. If the spiritual body exists as a germ w in the natural, mortal body, it is only reasonable to suppose that this rm will be developed in the Intermediate State, being our body in that ate, and will finally blossom out into its consummation at the Resurction.

L. R. FLEMING.

The Rectory, Timoleague, Co. Cork.
October 1st, 1927.

[Of course the phrase 'thy body' means certainly the natural body beved by orthodox teachers to be transformed into a spiritual body at the esurrection. St. Paul seems to teach, in *II Corinthians* V, 1—3, that the iritual body is in heaven. When our correspondent writes: 'No one, surely, nagines that the Resurrection-body will be put on, like a suit of clothes, the last day,' it is permissible to point out that this is the conviction of . Paul in *II Corinthians* (see Archbishop Bernard's Commentary *ad loc.*). his was not St. Paul's peculiar view: it was also the view of the Apolyptists, from whom St. Paul probably derived it (see R. H. Charles' *scension of Isaiah* iv, 16; ix, 17). This spiritual body is not regarded as uilt up by the natural processes of growth, but is the direct gift of God. is to the great Origen that we owe 'the germ theory' of the spiritual dy, but this view was condemned as heretical. Dean Inge, in his *Plotinus,* ys of Origen's view that what survives is 'the Soul become Spirit, hich will make a new house for itself, the resurrection body.' This, he ys, resembles the Pauline view of the resurrection, which differs widely om the later Catholic orthodoxy (Vol. I, p. 102). If in some ways it sembles St. Paul's view in *II Corinthians*, then it seems to differ widely om his view in *I Corinthians* and *I Thessalonians*, and in any case it nnot be shown that St. Paul teaches it, nor does any other New Testaent writer, or our Lord. By this we do not mean that it may not be the se, but that we really know nothing at all about this germ-spiritual body. is an interesting speculation.—ED., M.C.]

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE AND JESUS CHRIST.

IR,

I am indebted to Col. R. E. Key for his correction, in his letter printed your August issue, of a quotation from Mrs. Eddy's *Miscellaneous Vritings* which I gave in my article on 'Anglo-Israelism, Christian Science nd Theosophy' in the *Modern Churchman* for July last.

Although I had verified the quotation, as I supposed, in the *Miscelneous Writings,* I had inadvertently, with a carelessness for which I ust apologise, allowed the words to stand as they stood in the source om which I originally derived my knowledge of them—the late Mr. tephen Paget's *Faith and Works of Christian Science,* p. 38. Mr. Paget, owever, was giving only a summary of what he took to be Mrs. Eddy's aching about Jesus Christ; and I read her words without realising that ey might be taken in a different sense to that in which he took them. ol. Key gives them as they appear in the text of Mrs. Eddy's answer to e question 'Why did Jesus call Himself "the Son of Man"?' I am

indeed, I must confess, far from sure that I understand them; but, though I can see how Mr. Paget came to understand them as he did, they plainly do not compel that interpretation, and seem rather, in their context, to mean that Jesus did *not* prophesy his death, and that his silence on this subject was an instance of the wisdom 'shown by his forbearing to speak as well as by speaking, the whole truth.'

I gladly accept Col. Key's implied assurance that the reverence of Christian Scientists for the Master of all Christians would repudiate the suggestion implied in my inaccurate quotation of Mrs. Eddy's words. It remains, however, true that the attitude towards our Lord recommended by Mrs. Eddy must be allowed to differ from that usually recommended by orthodox Christianity. I will give one quotation from her *Miscellaneous Writings*, p. 309 ('Deification of Personality'). 'Pondering,' she says, there 'on the finite personality of Jesus, the son of man, is not the channel through which we reach the Christ, or Son of God, the true idea of man's divine principle.' A little below 'the Christ' is identified with 'the impersonal form of Truth, amplified in this age by the discovery of Christian Science.'

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

October 4th, 1927.

PRAYERS SUGGESTED FOR USE BY MEMBERS OF THE CHURCHMEN'S UNION.

O Lord, in Thy great mercy, support all those who are endeavouring to learn the Truth, especially the Members of this Union. Grant unto them Wisdom and Understanding that they may avoid all false doctrine, follow the example of Thy Son Jesus Christ our Lord, and uphold the principles for which He lived and died, that by so doing they may be brought nearer to Thee, to whom be honour and glory, world without end.

Almighty God, grant unto all Thy children the desire to know the Truth, and upon those of this Union who are earnestly seeking it let Thy light shine abundantly. Give them courage to fight error, to repudiate all that is proved not to be true; and grant them wisdom and understanding that they may follow in the footsteps of Thy Son Jesus Christ, to whom with Thee and the Holy Spirit be honour and glory, world without end.

O Lord, give us humble hearts that we may draw near to Thee with prayer and reverence. Reveal to us so much of Thy Truth as our minds can comprehend; and grant us faith to hold Truth fast, and make it known; with hope of Thy blessing; and in all our thought, and words, and work—with love. May Thy Spirit ever dwell within our hearts, so that we may live as Christ's disciples, and spread the knowledge of Thy glory and Thy love, by the grace of Jesus, the true pattern of divine humanity, through whom we approach Thee, great Father of all. Amen.

O God, Who sendest Thy Holy Spirit to teach us many things which Apostles could not bear, and to lead us into all truth, grant, we beseech Thee, that diversities of gifts may not divide those who strive to hear Thy voice; but that thinking nobly, seeing clearly, and speaking boldly, we may with thankful hearts confess our unity in the Way, the Truth, and the Life,* Jesus Christ our Lord.

**The Real and Living Way* (Moffatt).